Chapter 5; The Fight for Norway

ON 8TH APRIL, 1940, at 2.0 o'clock in the afternoon, a Sunderland flying boat sighted a battleship of the " Scharnhorst " class accompanied by two cruisers of the " Leipzig " class and two destroyers. They were a hundred and thirty miles from the Alsboen Light off the West coast of Norway. The ships saw the Sunderland almost at the same moment, and opened anti-aircraft fire which was both heavy and accurate. The Sunderland was hit almost at once ; two of its tanks were holed and the hull gradually filled with petrol. When it landed at its base it had lost 300 gallons. That same day German destroyers had been seen at various times in the neighbourhood of the Horns Reef, steaming on a Northerly course. The German attack on Norway had begun.

Throughout the next day aircraft of Coastal Command were very busy reconnoitering the new area of battle. Before midday a London flying boat had reported the presence of a German cruiser of the "Kôln" class in Bergen. This intelligence was confirmed later by a Blenheim and a Wellington. A Sunderland reported one "Hipper" class cruiser in Trondhjern Fjord, and Wellingtons enemy warships and possibly transports at Kristiansand (South). The cruiser at Bergen was attacked that afternoon by Wellingtons, which dropped thirty armour-piercing 500-lb. bombs from between 4,000 and 6,000 feet. They were met by heavy fire, but thought that they had scored one direct hit on her stern. On the next day a Hudson reported that after a further attack by naval Skuas from the aircraft carrier H.M.S. "Furious" the cruiser had sunk.

On 12th April a Wellington, put at the service of Coastal by Bomber Command, flew from an aerodrome in Northern Scotland over a thousand miles of sea to the North of Norway. When it entered Narvik Fjord " huge rocks towered up on either side of us," reports the wireless operator. "Snow drifted down so that we could see only a few yards ahead. The gusts were terrific, bouncing and throwing us about. . . . By then we reckoned we were within about ten miles of Narvik, but we could not continue. Visibility was almost nil.... We went about and picked our way down the fjord again . . . like a boat hugging the shore. Suddenly we saw once more the open sea." They soon saw something else, a Ju.88 crossing their bows. " We began to circle each other, two heavy bombers waiting to pounce." Then the inevitable curtain of snow fell and they lost each other. Near Narvik the compass showed errors of between twenty and thirty degrees, but the Wellington set course for base and landed safely after a flight of fourteen and a half hours.

On the next day the Royal Navy entered the fjord and sank seven German destroyers. A second reconnaissance, made on 22nd April, also by a Wellington, covered 1,180 miles in eight and a half hours and photographed Trondheim. It saw, among much else of interest, twenty-two German aircraft on " a frozen lake," and its signal about this discovery was picked up by an aircraft carrier whose aircraft " bombed the lake with excellent effect."

By 14th April the German Air Force was in occupation of all the aerodromes in Norway and Denmark. The most suitable from which to launch air attacks on the Fleet in Scapa Flow or on other Scottish naval bases was that at Stavanger, where there was also a seaplane anchorage, It is not quite three hundred miles from the nearest point on our coast. The Germans began without delay to make the fullest use of it and for us it became an important target. Coastal Command bombed and machine-gunned it many times, beginning on 10th April. Here is the report contained in the official summary of a machine-gun attack by a long-range Blenheim. It is typical of many such.

" Reached Norwegian coast at 16.00 hours on 10th (April). At 16.04 entered the clouds after seeing five Messerschmitts taking off from Stavanger. At 16.10 observed 18 seaplanes (Bloem and Voss) in the harbour, also 20 Heinkels and 15 Messerschmitts. on the aerodrome. Two Heinkels and three Bloem and Voss seaplanes were raked with machinegun fire from a height of a hundred feet. One l1einkel was destroyed by an explosion and the other damaged. A Bowser pump was set on fire whilst filling a large bomber. 2,000 rounds in all were fired.

At 16.20 the Blenheim air , craft set course for Bergen, but failed to locate it. At 18.15 (on the way home) a Ju.88 was attacked in a position 135 miles from (North coast of Scotland) ; 500 rounds were fired, which put the port engine and rear gunner out of action, and it is doubtful whether the enemy aircraft could have reached its base. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered at Stavanger and our aircraft was hit by explosive bullets. Undercarriage partially collapsed on landing, rendering aircraft unserviceable. The pilot was slightly injured in the hand from splintered glass caused by enemy fire."

At dawn on 17th April the aerodrome was shelled by H.M.S. " Suffolk " ; a Hudson spotted for her and had to fight a Ju.88 over the target. Despite many attacks it was impossible with tile forces at our disposal to do more than make the aerodrome uncomfortable and dangerous to use. It could not be knocked out, and this was equally true of the other important aerodrome at Vaernes.

Though seizing every opportunity to attack, Coastal Command continued throughout April and May to play its main role, that of reconnaissance. Patrols were flown whenever possible up and down the coasts of Norway. Hudsons from Scotland had a particularly gruelling time. Their efforts were reinforced by those of long-range Blenheims which had begun to join the Command in small numbers. They were at that time the only aircraft which could be used as fighters over Norway with the exception of the naval Skuas which operated from aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy.

The Blenheims shared with the Hudsons the task of attacking an enemy air force greatly superior in numbers and possessed of bases in the area of combat. To reach this our own aircraft had to fly between 300 and 400 miles, and when the patrol was over they had to return over the same distance. This meant that the Blenheims had at most an hour at their disposal during which they could provide air cover to our naval units and, as the campaign developed, to our troops engaged in battle in the regions of Namsos and Aandalsnes. As was to be expected, they and the Hudsons met heavy opposition and combats were frequent.

The closing days of the month saw the withdrawal of the British forces from Namsos and Aandalsnes. These evacuations were carried out by the Royal Navy covered by naval aircraft and by Coastal Command. This entailed an increase in escort duties which put a considerable strain on its resources, for it must be borne in mind that the Norwegian campaign was not allowed to interfere with the normal routine of Coastal Command.

Though we had had to withdraw at Aandaisnes and Namsos, Allied troops still remained in the neighbourhood of Narvik, which was besieged and finally captured on 8th June. For the success of this operation it was necessary to construct aerodromes and set up a wireless station in the region of Bodo. A number of technical experts were needed and were brought there by two flying boats, the " Cabot " and the "Caribou", which had been taken off the Atlantic service of British Overseas Airways and lent for this purpose. There is little doubt that their presence very soon became known to the German Intelligence Service, who may have obtained the information from local quislings. The flying boats were both destroyed before they could be refuelled for the return journey.

Not all the efforts of the Royal Air Force or of the aircraft of the Royal Navy could prevent the enemy from winning the mastery of the Norwegian air. It was, indeed, physically impossible to prevent him. The numbers of aircraft at the disposal of both Services were too small ; the distance they had to fly too great. This was not altogether true of the naval aircraft, for the carriers from which most of them operated went in dangerously close so as to enable the Skuas to remain as long as possible over the areas in which fighting was taking place. But there were not nearly enough of them, and they were much slower than the Messerschmitt 109 and 110 at the lavish disposal of the enemy. Nevertheless their efforts and those of Coastal Command to strike the enemy did not cease with the withdrawal of the British and French troops.

On 10th June, two days after the evacuation of Narvik, a Blenheim, one of three on reconnaissance over Trondheim Fjord, sighted the " Scharnhorst " and two cruisers, one of which they thought might not be a cruiser but a pocket-battleship of the " Deutschland " class. The warships were back from their successful encounter with the " Glorious " two days before. It was decided to assault them where they lay at anchor near a supply ship, and twelve Hudsons carried out a pattern bombing attack from 15,000 feet. They dropped 36 250-lb. armour-piercing bombs, losing one of their number to anti-aircraft fire and another to an enemy fighter. The " Scharnhorst " was probably missed, but both the cruisers and the supply ship received direct hits. This was on 11 th June.

On the night of the 13th /14th naval aircraft took a hand. The " Ark Royal," escorted by the "Nelson" and other units of the Home Fleet, arrived at a position 170 miles off Trondheim. At midnight fifteen Skuas took off for the attack. Long-range Coastal Command Blenheims provided fighter cover over the objective, while Beauforts of the same Command -created a diversion by attacking the nearby aerodrome at Vaernes in order to prevent, if they could, German fighters from taking off to engage the Skuas. At that time of the year, and in that latitude, daylight is perpetual. It was not possible, therefore, to effect surprise. The enemy were prepared and waiting. The Skuas pressed their attack with the greatest determination. Eight of them more than half-were shot down, but two hits were scored on the " Scharnhorst."

Two days later a reconnaissance showed that she was still at Trondheim. On l6th and l7th June two attempts by Coastal Command were made to attack her, but clouds, lower than the hill-tops, obscured the harbour. 11 was not until 2 1st June that the " Scharnhorst " was again sighted. This time she was at sea eight miles West of the Utyoer lighthouse -steaming South at 25 knots, with an escort of destroyers. After an unsuccessful attempt by three Blenheims to find her, she was picked up at 2.45 in the afternoon by a Sunderland. The flying boat was at once attacked by heavy fire which endured for an hour. During this time its crew watched a torpedo attack by six naval Swordfish, of which one was shot down. Shortly afterwards they found themselves engaged with four Me.109s. Their captain was that same officer who had piloted the Sunderland which had fought six Ju.88s when protecting a convoy on 3rd April. The combat lasted about half an hour. All the Messerschmitts were hit and one fell in flames to the sea.

The Sunderland, which was slightly damaged, made off for its base shortly before the arrival soon after 4.30 p.m. of nine Coastal Command Beauforts. They belonged to a squadron which had been grounded because of trouble with their engines. On hearing that the " Scharnhorst " was at sea every pilot volunteered to take up his aircraft. They were allowed to make the attack. When they saw these Beauforts, it is probable that the Germans thought that, like the Swordfish, they were carrying torpedoes and that another torpedo attack was imminent. The destroyer escort was seen to deploy so as to intercept, if they could, the torpedoes launched against the capital ship.

The Beauforts, however, were loaded with armour-piercing bombs and, flying in a crescent formation, made a dive-bombing attack. At least three bombs hit the "Scharnhorst", one on its stern, another nearly amidships and the third forward on the port side. The B eauforts were forthwith attacked by Me.109s in number from 45 to 50. Three were shot down ; the rest got back to their base. There were no cases of engine failure. Hudsons, one of which was lost, renewed the attack, but encountered fierce opposition from an enemy now fully ready to meet them, for the warships were by then only 25 miles from Stavanger. In this action five aircraft were lost altogether, but the " Scharnhorst " had received sufficient damage to cause her to retire to a floating dock at Kiel. She remained out of action for the rest of the year and did not put to sea again until early in 1941.

The part played by Coastal Command in operations against her during 1941 will be set forth later. It is now time to go back to the early days of May and to move from the wild and solemn beauty of Norway, from gleaming fjords and sombre mountains where flying is at once a delight and a peril, southwards to placid, open lands.

On 10th May Germany invaded Holland, Belgium and Northern France.