|
After the crushing
repulses of two large-scale counter-attacks the Japanese commander
withdrew his forces and concentrated them in three main areas-Buka
Passage in the north, Numa Numa and Kieta in the east, and the
Buin-Mosigetta plains in the south.
The two American divisions were gradually withdrawn for operations in
the Philippines; and by the time the first of them-the 37th- had quitted
Bougainville the Australian campaign was under way.
When the Australians, under Lieutenant General S. G. Savige, Commander
of the Second Corps, assumed responsibility in November/December 1944,
the main Japanese force was known to be concentrated in the south. From
there the Japanese 17th Army Group controlled all enemy forces on
Bougainville and the outer islands.
With the relief of the Americans the campaign developed into three
separate drives, controlled and co-ordinated by Second Corps. In the
north it was planned that the enemy should be forced into the narrow
Bonis Peninsula and contained there. In the centre the seizure of Pearl
Ridge would give command of the east-west trails and protection against
any repetition of the vicious counter-attacks launched against the
Americans in March 1944. At the same time it would open the way for a
future drive to the east coast. The main decisive battle, however, would
occur in the south where the bulk of the Japanese force was located.
Under the command of General Savige were five Australian infantry
brigades-the 7th, 15th and 29th (comprising the Third Division) and the
11th and 23rd, the last named brigade being disposed as garrison troops
on the islands of Emirau, Green and Treasury and at Munda in New
Georgia. The Third Division was commanded by Major-General W.
Bridgeford. Air support came from the American First Marine Air Wing,
the R.A.A.F. and the R.N.Z.A.F.
The first
operational role undertaken by the Australians fell to the 2/8th Cavalry
Commando Squadron which took over the routine weekly patrol to
Cape Moltke on the 7th of November 1944. The first change of note came
on the 23rd of November when the 9th Battalion (under command of 7th
Brigade) took over from the Americans in the Doiabie area, some eight to
eleven miles inland along the Numa Numa trail.
This placed our troops in typical ridge country. The role of the
battalion was to exert continual pressure on the enemy and to make local
advances towards Pearl Ridge, the commanding high ground in the area.
Possession of this feature, with a force at Sisivie on the left flank,
would give the Australians control of the only inland approach to
Torokina.
Our force at Sisivie remained static except for the usual patrolling.
The advance to Pearl Ridge stemmed from the important Piaterapaia Ridge
which rose out of the Doiabie River valley. This was the logical point
for any for-ward movement as along it ran part of the Numa Numa trail
leading from Torokina to the enemy base at Numa Numa on the east coast.
It was on Piaterapaia that the 9th Battalion struck the first blow of
the Australian campaign. On the 29th of November a platoon of
"D" Company moved across the fifty yards between their
position on George Hill to attack the Japanese on the next knoll, Little
George. In an hour's sharp fighting they took the position.
This success was followed by another on the 18th of December when
"C" Company of the battalion, in a company attack, stormed the
important Artillery Ridge-the next high feature before Pearl Ridge.
The enemy was present in considerable strength. The once dense tree and
secondary growth had been blasted away over a long period by the
concentrated fire of American 155-mm, guns back in the Laruma River
valley. With the binding vegetation gone, the shelling started
landslides which made the already precarious slopes more difficult to
traverse.
The only line of approach was along a single track on either side of
which the ridge fell sheer away. The start line, where the ridge splayed
out, was reached without opposition owing to the effective neutralizing
fire of the artillery, mortars, and medium machine guns. As the ascent
proceeded, the support lifted. The loose soil on the slopes gave scant
foothold on the flanks and the attackers floundered and scrambled,
rather than climbed. Three Vickers on neighbouring ridges kept firing
until the last minute.
With the Australians only ten yards away the Japanese jumped from their
pillboxes to man open weapon pits running along the entire rim of the
knoll. Because of the steepness of the slope the attacking force could
not bring fire to bear; nor could the enemy to any extent, without
exposing themselves. The action quickly developed into a grenade battle.
A hall of grenades rained down as the two platoons clambered to the
summit. The attackers worked in twos and threes, with Owen guns and
grenades.
Selecting a weapon pit the Owen gunners heaved themselves over
the rim and poured in fire while the other men moved in and threw
grenades. It was intense, bitter fighting. The new phosphorus grenades
were used, their smoke blanketing the pillboxes while the infantry
closed in for the kill. After nearly an hour's fighting the position was
ours. Enemy killed during the attack numbered thirty-five; and about
twenty unburied and partly buried bodies were found. Our losses were
five killed and ten wounded.
The centre of interest
now shifted from the mountains to the southern sector. It was planned to
make an early advance from our forward positions at the Jaba River
against the main enemy concentrations in the south. But it
was necessary first to find out where the Japanese were located and in
what
strength they were. To do this it was decided to push down the coast
towards the enemy road-head at Mawaraka and at the same time extend
inland to test the enemy strength along the few existing tracks leading
to the south. Troops of the 15th Battalion (of 29th Brigade) had taken
over the Jaba
River line from the American division. On the northern bank of the river
they faced the enemy on the other side.
On the day following the Artillery Ridge attack the brigade commander
(Brigadier R. F. Monaghan) pushed his troops across the river without
opposition and made a landing from three barges some 4,000 yards down
the coast. It was the first move of the campaign proper. The coastal
drive to Mawaraka was on.
Towards the New Year our men began to meet well equipped infantry who
had evidently moved up from the south. The spearhead of our advance was
provided by the 15th Battalion with the 42nd and 47th Battalions pushing
inland to establish firm bases on the south bank of the Jaba.
The country there was flat, with thick jungle, swamps, and a multitude
of small streams criss-crossed by native pads. In the New Year the
characteristic Japanese tactics of infiltration, ambush and attack came
to the fore and the fighting began in earnest. Twenty-five-pounders came
in as support but the flat nature of the country prevented the setting
up of observation posts, and most of the shooting was done by forward
observation officers working with infantry patrols.
On the 7th of January the 61st Battalion (7th Brigade) relieved the 47th
Battalion on the Jaba so that it could take the lead in the brigade
advance. At the Adele River our troops came within range of enemy
artillery for the first time. On the 12th of January, preceded by an air
strike, the 47th Battalion seized the mouth of the Hupai River and a
log-crossing 800 yards inland. The brigade now began patrolling and
consolidating, and patrols pushed forward to a sunken barge a few
hundred yards north of Mawaraka.
The 42nd Battalion took over and by the
18th of the month reached the objective. Mawaraka was occupied without
opposition but heavy fighting took place before the enemy was cleared
from the Pallisade area along the road towards Mosigetta. The following
day the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion pushed round Gazelle Harbour,
turned Motupena Point, and overcame an enemy observation and listening
post. The door was open for the drive inland.
While the resistance in
the southern sector was increasing daily, although without sign of the
formation of any general defensive line, the Australians turned once
more to the inland sector about Doiabie. On the 3oth of December 1944,
all four rifle companies of the 25th Battalion 7th Brigade) which had
taken over from the 9th Battalion converged on Pearl Ridge, the focal
point. Two companies attacked from Artillery Ridge on the right flank,
one in the centre, and the fourth to the rear to sit astride the enemy
line of communication with Numa Numa.
Enemy fire pinned down the forward company advancing along Artillery
Ridge. The men dug in and reorganized. The following day the main attack
developed from the left and by mid-afternoon the enemy had been cleared.
Five days later the 11th Brigade (under Brigadier Stevenson) took over
the central and northern sectors and 26th Battalion took over the line.
With the fall of Mawaraka
the next step was to clear the way to the Puriata. The task 'fell to 7th
Brigade (under Brigadier J. Field) and on the 23rd of January the
29th Brigade was relieved. The first move was an inland thrust to secure
Mosigetta and drive the enemy from the area. On the 25th of January Twen
Force, comprising "C" and "D" Companies of 61st
Battalion, pushed inland along the Pagana River in the direction of
Kupon. Farther inland the commandos were denying the enemy the track
system running through Mosina, Nigitan, and Sisirual. The 9th Battalion
left Mawaraka next day and struck, east towards Mosigetta along the
south bank of the Hupai.
Within a fortnight 61st Battalion had penetrated Nigitan and Mosina, and
turned south towards the 9th Battalion objective. Seven days down the
track from Mosina saw the 61st poised near Mievo, a few hundred yards
north of Mosigetta. Meanwhile along the Mawaraka-Mosigetta Road the
going had not been easy for the 9th Battalion. Feeling a way through
jungle swamps often shoulder-deep, pinned down in the mud, sleeping in
water, and hampered by a supply line kept open only by the sweat of the
native carriers and by the tractor towed jeep trains, they broke into
Mosigetta on the 16th of the month, half an hour ahead of the force
moving down from Kupon.
On the 24th of
January, the 25th Battalion relieved the 47th on the Tavern River. The
same day a platoon from "D" Company landed at Motupena Point
and set off down the coast towards Toko. By the 3rd of February the
platoon had closed to within half a mile of Toko and established itself
on a lagoon. That day another platoon landed from a barge and the force,
carrying the sandbar at the point of the bayonet, swept into the area
which was to become the base for divisional operations in southern
Bougainville.
From Toko a reputedly "jeepable" track ran inland a few
hundred yards above the Puriata in the direction of Darara on the No. 1
Government Road to Buin. This road was a continuation of the track south
from Kupon through Mosigetta to Darara and on to the main Puriata ford.
An eastward move from Toko towards Darara would close the river
crossing, cutting the escape route of the enemy retreating before the
two battalions reorganizing at Mosigetta for the Daxara drive.
On the 10th of February "D" Company was ordered to take
Darara. At first the push was one of platoon strength; two others
remaining at Toko to assist unloading through the heavy surf. It was not
until the arrival of "A" Company and a platoon of the New
Guinea Infantry Battalion that the position improved and the whole
company got under way.
It was a nerve-racking job. Twice the force was ambushed and attacked,
and once while split into groups the enemy swept in between. All the way
the men had had to cut their own jeep track and on the 23rd of February
"A" Company pushed through and drove the enemy from Darara.
Patrols reached the Puriata and scaled the southern fords. The enemy
moved inland to escape across the northern fords, falling to the
commandos in twos and threes.
The way had been cleared for a shortened line of communication. Within a
fortnight 7th Brigade established headquarters at Toko.
More and more air dropping came to the fore. At Piva strip, Torokina,
the men of the Air Maintenance Platoon worked late into the night
stowing the para-packs and free-drop rations. To maintain the road
between Torokina and Toko engineers struggled against floods and a
pounding surf which gnawed away at the coastline, washing out the road
and breaking through the swamps.
With Toko-Darara in our hands Brigadier Field prepared to cross the
Puriata. On the 2 5th of February 9th Battalion was withdrawn .or a
well-earned rest at Motupena Point. From Mosigetta the 61st Battalion
fought its way south-east, crossed the Puriata, and by the 15th of March
was established in the Horinui region, threatening the approaches to No.
2 Government Road.
Early in January, 11th
Brigade in the northern sector established a base at Armin and
moved on towards Puto. The capture of Pearl Ridge in the central sector,
the appearance of bulldozers, and the progress of our supply road led
the enemy to expect an eastern drive to Numa Numa. Natives from
Teop on the enemy-held north-east coast reported the evacuation of
troops from the important for-them bases of Ratsua and Pora Pora down
the coast to Numa Numa. These reports and the fact that 11th Brigade had
reached Puto without opposition suggested that the enemy intended to
evacuate the north entirely. However, by the middle of the month, the
31/51st Battalion, between Puto and the Genga River, struck a hard crust
of Japanese resistance.
In a series of sharp
engagements the enemy was driven north on to Tsimba Ridge to the
Amphitheatre, a curved knoll where the mountains pushed the
coastal track into a narrow bottleneck against the sea. Here the ground,
rising some sixty feet, runs inland over two hundred yards to a feature
known as the Pimple. Before the ridge lay a native garden, behind was
swampland. The enemy had constructed 300 yards of defensive positions
with fire lanes covering every approach. Despite artillery
concentrations from guns of the 4th Field Regiment, the enemy delayed
our advance for three grim weeks.
On the 23rd of January
the Australians brought up a mountain gun and ripped away at the ridge.
The enemy replied by shelling our forward troops. The fighting was
intensified and two days later, after a wide flank move, we succeeded in
establishing a force on the northern bank of the Genga River. For nearly
two weeks this force held out in the face of repeated counter-attacks.
On the 6th of February, under an artillery barrage and vicious fire from
enemy guns, the Amphitheatre was forced and the way opened to Matchin
Bay.
In the last week of
February the 31/5Ist Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion, fresh
from the central sector, and the next day contact was resumed. By the
ist of March forward elements were on the Compton River. The primary
objective of the battalion was to clear the enemy from Soraken Peninsula
which protruded northward some two miles into Matchin Bay.
| Offshore islands
manoeuvre |
It was then seen that the
enemy intended to deny us a footing on the Bonis Peninsula. On the
3rd of March an urgent message from a Corsair pilot patrolling the
Ruri Bay area brought eight more planes roaring north from the Piva
strip. After fifteen months of concealment, Japanese medium tanks had
appeared! Heading across the Bonis Peninsula they were spotted on the
road to Soraken plantation. By accurate bombing with thousand-pounders
three tanks were destroyed and there were twenty enemy killed in &
strafing. In a matter of hours the tanks would have menaced our for-ward
troops. The second event of importance was the reported threat to our
flank by Japanese artillery directed from the offshore islands of Saposa
and Talof. Finally the enemy began to concentrate in the Pora Pora Hills
dominating the track from Soraken to Ratsua.
On the night of the 5th of March "A" Company of the 26th
Battalion embarked on the first of a series of amphibious operations
which were to culminate in the crushing of Japanese resistance on the
Soraken Peninsula. Troops went ashore on Saposa Island and within two
days it was cleared. On the 10th they withdrew, leaving behind an
infantry protected artillery observation post. The same night, farther
to the north, native police boys cleared the enemy from Taiof. The
threat to the flank disappeared.
In the meantime the
battalion attacking up the coast had squeezed the main force into the
defensive positions between the sea and where the Compton River turned
parallel to it. Under a withering fire "D" Company attacked
the centre, gained some ground and dug in. The 25-pounders of 4th Field
Regiment settled down to blast the enemy and on the night of the
16th/17th he fled the area. Meanwhile "A" Company again went
ashore unopposed, this time near the base of the plantation. The
following day contact was made with "C" Company which had
pushed in from the south. The Compton River was crossed and the enemy
line of communication cut.
| Counter-attack in
the south |
With supporting fire from
mortars and medium machine guns, "A" Company of the
25th Battalion breached the Puriata at Galvin's Crossing on
the 4th of March and established themselves two hundred yards south
along the main road to Buin. At noon the following day the enemy shelled
the area and the battalion suffered its first artillery casualty Pte
Slater, after whom the knoll was named.
For several days
"A" Company attempted to move down the road without success.
It was decided to send "B" and "C" Companies across
the river on the right flank to establish firm bases in gardens around
Old Tokinot. Such a move would cut the Buin Road in the rear of the
enemy and secure the Hatai track junction for a possible move up the
track to link with the 61st Battalion in the Horinui region. At the same
time, "A" Company would, within two days, clear the road and
contact the outflanking companies near the 'Junction. "B" and
"C" Companies crossed the river and gained their objectives on
the second day.
Experience at Tavera River, and along the track from Toko, had shown the
enemy policy to be comprised of sporadic small-party attacks, evacuation
under artillery pressure, and a general attitude of "a live soldier
is better than a dead one". With this in mind "A" Company
struck out for the Hatai track to receive the first indication that the
Japanese Sixth Division, under Major-General Kanda, had swung over to
the attack.
While in the north in the first two weeks of March the enemy was being
forced back on the Compton River, he seized the initiative in the south
and gathered momentum for the drive which culminated in the attacks of
Easter week.
North of Galvin's Crossing a patrol reported a four-days-old bivouac
area estimated to have held eighty enemy troops. A jeep was ambushed.
The enemy refused to budge under shelling. This had not happened before.
On the '5th of March "A" Company fought its way across Kero
Creek and with "D" Company In the rear held off three
counter-attacks and a fourth the following day. It was now apparent that
the road was solidly blocked. Though patrols from "B" Company
at Tokinot had reached "A" Company a permanent line of
communication could not be maintained. The time had come to make a
determined thrust down the road. "A" Company on the east and
"D" Company on the west were to move down the axis and contact
a force moving up from "B" Company. After fierce fighting
contact was made on the 19th. "A" Company went into a
perimeter defence and "B" Company, turning about, made back
for its firm base.
Within sight of the junction the force bumped into enemy of unknown
strength on the east of the road. The company commander went in to
attack. The force, in patrol formation, was without bayonets, but they
were borrowed from "D" Company platoons which were brought in
behind. The Japs were in a deep defensive position, crescent-shaped.
Attacking with bayonet, rifle, Bren and grenade, the first row was
cleared and the enemy was forced to retire from the second to the third
before halting the Australians.
It was then too late in the afternoon to
increase the scale of attack, and although skirmishing continued for the
next two days it was not until the 22nd of March, after an Auster pilot
had dropped an area sketch and the position had been plastered by
artillery and air, that "A" Company cleared the position. In
this attack Corporal (later Sergeant) Rattey won the Victoria Cross.
The following week the enemy began to reconnoitre all the approaches to
the Puriata. jeeps were ambushed. Rear echelons and a gun position were
raided. After diversionary attacks on our positions along the Puriata
the first blow fell on "B" Company of 25th Battalion, dug in
hard against Anderson's junction, the comer of the Buin Road and the
track to Hatai. The night before Good Friday booby-traps were exploded
about the "A" Company perimeter, some two hundred yards in the
rear. The next morning the water patrol south to Dawe Creek was fired on
and a patrol of twelve went out to investigate.
This patrol was still
away when the attack broke, and after several attempts to regain its
perimeter was eventually ordered to "A" Company. Thirty-one
remained in the "B" Company pits.
Towards the middle of the morning sixteen enemy approached up the Buin
Road. The first three were killed by the corner Bren-gunner. The
remainder jumped into old enemy pits on the south-west side of the road.
Half an hour later a shower of grenades poured in from both sides of the
junction. The enemy opened up with everything. There were four attacks
that morning; each one was pepped up in intensity. For the fourth the
enemy fixed bayonets and made an abortive banzai charge.
Reduced to twenty-eight and with ammunition low the defenders fell back
on the "A" Company perimeter with the enemy hard on their
heels. The Vickers stopped the rush and the men, piling into the
communication trenches began to dig in furiously. That afternoon the
enemy again staged four attacks but all were repulsed. At night the
Japanese set up the abandoned "B" Company mortars, and by
tapping our wires managed to range on "D" Company which they
plastered until morning. Night
attacks continued on the encircled companies whose combined strength
totalled eighty-three. Later estimates placed the attacking force at
550. All lines to battalion headquarters had been cut.
At 9 a.m. on Thursday and again on Good Friday advance tanks of
"B" Squadron 2/4th Armoured Regiment went ashore at Toko from
L.C.Ts. On Thursday night Brigadier Field ordered the tanks to the
Puriata. The following morning engineers of the 15th Field Company
closed the three-ton truck bridge at Combes Crossing to traffic, and by
2.30 p.m. had a "tankable" bridge across the ditch. The tanks
were delayed fifteen minutes.
But the Puriata had flooded and although
the level had fallen on Friday it was too high to ford the Matildas. The
crews got to work and in half the time prescribed had waterproofed their
vehicles. BY 4.45 p.m. they were ready to cross. The first tank bogged
and had to be abandoned. The other three crossed with the aid of a
bulldozer, and moved on to 25th Battalion behind Slater's Knoll.
Next morning the tanks, escorted by infantry, engineers, and a
bulldozer, set off for the invested companies. After surmounting all
kinds of heart-breaking difficulties the track began to improve and the
force pushed forward. In the perimeter the hard-pressed troops heard the
engines roaring above the firing. Churning down the road the Matildas
went in. Near the road the enemy broke, and sweeping into the open, were
mown down by the infantry. Moving closer in, the tanks' guns blew open
the fox-holes and flayed the area with automatic fire while the infantry
moved their wounded to the road.
Here the force split, one
tank escorting the wounded back towards Slater's Knoll, the others
advancing with "B" Company to its old position to recover the
heavy equipment. The force turned back and reached the other tank in
time to beat off an attack on the wounded at a point where, earlier that
afternoon, a jeep train had been ambushed. Too late to move farther, the
men sheltered in the gutter along the road with the tanks drawn into the
centre. The night passed quietly. The following day the weary companies
returned to settle about the knoll, "C" Company withdrawing
across the river from Old Tokinot to the Darara track.
The enemy had shown
his hand. Barbed wire was rushed from Toko and a further supply
air-dropped. Above battalion headquarters "B" Company set
about digging in on the knoll. Down the west bank to the south
"D" Company went into the perimeter with "A". They
did not have long to wait. At 5 a.m. on the 5th of April the Japs struck
in force. Slater's Knoll, split left of centre by the Buin Road, is hard
against the west bank of the Puriata bend. Approaching from the south,
or enemy side, the terrain descends to a
gully and rises quickly some thirty feet to a plateau approximately the
size of two tennis courts. At the rear of the knoll the country drops
abruptly to almost water-level; here battalion headquarters was
established.
Striking in from the west a diversionary
force hit battalion headquarters behind the knoll. It was quickly hurled
back as the main attack developed. For an hour and twenty minutes the
enemy swept up in waves. Forcing the centre, he came within four yards
of the forward pits. The company held firm. The troops, determined not
to let the enemy come any closer, fired standing upright in their pits.
A small party attempting to cross the river were shot climbing the bank.
Twenty-five-pounders joined in and by first light the sting had gone
from the assault. The enemy, pinned down along the wire, could be hear4
digging in the gully. An enemy mortar opened close in, to be silenced by
a Pita. All morning mortar bombs and grenades crossed and criss-crossed
the wire. Sporadic attacks were broken up and the wounded were cleared
away.
Below at headquarters the enemy had long broken contact. A little after
midday two Matildas moved through the cutting and the men of
"B" Company came out to mop up. Small enemy parties broke
cover and were cut down. Enemy dead lay in heaps along the wire; they
were found in an area two hundred yards square. The Puriata line was
held.
Farther inland after wide
patrolling, the 9th Battalion (which had relieved 61st Battalion in the
Horinui area) moved towards Rumiki and by the 27th of April was
established on the next water barrier, the Hongorai, near the northern
ford.
After four months of fighting the weary 7th Brigade was relieved, and
from the 13th of April the 15th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier
H. H. Hammer, was set the task of clearing to the Hari.
The initial step was to secure Anderson's junction. With Matildas in
support the 24th Battalion pushed down the road to Dawe Creek, and by
the 17th of May the junction was in our hands. The advance moved on
towards Shindou River and the 58/59th Battalion sent patrols along the
Hatai track to contact 9th Battalion in the Rumiki area.
Fresh to the island, the 2/11th Field Regiment came in with
"U" Heavy Battery to strengthen the artillery support already
being given by the 2nd Field Regiment. The 24th Battalion then began a
series of tank-supported company leaps down the Buin Road and by the 7th
of May was established on the west bank of the Hongorai River at the
Buin Road ford. The advance was forced against positions which had to be
blasted by artillery, tanks and Corsairs of the R.N.Z.A.F. Enemy 75-mm-
guns appeared as anti-tank weapons, usually manned by suicide crews.
Land mines, booby-traps and shells buried nose-uppermost were also
planted along the tracks. When these proved ineffective an unsuccessful
banzai attack was made on "D" Company of the 24th Battalion.
Meanwhile in the Rumiki area 57/60th Battalion had relieved the 9th
Battalion and was deploying west of the Hongorai on the axis of Commando
Road. All battalions had been most active in their patrols and the area
between Commando Road in the north and for several miles south of the
Bum Road had been made untenable by the enemy. Thus he was forced to
concentrate his troops along the two main tracks. This was greatly to
our advantage for they now became excellent targets for our planes and
artillery.
Towards the end of May the 15th Brigade prepared to strike for the Hari
River down the axis of the Buin Road and down Commando Road
simultaneously.
The Jap had every
intention of holding the Hari, but threatened with a bold wide out
flanking movement on the northern axis by 57/6oth Battalion,
continually battered by our artillery and planes, and unbalanced by a
series of outflanking moves along the main road, by the 24th and 58/59th
Battalions, his defences collapsed and a spectacular advance took our
forces across the Hari to the Ogorata to within striking distance of the
Mobiai.
On the 13th of May a company from the 24th Battalion crossed to the east
bank of the Hongorai and dug in near the ford. The 15th Brigade decided
to hold the enemy at the ford and create a diversion north of the
junction of the Hongorai and Pororei rivers while at the same time the
24th and 58/59th Battalions were to cross the river south of the Buin
Road and attempt to come in behind the main enemy defences which
dominated the ford. Meanwhile, the 57/60th Battalion would continue the
advance down Commando Road and link up with the battalions advancing
along the Bum Road.
| Strong enemy
resistance encountered |
On the 17th of May the
57/60th Battalion began its advance after an air attack by thirty-two
aircraft and preceded by successive artillery concentrations. After some
resistance the enemy withdrew to the south.
The for-ward company settled down and the rear advanced through it to
Huda River. Another force, completing a wide outflanking move, came in
from the north to attack a strong position astride the road about half a
mile south-cast of the Huda. The enemy resisted fiercely and the
position was occupied only after a fierce fight. A third force moving to
cut the line of retreat broke through to the Torobiru, completing an
advance of 3700 yards in one day. Two days later, the battalion,
entrenched along the river, threw out a company to within 500 yards of
the Uso-Oso junction and Winchester junction. Another patrol moving back
cleared Tiger track to the Hongorai.
In the meantime, on the Buin Road, the company Of 24th Battalion across
the Hongorai on the main road was confronted with a strong force dug in
on Egan's Ridge. Against the ridge Corsairs of the R.N.Z.A.F. mounted an
eight-day attack which Put 381 aircraft over the area. The enemy was led
to expect a frontal assault down t6 road and an outflanking move to the
north via Martin's crossing but under cover of the intense air and
artillery attacks on Egan's Ridge a bulldozer cleared a secret track to
Mayberry's crossing south of the river Junction.
The enemy failed to
discover the presence of the track, the noise of the dozer working being
covered by the air and artillery bombardments. On the 20th the 24th
Battalion with a troop of tanks crossed the river north of Mayberry's
crossing and advanced north-east to cut the Buin Road on either side of
the Pororei ford.
Next day the 58/59th
Battalion with two troops of tanks crossed the river at Mayberry's
crossing, and, advancing over difficult country against determined
opposition, reached Aitara track to cut the road on the enemy side of
the Pororei. "B" Company settled down at the Aitara junction
and an armoured force moved back along the Buin Road to contact
"A" Company Of 24th Battalion at the Pororei ford. En route
the point tank opened up on the enemy position and when the infantry
went in they found a 75-mm- gun sighted in the direction of Egan's
Ridge.
The enemy had been taken in the rear. In the meantime, another
armoured force in the 24th Battalion area cleared back towards the
Hongorai and after a preliminary bombardment "C" Company,
which had crossed at the ford, moved up to the ridge. In a two-days'
sweep the Hongorai and Pororei had been crossed, the track cleared to
Rusei and the southern end of Hammer Road secured.
| Northern and
southern forces link up |
In the north the 57/60th
Battalion had cleared the Uso-Oso track junction and the lateral
link was opened when patrols from 24th and 58/59th
Battalions contacted 57/6oth
Battalion near Winchester junction. The opening of this lateral link
increased the effectiveness of the force pushing along the Commando
Road. Medical evacuation was reduced by eight hours and it was now
possible to supply the 57/6oth Battalion from the main artery. Further,
it enabled tanks to move up in support for the drive on the Tai Tai
gardens.
Around Tai Tai the Japanese had some 3,000 acres under cultivation. On
the 2nd of June the 57/6oth Battalion took the first step in its
capture. Employing the same tactics of direct approach and flank attack
the force swept down on the Tai Tai track junction and on the 10th of
June came out below Amio.
On the Buin Road the 58/59th was jabbing for the Mamagota Junction.
Subject to daily attacks and a host of obstacles including mines,
booby-traps, tank ditches, and rough terrain, the troops gained a
position west of the Tomoi. For the first time in the campaign the
bridge-laying Scissors tank was employed. On the 3rd of June the Tomoi
was crossed and the battalion moved to within i 5oo yards of Mamagota
junction. Two days later it was in our hands, and by the end of the week
the northern and southern forces had made contact. The brigade poised
before the Hari.
| The Hari-0gorata
crossing |
With prisoners reporting
1500 Japanese dug in east of the Hari, supporting arms began plastering
known positions. As at the Hongorai River another encircling move
was planned with a frontal assault along the road by 58/59th Battalion.
From the north the 57/60th was to go through the jungle to the east and
south in a wide arc to cut the enemy's line of retreat on the east of
the Ogorata River near Rusei. Farther still to the north, an armoured
patrol known as Scott Force was to thrust along Commando Road in the
direction of Kingori as north flank protection.
The frontal assault met tenacious resistance from
strong enemy rearguards and the advance was halted. "A"
Company, after clearing many mines and booby-traps, crossed the Peperu,
but struck the enemy on an escarpment and came under heavy fire. A
dozer, trying to clear a path, might have had to be abandoned if it were
not for the covering artillery support during which a tank retrieved it.
Towards dusk the company pushed up and occupied the ridge temporarily
evacuated by the enemy. Both "B" and "D" Companies
struck trouble. Although "B" Company broke through on the
following day to the main Hari ford no further progress could be made.
So, on the 7th of June the 58/59th Battalion was occupying the west bank
of the Hari river from the ford northwards to Hari No. 3, and was
opposed by the enemy in strong positions along the east bank.
The companies settled down to patrolling and a new
plan was evolved. This aimed at pushing Pike Force ("A" and
"C" Companies) across the river near Pepib with the object of
descending on the road at Hari No. 1. "B" Company would then
move through and open the road. Finally "D" Company, with
tanks, would cut the axis between Pike Force and the ford. The attack
fell as planned. The fords were subjected to bombardment from artillery,
mortars and planes, while tank diversionaries with 24th Battalion were
sent south across the river-a move calculated to delude the enemy into
thinking that the Hongorai crossing was about to be repeated. Pike Force
cut the road without sighting a single enemy. "D" Company
forced the steep bank at Hari No. 3, and, cutting the road, moved back
to trap the enemy at the main ford. "B" Company crossed the
river, linked with "D" and the battalion moved through to
consolidate on the Ogorata. The entire operation lasted three days. The
Hari had been crossed.
Simultaneously in the north 57/6oth Battalion cut a path through
unmapped territory east towards the Ogorata. At 8 a.m. on the second day
the force struck Barret's track and a two-hour fight with the enemy
ensued. Troops were deployed to hold the lateral tracks and while the
fighting was hottest the main body crossed into the jungle on the far
side, moved 5oo yards farther east and wheeled to the south. Farther to
the north Scott Force had been ordered to slow down in order not to warn
the enemy of the move. The force turned down Barret's track with orders
to find the 57/60th communication wires and rejoin.
Brushes with the enemy continued and on the night of the 13th of June
the weary battalion settled down to sleep in the water, the ground being
too boggy for digging in. In thirteen days the force had moved 13,000
yards, and the next day the road was cut without opposition cast of
Rusei.
By the 16th of June the
two battalions had linked on the road, with the 24th Battalion
moving up in rear. Stores the came down the road and the 57/60th,
supported by tanks and 2/11th Field Regiment, prepared to thrust for the
Mobiai.
Late in the afternoon "B" Company set off. Four hundred yards
from the start point the leading tank, tracking round a corner, received
three direct hits from a 150-mm. gun. The enemy then began shelling the
road. The company reorganized and struck at the high ground on the left,
only to be forced back. All night artillery and mortars pounded the
defences across the depression. Next day the bulldozer broke down, and
while it was being repaired patrols combed the area. A two company right
flank encirclement got under way after the usual air bombardment.
Without much opposition it cut the road behind the defence position. The
following day the advance continued under heavy enemy mortar fire. On
the 23rd of June "A" Company of the 57/6oth dug in on the
Mobiai.
Meanwhile, far to the
north above Musakaka, and near the commandos at Morokia- Mori, a
self-contained force known as Atkinson Force had been patrolling
across the Mobiai and Mivo. Operating since the 7th of June, in country
thick with enemy, the force continued to supply valuable information of
enemy movement on the outer flank. "C" Company of the 24th
Battalion (Grahame Force) was five days late relieving them, due to
continual enemy attacks. In the last prolonged attack "C"
Company, down to its last grenades, was ready to retire when the
"sky train" came over and dropped ammunition into the
perimeter.
|
