Chapter 6; Heinkel Haunted Skies; Attack on the West

THE GERMAN ATTACK on Norway added to the labours of Coastal Command in more ways than one. The number of reconnaissances over the Frisian Islands and the Heligoland Bight had also to be increased. Thus on 12th April a Hudson made a reconnaissance of Texel, Borkum and the other neighbouring islands, and thereafter more and more of these patrols were flown as this faster type of aircraft with its longer range took the place of the slower and shorter ranged Ansons.

In order to fulfill their task the Hudsons had soon to engage in combat; for the enemy was vigilant and active. An account of one of these duels must suffice. On 3rd May a Hudson was attacked near Borkum by three Me.109s. One of them was shot down by the rear gunner, who was killed almost immediately afterwards. His body jammed the turret, and the Hudson, defenceless from the rear, made off hotly pursued by the remaining Messerschmitts, who fired repeated bursts at it until their ammunition gave out. By this time the Hudson, which had gone down to within a few feet of the water, was riddled-242 bullet and 12 cannon-shell holes were counted when it landed-its pilot and navigator were wounded but the engines were untouched. The Messerschmitts flew for some time in- formation with it and rocked their wings in appreciation of the valour of its crew. Once free of the enemy the pilot showed signs of collapse. The automatic control was switched on and while the pilot was recovering the navigator and the wireless operator withdrew from the turret the dead air gunner and laid him on the floor of the aircraft. So they brought him home.

It was becoming increasingly obvious in the first days of May that something was in the wind. On the 7th of that month all telephone and telegraphic communications between Holland and the U.S.A. were suspended. A considerable amount of German shipping, including a cruiser, had been observed by Hudson patrols off the Frisian Islands. On the same day Beauforts on reconnaissance attacked the cruiser. Enemy destroyers were also observed plying busily along the Northwest coasts of Germany.

The 10th May did not therefore find the Command unprepared. Blenheims on reconnaissance early that morning reported eleven German aircraft crashed on the beach just South of the spot where the Amsterdam Canal joins the sea, and eleven Ju.88s on the aerodrome at The Hague, which was strewn with the abandoned parachutes of German paratroops.

The 12th May was full of incident. Three Blenheims fought eight Me.109s while giving cover to British destroyers engaged in landing marines at the Hook. Two of the Blenheims were lost, but the third accounted for two of the enemy. A little later three more Blenheims attacked about twenty-four Ju.88s and Heinkel Ills seeking to bomb an ammunition ship in Flushing Harbour. The battle, fought at heights which varied from 5,000 to 500 feet, lasted forty minutes. The ammunition ship remained unscathed. Finally, a Swordfish and four Beauforts bombed Waalhaven aerodrome and a fifth the football ground next door, the attack being repeated by Hudsons after nightfall.

The armada of little ships that evacuated our army from Dunkirk. The Hudson flying above them was one of the Coastal Command aircraft which made 327 sorties over this area in four days.

By that time "a great pall of smoke was drifting across blazing Rotterdam, and more fires had started at Dordrecht and the Hook." The water in the canals of The Hague gleamed livid in the light of burning oil tanks and in the brighter glare of the warehouses and buildings behind the neat, well-ordered quays. So the flame of war swept. over the Netherlands. The pilots of Coastal Command watched its fiery progress from Heinkel-haunted skies. They were flying and fighting over a scene of destruction and chaos. Harbours were filling with sunken ships, aerodromes and beaches with wrecked aircraft, roads with herded refugees. The enemy was everywhere. By the evening of 13th May the Dutch Air Force, which had fought with gallant fury since dawn on the l0th, was literally no more. Of its total strength of 248 aircraft there was left not one. On 15th May, at 11.0 a.m., Holland, overwhelmed, capitulated.

For Coastal Command the centre of interest was now shifted Southward. For five days it had fought over Holland and escorted ships moving to and from that country with troops and refugees.

The part played by Coastal Command in the Battle of France was shared by naval Swordfish, Albacores, Skuas and Rocs disembarked from carriers. The targets were enemy motorised columns engaged in the great drive which formed so important a role of those columns. On 24th May the slow-flying Swordfish twice attacked an enemy tank column on the road between Calais and Gravelines. They lost one of their number to heavy anti-aircraft fire from a nearby wood, but they destroyed three tanks and made five direct hits on the road.

Ansons of the Command were also very busy. They were on constant watch for enemy E-boats which, now that the Dutch ports were in the hands of the enemy, were seeking to run down into the Narrow Seas and prey upon our shipping. On 20th May they were in action against E-boats off Texel, and there was much activity during the next few days. On the 25th, for example, four miles off the Maas, an Anson blew an E-boat to pieces with an anti-submarine bomb, and two more were raked with machinegun fire. Altogether in the thirty-three days between 20th May, when the first E-boat was attacked, and 21st June, when France and Germany signed an Armistice, 17 attacks on E-boats were made by aircraft of the Command.

Me?,-awhile, at night Hudsons and Beauforts delivered a series of attacks on the oil tanks and plant at Rotterdam. On 20th May several tanks were hit and fired, the smoke of their burning rising to 7,000 feet, and by 31st May the Group to which these aircraft belonged was able to report : " It appears that all oil tanks are now destroyed." Another attack on oil targets may here be mentioned, though it took place somewhat later. On the 9th June, seven Beauforts, bombed the oil tanks at Ghent, causing huge fires. They came down to four hundred feet and added to the destruction by machine gunning those tanks not hit by bombs. "I saw Germans round the oil containers," said one of the navigators, " running about like confused hens. They were the first enemy I had seen. We used armour-piercing bullets followed by incendiary, and the tanks flared up like torches."

The activity of the Command can be judged by the number of patrols flown in daylight. Ninety-four of varying strength were carried out over Holland, Belgium and Northern France in the first twenty days of the battle. This number was to be exceeded not in the next twenty, but in the next seven days. From 30th May to 4th June 135 patrols were flown. On 30th May the evacuation of the British Army and the French Northern Army from Dunkirk was begun.

in this operation it was the part of Coastal Command to cover the area of the Narrow Seas while Fighter Command provided closer protection. Coastal Command gave to its orders the widest interpretation. Not only were German bombers and their escorts attacked, but also, where possible, German troops. It is not necessarily in the actual area where an operation by land and naval forces is in progress that the most effective air support can be given ; much can be done by attacking the oncoming armies of the enemy.

Thus, on 31st May, ten Albacores and nine Skuas, under the direction of Coastal Command, bombed pontoon bridges over the Nieuport Canal and piers on the foreshore. Direct hits were made. Going home, the Skuas, their ammunition exhausted, ran into twelve Me. 109s. Two Skuas were lost, but the remainder got away, for the Messerschmitts turned upon three Hudsons on patrol. -The Hudsons closed up into tight formation and went down low over the sea. There they fought out the battle, driving off their far swifter opponents and shooting down one of them with no loss to themselves. On the next day the same three Hudsons attacked about forty enemy aircraft near Dunkirk. They shot down, again without loss, two Ju.88s and one Ju.87 for certain and severely damaged four more.

One of three Ansons, after an action off Zeebrugge, landed in the sea short of petrol forty yards from a destroyer. The crew, confidently awaiting rescue, observed with some dismay a hundred or more naval ratings suddenly cast themselves from the destroyer's deck into the water. " We are sinking," shouted the pilot. " So are we," was the answer. The crews of both craft were rescued by another destroyer brought to the scene by another Anson.

On the last day of May and the first three days of June, when the evacuation operations were at their height, one Group of the Command made 327 sorties over or near Dunkirk. It must be remembered that this severe fighting was being conducted by General Reconnaissance pilots and crews with no specialised fighter training, flying aircraft neither designed for the purpose nor possessed of the great speed of their adversaries. It was found, however, that the British types, especially the Ansons, showed great powers of manoeuvre. Their pilots, by keeping in a tight turn in the direction of their faster flying enemy, were able not only to avoid his fire but also to bring their own to bear with good effect.

Aircraft of Coastal Command were able to help in the rescue of men in small boats or struggling in the sea. On 1st June escort vessels were guided to soldiers seen clinging to wreckage, and later on that day tugs were brought to two heavily-laden lifeboats, while enemy aircraft which appeared on the scene were driven off. On 5th June a motor-boat and dinghy with French troops on board were sighted and a French destroyer informed. It picked them up. A high-speed launch, five seaplane tenders and a pinnace, all belonging to the fleet of water-borne craft at the disposal of Coastal Command for the Air-Sea Rescue Service and for other purposes, also played a part. Their exploits are best described in the words of the official report :

" The seaplane tenders proceeded to Dunkirk under the command of a Pilot Officer at dawn on the 31st May, and were thereafter engaged on the very difficult task of ferrying soldiers from the beach to larger vessels lying off. Some 500 men were taken off; two tenders were lost in the process, but their crews were saved.... During this operation the crew of Seaplane Tender No. 276 showed great bravery and resource. After being bombed and machine-gunned and having the starboard engine throttle control carried away by a shot they carried on to Dunkirk, completed their task, and returned to Dover on one engine. During their voyage a gun-mounting was improvised out of a towing-bollard, an engine starting-handle, a tube and some rope. From this lash-up they were able to maintain a high rate of fire with their Lewis gun."

Air reconnaissance became of even greater value than before. It was indeed indispensable. A series of anti-invasion patrols wer - e instituted and these were. flown daily up and down the coast-line of the occupied countries.

On 13th June there was added to these patrols another series flown with the design to photograph everything in the ports and thus to discover hostile movements from which the probable intentions of the German High Command could be deduced. The aircraft which carried them out often flew as low as 500 feet in order to obtain clear and well-defined pictures. Both kinds of patrol very soon became offensive.

As the days went by Coastal Command bombed the enemy more and more frequently, making raids on Den Helder, ljmuiden, Willemsoord, Rotterdam, Calais, Boulogne, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Lorient. and other places in Holland, Belgium and France. The objectives were for the most part barges and docks. The places most often visited were Boulogne, which was bombed 21 times up to the end of October, and Cherbourg, which was bombed 24 times. The Command was especially active in September, its aircraft being over these and other enemy bases on all but three days of that month. These attacks were ail made to hinder the preparations for invasion. Bomber Command was at that time engaged on a similar task, but much of its strength was being used on targets farther afield, such as Hamburg, Bremen and other German ports, and also on the centres of Germany's war industries.

Nor were aerodromes in enemy occupation neglected. Coastal Command attacked them 41 times during the same period, the places bombed ranging from Aalborg in Denmark to Cherbourg in France.

Altogether from the opening of the German offensive Coastal Command delivered 251 attacks on land targets and barges in or near harbour. Their scale was not, however, formidable. It could not be, for the Command did not have the necessary strength in aircraft. But what was lacking in numbers was made up in skill and determination. It soon became the practice to allow our pilots, when they had completed a routine patrol, to attack selected targets if circumstances permitted. On 28th June, for example, the gas-works at Willemsoord were blown up by a single aircraft on its way back from a reconnaissance. This permission our pilots regarded as a privilege, and they availed themselves of it as often as they could.

From the end of the first week in August to the 31st October, 1940, Fighter Command was engaged with all its strength in the Battle of Britain. Those weeks were critical. Had that battle been lost, aircraft of Coastal Command patrolling off Norwegian fjords, off Danish and Dutch sandbanks and islands, off the grey shores of Belgium and the iron coast of Northern France might well have had to report that the German Armada was standing out to sea.