The Battles at Suvla Bay: from The Story of The Anzacs

He had become aware of the large reinforcements which we had received, and had realised that, with these, our warfare would be no longer restricted to desperate and costly frontal attacks, but would be able to comprise turning operations extending over a wide and unrestricted area. By the massing of his heavy reinforcements upon Battleship Hill he showed that he was nervous as to what we were doing, but the event appeared to indicate that he had hardly expected our blow at SuvIa.

The troops which he had allotted for the defence of this position were said to be only 4,000, with no heavy artillery at their back. It was also certain that the enemy had not attempted to defend Suvla with the deadly thoroughness that had played such havoc with our landing at Helles. There were only a few scattered trenches around the hill, Lala Baba, which commands the centre of the Bay. Further back, another eminence known as Hill 10 had indeed been fortified, but not in such a way as to suggest any immediate expectation of attack. 

More important still, from our point of view, was the fact that the deadly barbed wire entanglements which had caused such mortality among our troops in the water and on the beach at Helles, were entirely absent here. It is certain that if the Turks had really been nervous of an attack at this point they would have used the protection which had already stood them in such good stead.

Our Intelligence Department had reliable information regarding their strength and positions, and everything looked promising for a surprise attack which should succeed in carrying the outlying heights known as Yilghin Burnu ("Chocolate Hill') and Ismail Oglu Hill. If these could once be seized, it was hoped that the troops could press on across the two Anafarta defiles to the north-east of Sari Bair, could seize the heights commanding these ravines, and thus distract the Turks from the main Anzac attack, and could link up their right wing with the Anzac left; were this done, the whole ridge would be permanently in our hands, the Turkish Army would be completely defeated and demoralised, and the prize at which the whole expedition had been directed would be at once ours.

The greater part of the 9th Army Corps was concentrated at Imbros, and it was arranged that the 11th Division should land first. Disembarkation was timed for 10-30 p.m-, thus synchronising exactly with the fierce operations that had been set going at Anzac. It would have been impossible to do anything earlier than this hour, since it was especially important that the Suvla landing, on account of its unexpectedness, should take place at a moment when the enemy was heavily engaged in all the other zones of action.

The 11th Division were embarked upon destroyers, and when they neared the land, they were transferred to a type of craft which had not heretofore been used in any of the landing operations; this was the motor lighter, which was at once a speedier and a safer mode of conveyance than the open row-boats in which the men had been put ashore at Anzac and Helles. Each of these boats carried 500 men, together with ammunition and water. Elaborate arrangements were also made for the rescue and protection of any lighter which should become damaged on its way to the beach, and ketches and transport life-boats lay in waiting in case of accident. Two cruisers, moreover, H.M.S. "Endymion" and H.M.S. "Theseus," carried 1,000 men apiece in shore to where the lighters were waiting for their living freight. 

The official narrative also mentions "the sloop 'Aster' with 500 men, towing a lighter containing 8 Mountain Guns; 3 ketches towing horse-boats containing 8 18-pounder guns and 76 horses; water-lighters towed by a tank steamer, and a specially fitted-out steamer, the 'Prah,' with stores (shown by our experience of 25th April to be most necessary), i.e., water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs."

It has been shown that at Sari Bair the shortage of water was a contributory cause of our failure to secure complete victory. It is impossible for those who have always lived in a temperate climate and taken their water supply as a matter of course to imagine the thirst of men fighting day after day under a broiling sun with dust and bush fire to add to their drouth and misery. There were few men throughout the Gallipoli Campaign who had not had to undergo this ordeal; but at Suvla, as has been shown, preparations were taken which, so it was hoped, might save the men from any such suffering. 

It was thought that the Suvla plains and the ravines leading up to the Anafarta ridges would provide springs sufficient to relieve our men; but Sir Ian Hamilton states that he did not trust to this source alone, but collected from the War Office, India, and Egypt, receptacles of a strange and motley order, sufficient to hold 100,000 gallons. It will be remembered, too, that a 30,000 gallon tank had already been secretly constructed at Anzac. The elaborateness of the preparations against thirst, and the magnitude and detail of the transport service, may be gauged from the fact that 3,700 mules and 1,750 water carts were provided for the supply of the Anzac and Suvla Expeditions.

Suvla Bay, otherwise known as Little Anafarta Bay, is 1¾ miles in width. Its southern point, Cape Nibrunesi, is about four miles distant from Anzac. On the north it is bounded by Cape Suvla. The two Capes are narrow spits of sand, and a narrow stretch, or nek, of sand separates the Bay from a curious Salt Lake which is a bog in winter, but is partly dried up in summer time. On the other side of the Lake, the land is level for a considerable stretch, but gradually rises to the foot-hills on which lie the two villages of Kuchuk (little) and Biyuk (big) Anafarta. The distance from the edge of the Salt Lake to the Anafarta villages is a little over 4,000 yards. On the south-east, the hills fall back, so that there is a steep ravine between the Anafarta position and the main height of Koja Chemen. The foothills run up on the east into a higher ridge, which forms a continuation of this coveted summit.

The landing was effected on three beaches. B and C Beaches were respectively to the north and the south of Cape Nibrunesi; A Beach was on the southern side of Cape Suvla; it lay well within the Bay, and the water adjoining it was shallow. Sir Ian Hamilton tells us that it had been his wish that the whole force should land at Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the wishes of the Corps Commander he agreed, to his subsequent regret, to the landing at A Beach. The 32nd and 33rd Brigades were destined for B and C Beaches and the 34th for A Beach. The event showed that the Turks had been taken completely by surprise. 

The landing at B and C Beaches met with no kind of opposition; but at A Beach the enemy recovered quickly enough to put considerable difficulties in our way. It has been shown that this position is dominated by the entrenched knoll of Lala Baba, and from here a steady fire was poured both upon the lighters and the beach. In addition, it was found that those who had chosen this spot had not allowed for the shallowness of the water; several of the lighters grounded a fair way out from shore, and in some cases the men had to wade in here through over 4 feet of water. Sir Ian Hamilton reports that the enemy, "knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very dark night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our fighting line and its supports."

The 34th Brigade, therefore, had a certain difficulty in making good, but its progress was greatly helped by the 9th West Yorkshires and the 6th Yorkshire Regiment of the 32nd Brigade, which, after landing at B Beach on the southern spit, worked across the nek, storming on their wav the Lala Baba position, and joined up with the 34th Brigade. Our troops now held the two sandy spits to the north and south of the Bay, together with the nek itself. Their next objective was to drive the Turks backwards along the sandy hillocks known as the Karakal Dagh running along the beach to the northeast into the district known at Kiritch Tepe Sirt. 

Once this was done, our left flank would be saved, and we would be able to wheel round and draw up our line in front of the Salt Lake, whence it should be easy for us to deliver our attack upon our main objective, while our right, if we could extend it sufficiently, would be protected by the Australian left now operating against Sari Bair. In pursuit of this objective the Manchester Regiment of the 34th Brigade assumed the offensive on the left, driving the enemy for a great distance north along the sea-coast.

While they were doing this the dawn broke and the enemy began to direct their artillery upon our whole position. It has been shown that at this period they had not many guns at this position, but those they had were sufficient to create serious gaps in our ranks. Yet the Lancashires pushed forward with the greatest pluck and spirit, and it was not the fault of the men that they did not make even greater progress than they actually achieved. Here was manifested the first sign of that regrettable failure of leadership which blasted the success of the entire Suvla operation. "No one seems to have been present," says Sir Ian Hamilton, "who could take hold of the two brigades, the 32nd and 34th, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack." 

Encouraged by this sign of wavering, the Turks counter-attacked, but were met and routed with the bayonet by the 9th, Lancashire Fusiliers and the 11th Manchester Regiment. These troops were opposite to Hill 10, which lies to the north-east of the Salt Lake, when two most regrettable incidents occurred. In the first place, our own troops appeared to have been shelled by our own artillery; and in the second, heavy bush fires broke out among the gorse, and burnt intermittently in various areas of the operation throughout the next few days. 

Many of our soldiers showed the very greatest pluck in facing this ordeal, and although as the hours wore on, the heat and thirst became barely tolerable, they met the Turks repeatedly among the flames and smoke, and drove them back to death or safety through the fiery zone.

This having been done, the 34th Division now wheeled round to the right, and joined up in front of the Salt Lake with the troops which had been advancing into position from the south. At this period, substantial reinforcements arrived in the shape of six battalions of the 10th Division under Brigadier-General Hill, from Mitylene, together with fresh supplies of artillery. This force arrived at the most timely moment, and its transportation from an island 120 miles distant from its objective was carried out by the Royal Navy in a fashion officially described as "masterly." 

There~ seems to have been, however, a fresh misunderstanding with reference to the exact landing places of these troops. General Stopford had apparently asked that they should be sent straight
to A Beach to support the left flank of the 34th Brigade; the Naval Authorities, however, apparently deterred by their previous experience of the shallow water off Beach A, insisted, according to General Stopford, in setting them ashore at Beach C, which decision made it much more difficult and dangerous for them to advance to the required position.

It may here be mentioned that the Australian Naval bridging train had been landed with the British Forces. Our offer of it had been accepted by the War Office, and it was en route for a destination, which it believed to be England, but on arriving at Port Said it received orders to proceed else-where, and eventually found itself at Suvla on the evening of August 6th. It took part in all the engineering operations on the beach, constructed a jetty and pier near the site of the A landing, and subsequently erected a solid pontoon pier, from which the wounded could be transferred to rafts,
en route for the hospital ships.

The part of the bay where the Bridging Train detachment was stationed has been given a name truly Australian, viz., "Kangaroo Beach." Further reinforcements arrived later in the day under Lieutenant-
General Sir B. Mahon. The 34th and 32nd Brigades of the 11th Division, and the 31st Brigade of the 10th, now formed a continuous line facing the Anafarta ridges and ready for attack. Its immediate objective consisted of the hills intervening between the Suvla Plain and the Australian left at Abdul Rahman Bair. 

The nearest of these was Yilghin Burnu, known to our men as Chocolate Hill owing to its surface having been burnt that color by bush fires caused by our bursting shells. This was captured by General Hammersley on the evening of the 7th, but the General was not able to make good the Hill of Ismail Oglu Tepe, which would have given us the means of linking up with the men of Sari Bair, and would have opened up a fair chance of our carrying the whole position. On the left, Sir Bryan Mahon had greater success in a drive which he delivered at Kiritch Tepe Sirt. This gave further protection to our left flank ; yet it was on the right rather than the left that a speedy advance was vitally important; and it was on the right that the element of speed was most woefully lacking.

And now the arrangements which had been so elaborately made for watering the troops began to fail. Hitherto nothing had been lacking in the organisation of our water supply, but the bad luck which dogged this operation from the beginning once more came into play, and was aggravated by a good deal of mismanagement. The distribution from the lighters was faulty and fitful; in some cases, we are told, "the hose had been pierced by individuals wishing to fill their own bottles; in others, lighters had grounded so far from the beach that men swam out to fill batches of water bottles. "

Furthermore, the natural resources of the terrain were not developed by those in charge of the operations, and as a result the troops began to suffer terribly. This may have formed a partial excuse for our failure to advance on that momentous day, the 8th August. It is not too much to say that within the twenty-four hours which followed its dawning lay the whole fate of the Gallipoli Expedition.

The Suvla Army during the whole of the 7th had been very lightly opposed, and had suffered comparatively little from artillery fire. On the evening of that day, such enemy guns as were available had been withdrawn to a new position, and during the 8th, hardly a shell fell within our lines. Everything was to be gained by advancing, everything was to be lost by delay. An aerial and naval reconnaissance showed that the Turks were thoroughly aware of their danger and were hurrying up their reserves from Battleship Hill across the Anafarta ridge. 

Shortly they would hold the hill tops in such strength as to make their storming a matter of the utmost difficulty and peril; yet no substantial advance was made on our part during these "priceless daylight hours." It is true that the troops were weary and waterless; but so had been the men who stormed the heights of Chunuk and fought the great Battle of the Four Days at Sari Bair against overwhelming forces and without reinforcements. It is also true that the troops engaged at Suvla were new and untried, and to this fact may be in some measure attributed their failure to make good.

Yet the Suvla Army, or many of its units, fought heroically when heroically led, and it seems that we must look elsewhere for the main cause of failure. This was due, as Sir Ian Hamilton reports, primarily to inertia, and the inertia was primarily that of the men in high command. They had now sufficient artillery to back them; three batteries were already ashore on the 7th, -and the great guns of the Fleet were only waiting to thunder out their broadsides. There were practically no entrenched positions to be taken; a considerable part of the country in front of the troops was flat and sparsely held; yet no advance was made.

And here we may pause to deal with the responsibility of Sir Ian Hamilton in this affair. Much criticism has been levelled at him for his failure to be present at Suvla immediately after the Landing. It is said that if he had proceeded thither from Imbros, and ordered a general advance, he could have changed the fortune of the day, and it is claimed that his absence was unaccountable and unpardonable. It would be more to the point, however, to maintain that his presence at Suvla on the 7th would have been unaccountable and inexcusable according to any recognised military canon or standard. It must be remembered that simultaneously with the Suvla landing and fighting, there were raging three other great battles in different areas of the Peninsula. 

It may fairly be claimed that every one of these was more critical than the Suvla affair. At Helles, as has been shown, the Turks had been massing for a huge counter attack against our lines and had rushed up heavy reinforcements to this area. At Lone Pine we did -indeed take the enemy's stronghold at the first assault; but for several days afterwards the position was in peril; line after line of Turkish attackers was being hurled against our troops, and should our line here once break, the whole position at Anzac would be critical. The description of the Sari Bair Expedition must have made it evident that this operation, too, was of the most critical nature. 

The broken and intricate nature of the country, and the fact that the Turks were known to have strong reinforcements readily available for its defence, made it imperative that this operation should be closely watched from Headquarters. On the other hand, the Suvla Expedition seemed the easiest of the four; the landing had been effected with comparatively small loss, the element of surprise had been almost complete, and it was known that there was only a very small number of Turks between our Army and its objective.

The Island of Imbros, with its harbour of Kephalos, was the only base from which the Commander in Chief could watch all four battles simultaneously. It was 45 minutes distance from Helles, 40 minutes from Anzac, and 50 minutes from Suvla. By leaving it for any one of the separate areas of action, Sir Ian Hamilton would have forfeited cable communication with the remaining areas, and would have been powerless to supervise their operations during the crises which might, at any moment, have arisen in any one of them. It is difficult to understand how he could possibly have been expected to direct personally the landing at Suvla or to be present during the fighting which immediately followed it. 

All, at first, seemed to be going well, and very shortly after he had realised that all was not going well, i.e., on the afternoon of August 8th, Sir Ian Hamilton did leave Imbros for Suvla to find out the cause of the delay. When he arrived, he was informed by General Stopford that a general attack was in preparation for the dawn of the 9th; it also became apparent, that, apart from a few trifling operations, the whole of the 8th had been lost.

Sir Ian Hamilton's efforts were now bent on making up at once for lost time. One factor that had at first held up the troops had now been removed, for they had had plenty of water and food, and had also enjoyed a good rest. Sir Ian Hamilton, therefore, urged  Major-General Hammersley  commanding the 11th Division to attack at once with his thirteen battalions; but he replied that it was impossible to advance that night, as the troops were scattered, and orders would not reach them in time; he admitted, however, that the 32nd Brigade was near at hand, and ready to move; and Sir Ian Hamilton consequently gave orders that these four battalions should advance at once. Yet here again there was mysterious delay, for the Brigade did not commence its advance till 4 a.m. of the next morning (the 9th). 

When it did move forward, the 8th East York Pioneer Battalion reached the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir; but it found the surrounding positions so strongly held that it had to fall back on the remainder of the Brigade, which had been beaten back almost to its original position after a brief advance. The Pioneer Battalion suffered very heavily in this operation, the first company being practically destroyed, and the whole force being reduced to 9 officers and 35O men. Sir Ian Hamilton, however, draws the inference that this battalion's initial success shows that if the complete Division had been thrown forward on the evening of the 8th, or even on the early morning of the 9th, it must have made good the heights fronting the whole position.

On the next morning it was realised that the golden opportunity had been lost. The Turkish artillery had now teen moved back into position, and was shelling our lines heavily; shrapnel and shell were bursting all over our position, which was opposed by heavy enemy forces on the rear and both flanks. In addition, the bush fires had now become very fierce; smoke and flame swept across a great part of our front, forcing the infantry to fall back from their advanced positions, but also forcing the Turkish snipers headlong out of the scrub whence they had been thinning out our ranks. 

In some parts of our position it became impossible to attack, but the 33rd Brigade made a most spirited assault upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, which it actually took, and would probably have held, if it had not been for the unexpected and most disconcerting failure of our troops in the centre. Here for the time being, the whole line gave way : but it rallied, and the next morning was ready for a fresh attack. It must te mentioned that in this operation the Herefordshire Battalion of the 53rd Division attacked with great valor on the extreme right of the Suvla line. 

This attack almost brought us into contact with the Australian left at Azma Dere. It should be mentioned that this 53rd Division comprised the whole of Sir Ian Hamilton's General Reserve, which he had ordered to Suvla in order to give General Stopford every chance.

On the night of the 9th, the guns could be heard booming and the shells could be seen bursting to the southward at Sari Bair, and it was realised that the Anzacs were making a great fight in the hope that a junction with the Suvla force might enable them to carry the coveted heights. The whole of this night was lit up with the flames of the bush fires, and over all lay a white pall of smoke; out of this and the fire came the incessant rattle and spitting of machine-guns and rifles.

On the morning of the 10th, a fresh attack was delivered against the Anafarta heights. The 53rd Division took the lead here, but it seems that on this occasion the rawness of the troops told against our prospects of success, for the attack was a failure. It must be remembered that the country into which our Army was now advancing was becoming increasingly difficult, and was riven by awkward ravines, often precipitous, and always covered with thick scrub. This day was mainly eventful for a splendid attack delivered on our left at Karakal Dagh by two battalions of the 11th Division, which practically saved our whole left wing. On the evening of the 10th a strong trench was run right across our line of positions from Sulajik to the east of Chocolate Hill.

The next day, the 11th, was mainly spent in reorganising for a fresh attack, and in the evening we had the great satisfaction of being able to link up with the Australian left. The Anzac-Suvla forces now ran in one continuous line for 12 miles from Karakal Dagh on the north almost to Gaba Tepe on the south. The Suvla force had penetrated nearly three miles inland, and was now three times as strong as it had been on the day of the landing.

The 12th was memorable for a tragic and mysterious occurrence. A night attack, to be delivered by the 54th Division, had been projected for dawn of the 13th; in order to prepare the way for this, and to clear the country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova of the enemy, the 163rd Brigade was sent forward upon this position and made good a great part of it. The episode in question is best described in Sir Ian Hamilton's own words:

"The 5th Norfolks were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the Brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy Colonel Sir H. Beauchamp, a bold, self confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the Battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the Colonel, with 16 officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was a part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back."

The foregoing operation, as has been noticed, was intended as the precursor of a night attack upon the heights; but this was abandoned owing to difficulties raised as to the possibility of supplying the troops with food and water. A further attack projected in co-operation with the Anzac force also broke down, and it was found impossible to obtain reinforcements from this quarter. It will be seen that there had been almost continuous fighting along the whole line from the 6th till the 11th August; but after the 11th no attempt was made for 10 days to press the attack against the main objective, the commanding heights of Ismail Oglu Tepe. 

There were various reasons for this delay. The Turks had now entrenched heavily along their whole line, so that the position was a very different one from that which faced our troops during the 24 hours succeeding the landing. Their heavy reserves were now available for whatever area of our operations they might desire; of these, probably only 35,000 were engaged at Helles, the rest being concentrated nearer Anzac or Suvla to a strength estimated by Sir Ian Hamilton's staff at 75,000 rifles. Against this 110,000, we had 95,000 rifles distributed thus -25,000 at Anzac, 40,000, French and English, at Helles, and 30,000 at Suvla.

As the Turks held all the commanding positions, and could draw without difficulty on Constantinople for fresh supplies and troops, Sir Ian Hamilton saw that victory was practically impossible without substantial reinforcements. Before launching any further attack, he therefore requested the War Office to send him 45,000 troops to repair the ravages in his British Divisions, and 50,000 men as fresh reinforcements. "From what I knew," he savs, "of the Turks' situation, both in its local and general aspects, it seemed, humanly speaking, a certainty that if this help could be sent at once we could still clear a passage for our Fleet to Constantinople."

While lie was awaiting a reply from the War Office, a gallant operation was carried out on the left flank. The 3oth and 31st Infantry Brigades of the 10th Irish Division were ordered to attack the crest of Kiritch Tepe Sirt. If this could be secured, our line across Suvla could be strengthened, and the danger of a flank attack minimised. Sterling laid was rendered in this fight by a machine-gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service. After hard fighting the ridge was seized, largely through the gallantry of the 6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers; this Regiment swept forward with loud cheers while the Turks charged forward and met them in the saddle between the two crests. 

A desperate bayonet fight ensued, and there could be seen from a distance the flashing and stabbing of steel, until at last the Turks gave way and fled; our men leapt forward in pursuit and captured the whole ridge, firing on the retreating enemy from the summit. The British Naval gun fire helped greatly in the achievement of this brilliant piece of work. Most unfortunately, however, it became necessary to evacuate these trenches in view of the heavy odds against our men and the default of reinforcements. The casualties here were heavy; it is recorded that the Royal Irish Fusiliers had only one officer left. The Turks were believed to have had 2o,ooo men massed against us in this position alone.

An important feature of these days of waiting was the supersession of General Stopford on the 5th August. Sir Ian Hamilton leaves us in no doubt as to the reasons for this change :-

"The units of the 10th and 11th Divisions had shown their metal when they leapt into the water to get more quickly to close quarters, or when they stormed Lala Baba in the darkness. They had shown their resolution later when they tackled Chocolate Hill and drove the enemy from Hill 10, right back out of rifle range from the beaches. Then had come hesitation. The advantage had not been pressed. The senior Commander at SuvIa had had no personal experience of the new trench warfare, of the Turkish methods, of the paramount importance of time. Strong, clear leadership had not been promptly enough applied. These were the reasons which induced me, with your Lordship's approval, to appoint Major-General H de B. De Lisle to take over temporary command."

A few days later Sir Ian Hamilton, to his great consternation, received the news that it was impossible to send the required reinforcements. He was, therefore, thrown back upon the resources already available at the Peninsula, and he determined to do his best with these. His first move was to bring up from Helles, the heroic 29th Division. It has already been shown that on August 6th, the day of the Suvla landing, this force was holding its position on the left of our line at Helles across the Gully Ravine. It had taken a leading part in the great advance of nearly a mile which had been made on June 28th, and it was not its fault but its bitter misfortune that the attack at Helles on the afternoon of the 6th failed of its immediate objective. 

It had taken the lead in every operation of importance occurring in the southern zone, from the Landing onwards. Its losses had been tremendous; very few of the men who originally landed at Seddul Bahr survived to land again at Suvla. It was estimated that at least three times the number of its original strength had passed through its ranks. The Division had obtained an almost fabulous reputation on the Peninsula, and indeed throughout the world, and may well be called the Old Guard of Gallipoli. Its three Brigades were transferred by night on trawlers from Helles to Suvla without the Turks suspecting the movement. There are those who think that had these troops, with their splendid tradition, been available at Suvla on the 7th and 8th of August the fortune of the day would have gone very differently.

An attack in force was now projected against the two heights of Ismail Oglu Tepe and Hill 70, known as Scimitar Hill. A general advance along the whole line was impossible: all that could be done was to hold the enemy on the left and centre with the 53rd and 54th Divisions, while the 29th and 11th Divisions delivered the main attack on the right. It was now that the advantage of the linking up with Anzac became apparent. The connection was only maintained by a thin line of outposts, but it enabled the Suvla force to obtain the co-operation of General Birdwood, who was now ordered to swing his left forward from the Aghyl Dere north-east towards the heights of Kaiajik Aghala, between this position and the Asma Dere. 

The hill of Ismail Oglu Tepe stands in reference to the Suvla operations in the same relation is the height of Chunuk stood towards the Sari Bair expedition. It was vitally important to take and hold it in order to prevent an enemy advance between the two Anafartas, and to clear the way for the main assault upon the high ridges of which it was the foothill or spur. It was 350 feet in height, covered with dense scrub and broken into precipitous ravines. The 29th Division had to attack along a line not dissimilar to that with which the Australians had been confronted at Abdul Rahman Bair.

Furthermore, all troops brought up for the attack had to be moved under heavy shell fire across the open plains between the Salt Lake and Chocolate Hill. This latter eminence, with the hill of Lala Baba that had been captured immediately after the Landing, formed our only points of vantage in the whole position. We had now dug permanent trenches along our whole line connecting with the Australian left; but the Turkish trenches in front of us were stronger -and deeper than ours, and were carefully and elaborately fortified and loop-holed. 

To add to the difficulty, the Turkish lines on the 21St August were wrapped in a mist so heavy as to make the preparatory bombardment, upon which we had greatly relied, fitful and uncertain. At 3 p.m., however, the advance began. The 34th Brigade of the 11th Division made good on the right, but the 32nd Brigade in an attempt on the southwest corner of Ismail Oglu Tepe lost its way just as General Baldwin had lost his on Sari Bair, and failed of its objective, though it attempted with remarkable gallantry to make good its mistake.

The curious fatality which attended the Anzac: and Suvla operations caused the 33rd Brigade to fall into the same error, with the same result. These disastrous mistakes proved fatal to the attack of the 29th Division, which was now assaulting Scimitar Hill with the greatest gallantry and vigour. The 87th Brigade carried the entrenched position on the hill-top, and engaged in furious hand-to-hand fighting with the Turks, who faced the bayonet more bravely than they had hitherto done in any struggle on the Peninsula. Victory now seemed assured, and fresh lines of our men were swarming up the crest, when a Turkish Battery behind the adjacent height commenced to pour in shrapnel upon them at a range of 1,200 yards. Whole lines of our men were mown down, and the force was eventually driven down the slopes and back to its own trenches.

The 86th Brigade in attacking Hill 112 had little better luck, for it found itself in the middle of a raging bush-fire, which checked its advance; and when it had conquered this difficult position and bad pushed its way well up the ravine, victory was snatched from its grasp owing to the failure of the 32nd Brigade to hold the position on the right. Eventually it, too, came within the hail of enemy shell fire and "was simply swept off the top of the spur." The 29th Division had once again deserved success, and deserved it richly; but once again it had been unable to command it.

While this unsuccessful attack on Scimitar Hill was raging, the 2nd Mounted Division, which had been trained in Egypt, and was now serving as Infantry, was moved up from Lala Baba to Chocolate Hill to participate in the attack. This region, as has already been remarked, was exposed over its whole area to the artillery of the Turks, who now concentrated a terrible shrapnel fire upon the advancing Yeomanry. There now occurred one of the most spectacular and terrible episodes of the whole campaign. For a mile and a half these splendid troops, who were in action for the first time, and were led by officers bearing some of the best-known names in England, advanced as if on parade, though the men were dropping right and left at every moment. 

"Despite the critical, events in other parts of the field," writes Sir Ian Hamilton, "I could hardly take my glasses from the Yeomen: moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster; there they lay; there was no straggling, the others moved steadily on; not a man was there who hung back or hurried." They formed up behind the 29th Division in front of Scimitar Hill, and were in position to attack at about 6 o'clock in the evening.

In the meanwhile a tremendous bombardment was being directed from our ships and Batteries against the crest of Scimitar Hill. The Turkish Batteries were replying with gusto; the light was failing, and the horizon was weird yellow light and checkered with flame and smoke. Amid the roar and the flame the Yeomanry leapt from their position at the word of command and charged the northern crest; they were met with a withering fire, but swept on determinedly, losing leader after leader, including Sir John Milbanke and many other officers of noble birth and spirit. 

They swept up the ravine between Scimitar Hill and Ismail Oglu Tepe, and beneath the weird, yellow light, flung themselves against a line of trenches which barred their way. They believed that they had actually seized the height of Hill 100, and so did the beholders, who shouted the news exultantly down the line of communication. If this eminence had really been secured, it "would have been a very notable success, enabling as it would the whole of our line to hang on and dig in." 

But unfortunately it was found that the position captured was only a knoll jutting out from the coveted position, and that the Turks were strongly entrenched between it and the summit. We had failed to take either of the two peaks which had formed our objective, and had to fall back to our original line with losses which amounted to nearly 5,000, most of which were sustained by the 29th Division.

It is worth chronicling the fact that the Yeomanry Brigade which fought so heroically this day consisted of the Bucks Regiment, the Berks Regiment and the Dorset Regiment.

A more successful operation took place in the position between the Suvla and Anzac forces. The main objectives of this attack were twofold; firstly, the eminence known as Kaiajik Aghala. h a little to the south-west of the important height known as Hill 60, which commands the Biyuk Anafarta. This ridge is really a spur of Hill 60, and if the whole position could once become ours we should have gained a material step in our progress towards the heights, and should have also been in a position to check the Turkish reinforcements coming up the Anafarta Valley. The second object of the operation was to strengthen still further the thin line connecting Anzac with Suvla.

The operations were conducted under the direction of Sir William Birdwood, and the attacking force was commanded by Major-General H. V. Cox, of the Indian Army, who had already done splendid work in the Sari Bair attack. He had at his disposal two Battalions of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, two Battalions of the 2nd Irish Brigade, the 4th South Wales Borderers and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. This attack, which was delivered in the afternoon of the 21st August, was a brilliant success; the left made good the line of communications, the Indians in the centre seized the coveted well of Kabak Kuyu, and the right column, commanded by Brigadier-General Russell, fought its way through to the Kaiajik Aghala, carried the trenches at the foot of the hill, dug in and held its own through the night, in spite of heavy bomb attacks.

On the next morning his force was strengthened by the 18th Australian Infantry Battalion, which had just arrived at Suvla. This detachment stormed the summit of Kaiajik Aghala, and carried 150 yards of trenches, but was forced to fall back under a heavy enfilading fire. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles, however, although heavily attacked, managed to take and hold another 8o yards of trench.

The whole operation had been brilliantly achieved. The Anzac left had been firmly Joined to the right of the 9th Army Corps at Suvla, and our 12 mile front had been welded into an impregnable line. The capture of Kaiajik Aghala had given us a taking-off point for the attack upon the commanding position of Hill 60.

This hill still remained uncaptured, and Major-General Cox was ordered to seize it. He had at his disposal detachments from the 4th Australian Brigade and also from the 5th Australian Brigade, which had not previously been in action; also, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 5th Connaught Rangers.

The Turks had been well aware that the assault would be launched, and had fortified the Hill very heavily with trenches. A powerful artillery bombardment heralded the charge, but as soon as our troops advanced, they were met with the heaviest fire from rifles, machine-guns and field-guns, and also from a heavy battery behind the hill. In the centre were the New Zealanders with the Auckland and Canterbury Mounted Rifles in the first line, and the Otago and Wellington Mounted Rifles in the second line. On the left were the men of Connaught, while the Australians held the right. Within a few minutes of the advance the New Zealanders had carried one side of the ridge, and for five more hours they struggled here for a position until nine-tenths of the summit had been gained. 

On the left the Connaught Rangers "excited the admiration of all beholders by the swiftness and cohesion of their charge. In five minutes they had carried their objective, the northern Turkish communications, when they at once set to and began a lively bomb-fight along the trenches against strong parties which came hurrying up from the enemy supports and afterwards from their reserves."

They had been ordered to hold on till midnight, when they would receive fresh reinforcements, but before this hour the gallant men, whose whole initial strength had been only 250, were driven forth from the trenches by the heavy bomb attacks and' overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

Immediately afterwards the 9th Light Horse attempted to recapture the position, and seized the outer trenches facing the Turks, who still held the inner trenches. In this position the Australians found themselves bombed from three sides, and were forced slowly to retire. It now looked as if we were to lose the whole position ; but this tragedy was averted by the heroism of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, who hung on to their 150 yards of trench "all that night and all next day, through bombing, bayonet charges, musketry, shrapnel and heavy shell." 

Thus the fight raged for one day and two nights, till on the 29th, just after midnight, the 10th Light Horse made a most brilliant charge upon the lost trenches and carried them within five minutes. This put the hill permanently into our hands, and by so doing gave us command of the Anafarta. Sagir Valley, and further strengthened the communications between Anzac and Suvla Bay. Hill 60 had been the last crest of the last ridge separating Anzac from the northern plain, and through its capture 400 acres of ground were added to the Anzac position.

Our losses in this affair are officially recorded as 1,000, and those of the Turks as 5,000; in addition, we captured "3 Turkish machine-guns and 46 prisoners were taken, as well as 3 trench mortars, 300 Turkish rifles, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and 500 bombs."

The 10th Light Horse added fresh lustre to the glory they had already won in their splendid and desperate attack upon the Chess-board. The 4th Australian Brigade, it will be remembered, had already proved its prowess on the heights of Abdul Rahman Bair; on this occasion it showed that its heroism had become traditional, and could vie with that achieved by the 3rd Brigade at the Landing, by the 2nd in the great Helles charge, and by the 1st in the assault on Lone Pine. Brigadier-General Russell led the right column splendidly in this attack, and added fresh laurels to those he had already won in command of the New Zealanders upon Sari Bair.

Sir Ian Hamilton dates from the termination of this operation the commencement of that long period of trench warfare which was only terminated by the Evacuation.

It will be noticed that during the battle of the 21st and 22nd August, the Australians fought side by side with the Indians, just as they had fought with them near the summit of Abdul Rahman Bair and Hill Q. During the battle of the 27th the Australians and New Zealanders were once more linked together in that partnership or brotherhood which had withstood the fiery ordeal of Anzac and the Sari Bair advance. Such alliances as these during the whole of the Gallipoli Campaign have had the strongest effect in bringing together the different nations of the Empire and making them appreciate and admire one another's character and outlook. It is safe to say that this comradeship in battle will be of sterling help in the settlement of some of the vital questions which are certain to arise after the War.

Sickness was now beginning to tell heavily upon the men; the country in which they were fighting, owing to its restricted area, was perhaps as unhealthy as any in the whole war with the exception of Mesopotamia.

Very few of the troops in any of the three zones of action were free from dysentery, and a certain amount of rest was absolutely necessary in order to preserve their efficiency; but the main cause of inaction was not the sickness of the men but the deficiency in munitions. This factor, it must be repeated, hampered again and again our operations in the various zones. The last act of the Suvla drama, therefore, consisted of trench warfare, faced with grim endurance in the teeth of relentless enemy attacks, and the not less relentless warfare of the elements.