The Battle of Sari Bair from The Story of The Anzacs

Two of these ravines, Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere, run to the southern part of the ridge known as Chunuk Bair. The third and fourth, Aghyl Dere and Azmak Dere, with its southern branch, Asma Dere, lead upward to the summits of Koja Chemen Tepe. This peak looks down upon the Narrows, and were it once possible to lodge our artillery there, we should certainly be able to dominate the Straits, and to cut off the Turkish communications between Bulair and Achi Baba and we should have had at least a fair chance of taking, by siege or storm, the great fortress plateau of Kilid Bahr. 

It is not too much to say that that possession of Koja Chemen Tepe would have assured the success of the campaign, and might have altered the whole course of the war.  It was, therefore, worth taking great risks and incurring great losses in the attempt to secure this crowning position, nor was the hope of doing so by any means a poor one. The whole attack had been most carefully planned as a result of accurate information received by our General Staff regarding the Turkish positions. It was assumed, and the event showed the supposition to be justifiable, that the Turks were unprepared for any attack in force upon this position by means of these approaches.  Ignorant as they were of the new Army lying hidden in the bowels of Anzac, they had every reason to suppose that the battle raging there during these momentous hours would be quite sufficient to occupy the whole of the Australasian Army.

Map of the battles of Sari Bair & Suvla

It must be again and again pointed out that the attack on Koja Chemen Tepe was no "wild-cat scheme" undertaken in a spirit of reckless adventure or despair; it was carefully planned out in its minutest details and the strategic principle underlying it was of the soundest. There was no flaw either in the original plan or in the movements by which this was carried out. As will be realised, the failure of this magnificent adventure was due to causes quite external to itself.

It will be convenient to set out in the form of a table the different attacking forces, and their objectives. These are presented hereunder in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatch, slightly modified and rearranged

1. RIGHT COVERING COLUMN.

Object -To seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded, it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

• Composition - Brigadier-General A. H. Russell, commanding:-
  • New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. 
  • Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment. 
  • Maori Contingent. 
  • New Zealand Field Troop.

2. LEFT COVERING COLUMN.

Object-To march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful, it would be able to hold out a hand to the 9th Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

• Composition - Brigadier-General J. H. Travers, commanding:-
  • Headquarters 40th Brigade. 
  • Half the 72nd Field Company. 
  • 4th Battalion, South Wales Borderers. 
  • 5th Battalion. Wiltshire Regiment.

3. RIGHT ASSAULTING COLUMN.

Object - To move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines, and to storm the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

• Composition - Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, commanding:-
  • New Zealand Infantry Brigade. 
  • Indian Mountain Battery (less one section). 
  • One Company New Zealand Engineers.

4. LEFT ASSAULTING COLUMN.

Object - To work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

• Composition - Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox, commanding:
  • 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. 
  • 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.
  • Indian Mountain Battery (less one section). 
  • One Company New Zealand Engineers.

• Divisional Reserve
  • 6th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment. 
  • 8th Battalion, Welsh Regiment (Pioneers), at Chailak Dere. 
  • 39th Infantry Brigade. 
  • Half 72nd Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

"To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damakielik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the 9th Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from any force of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta Valley."

THE GREAT ATTACK.

The Expedition started from Anzac at 9 p.m. at night, the Gurkhas and New Zealanders leading the way and the Australians following closely. They passed along the narrow sap leading to No. 2 outpost, and thence skirted the beach for about il miles till they came to the mouths of the great ravines, and then turned sharply inland for their three-mile march. The right covering column drew first blood. Its immediate objective was Old No. 3 Post, which had been retaken from us by the Turks on the 30th May, but still retained its old name. 

This position lies seaward of the western end of Rhododendron Spur and the two Table Tops. It had been strongly fortified with timber and heavily entangled barbed wire. It was of supreme importance both to the Turks and ourselves, as it dominated both the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Dere ravines, and unless it could be captured, no headway could possibly be made by our right assaulting column.

Yet it seemed practically impregnable, and might have remained in the enemy's hands till this day had it not been for a brilliant stratagem.

For many nights before the attack. the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. "Colne," had, in the words of Sir Ian Hamilton, "long and carefully been educating the Turks how they could lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly be rushed by simple force of arms." At 9 p.m. punctually, for night after night, the British warship had flung her searchlight on to the fortress and bombarded it heavily for 10 minutes. There then succeeded a 10 minutes' pause, followed by fresh light and fresh firing, the second entertainment terminating always at 9.3o p.m. exactly. 

Such bombardment was too heavy for the Turks, and they had adopted the prudent custom of withdrawing from their trenches during this "bad quarter of an hour"-or half an hour. It was on this very natural wariness that our men relied for victory. On the night of the 6th the great beam of light leapt out of the darkness at the accustomed hour, and was followed by a mighty roar of guns. The Turks retired as usual: the light and the noise held on for the accustomed period, and then suddenly ceased. 

The Turks, as usual, returned to their trenches - but this time, to their dismay and astonishment,
were received with a heavy fire from an enemy who had apparently gained the trenches by some form of black wizardry'. What had happened was that, under cover of the firing and of the pitch darkness skirting the search-light's beam, the right column had stealthily moved up among the scrub
and brambles to the edge of the position, and in the instant that the light and gun fire had been swung off, they had leapt into the empty trenches.

They held the position firmly against all counter attacks, and, spreading out from this point of vantage, seized Bauchop's Hill, taking by surprise the series of interlacing trenches which crowned its summit. The honors throughout this part of the attack fell entirely to the New Zealanders.

Another body of the right covering column, consisting mainly of the Otago Mounted Rifles, had pursued the attack along the Chailak Dere. If the mouth of this could once be cleared the way was open for the right assaulting column now that No. 3 Outpost was in our hands. Unfortunately, however, the New Zealanders found themselves held up here by the strongest barbed wire entanglements hitherto encountered. Before any advance could be made, it was necessary to cut these through, and this was eventually effected by the intrepid New Zealand Engineers and the Maoris, who cleared the opening just in time to give a free road to the advancing main column.

A picturesque feature of this attack was the wild war-cry uttered by the Maoris as they advanced, and the still wilder Haka or war-dance which they performed after the moment of victory. The Maoris made the night hideous with their slogans, and showed corresponding vigor in the use of the bayonet.

The remaining task falling to the covering column was the capture of Big and Little Table Tops, which positions commanded respectively the intermediate sections of the Sazli Dere and Chailak ravines. The sides of these mountains are so precipitous as to give "the impression of a mush-room shape with the summit bulging out over its stem." The hill top, moreover was very strongly entrenched, and the whole position seemed well nigh beyond the possibility of capture.

It had reached the ears of our Staff, however, that but few defenders had been left upon it, and it was realised that the only chance of success in an attack on a position labelled in the text-book as "impracticable for Infantry," lay in the element of surprise. The Zealanders, therefore, assaulted it in three columns consisting of the Wellingtons, the Auckland Mounted Rifles, and the 'Maoris. The Turks resisted fiercely, but the dash and fierceness of our men was too much for them, and by midnight the impossible had been achieved, the precipice scaled, and the whole position lay in our hands.

These magnificent achievements now made it possible for the right assaulting column to begin its march, shortly after midnight, by the Sazli Dere and Chailak Dere ravines. Such good work had been made by the covering column that the Chailak Dere force moved a good way up the valley without opposition, though the column in the southern ravine was strongly opposed on the southern slopes of Rhododendron Spur, for which point of vantage a fierce battle now began.

We may turn now to the left covering column, whose objective was Damakjelik Bair, a commanding and strongly-entrenched position situated between the ravines of Aghyl Dere and Azmak Dere and dominating the two southern ravines. The honours here fell to the 4th South Wales Borderers, who led the attack against the position, and captured trench after trench at the bayonet's point. This force was heavily enfiladed from the Turkish positions on the hills above, but never flinched for a moment, though it consisted largely of inexperienced troops of the new Army. At 1-30 a.m. the whole hill had been occupied, and it was thus possible for the Australians forming the left wing of the left assaulting column to make their way towards the heights without danger of a rear or flank attack.

The whole proceedings at this stage of the operation went as if by clock-work, and completely refute those who contend that the expedition was from the start foredoomed to failure and had been mismanaged and mis-planned by Sir Ian Hamilton and his General Staff.

The left assaulting column entered the Aghyl Dere at 12-30 a.m., as soon as the covering column had done its work. The 4th Brigade of the Australians advanced up the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the further ravine of Asma Dere. They consisted of the 13th Battalion (New South Wales), and the 14th (Victoria), on the left; the 5th (Queensland and Tasmania), and the 16th (Westralia and South Australia) on the right. They had to march through dense scrub, often on their hands and knees, and constantly had to scale heights hardly less precipitous and threatening than those encountered at the great Landing. 

The ravines were full of brambles which tore the flesh, and on the heights were perched snipers who systematically thinned out the advancing lines of khaki. The Australians could not see the men who fired, and could only judge their whereabouts from the flashes of their rifle. They did not fire themselves, but sought out the line of Turkish marksmen with the bayonet, and when they found them, they exacted a speedy account. The men were sweating and parched with thirst. Never had the burden of the day been so fierce even at the terrible lines of Anzac. They wore white arm bands and patches so that the Fleet might recognise them and hold off its fire from their ranks. 

They also burnt green flares by night, and bore red and yellow flags by day to advise the warships of their whereabouts. Each man carried two days' rations, and a full water bottle. Constantly there was hand to hand fighting with the bayonet, yet the Australians went on, bearing ever to the left and north, with the great salvoes from the warships bursting overhead: while the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade split off from them, and made for the southern fork of Aghyl Dere, and that bristling ridge of Sari Bair known as Hill Q.

When the dawn broke it was found that the Australians and Indians together had flung the enemy back ridge after ridge, and held a great front, connecting as with an impenetrable wall, high up the northern ravines. Unfortunately this was only the first act of the tragedy in which this force was to play so heroic a part.

We may now turn back to the right assaulting column here along the southern ravine of Sazli Beit. The Canterbury Infantry Battalion had made its way slowly forward while the Otago Battalion fought its way steadfastly up Chailak Dere, and at 6 in the morning struck south from this ravine, joining up with the Canterbury men on the lower slopes of the Rhododendron Spur, just north of the captured Table Top position. 

The whole attacking force had now linked up across the four ravines, the left column connecting with the right by means of the 10th Gurkhas. Our right, always with heavy fighting and continuous bayonet charges, made its way to the top of Rhododendron Spur, where it entrenched "a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair, i.e., of victory."

During the early part of the morning the 5th and 6th Gurkhas, the 14th Sikhs, and the 4th Australian Brigade were ordered to assault the main ridge (Koja Chemen Tepe) on the left of our attack, but the men were exhausted. The right assaulting column had received a severe check; the Turkish machine-gun and artillery fire was becoming increasingly fierce, and it was realised that if the men were to make progress, they must have rest and whatever shelter could be obtained.

Part of the 14th and 16th Battalions of the Australian Brigade were now detached to scour the country to the rear, and here they came upon the gun position from which the Turkish 75, known as the Anafarta Gun, had wrought such havoc within the Anzac lines. The gun had been dragged away, but a large quantity of ammunition was seized.

During the rest of the day our left wing contented itself with holding the Asma Dere ravine, and preparing for the next morning. An examination of the position already taken and held will bear out the verdict of General Birdwood that the "troops had performed a feat which was without parallel.'' All the lower parts of the four ravines, with their immensely powerful redoubts, were fairly in our hands, thus opening free passage for supplies and reinforcements.

In the afternoon of the 7th August the troops were re-arranged thus for the advance:

The right column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston, consisting of the New Zealanders (including the Maori Contingent), and the 26th Indian Mountain Battery and two Battalions of the 13th Division. The centre and left columns, under Major-General H. V. Cox, consisting of the 4th Australian Brigade, the 21St Indian Mountain Battery, the 39th Infantry Brigade, the 6th Battalion, South Lancashire, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

The objective was the same as on the previous day - Chunuk Bair to the right, the peak of Koja Chemen Tepe to the left. The attack took place at 4.15 a.m., and on the right wing was completely successful. From the warships and the spurs below figures were seen moving along the ridge against the skyline. As the light grew stronger it was seen that these were men in khaki, and the white patches and arm bands showed clear in the morning sunlight.

The New Zealanders had gained the topmost ridge and victory seemed well within our grasp.

The fighting had been terrific. The 7th Gloucesters had suffered specially heavy losses; they had been unable to dig any but the shallowest of trenches, and were subjected to so appalling a fire that "every single officer, Company Sergeant-Major, or Company Quarter-Master Sergeant was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates." Yet the men fought on without leaders, with heroic gallantry and initiative, and made good their position. Not without cause has the great fight at Sari Bair been described as first and foremost a soldiers' battle.

All the south-western slopes of Chunuk were now in our hands. In the centre, the Indians were faced by a superior force, and their advance was checked for the meantime, the enemy's fire being particularly murderous in this quarter. On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from Asma Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair. It was hoped that if they once took this position, they would be able to wheel round to the right and storm the summit of Koja Chemen Tepe; but the Turks had foreseen this move, and had placed machine-guns in commanding positions, which wrought havoc in the Australian ranks. 

The Turks came out from cover and attacked our men with the bayonet and the butt, but here they were no match for the sinewy men of the south, and wherever this kind of warfare took place the Australians had the ascendancy. But the terribly heavy fire of the enemy told in the end. Though the Australians had done all that men could do, they were nearly surrounded, and had suffered losses of over 1,000 men. They were, therefore, forced to retire to their original position in the Asma Dere ravine. "Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half-dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks." As a result of this day's battle our line had been flung well forward and upward on the right, had made some little advance in the centre, and firmly held its own on the left.

During the afternoon and evening, our Commanders rearranged the forces in preparation for a supreme effort on the succeeding day. The columns were now composed as follows:

• No. I Column-Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston-
  • 26th Indian Battery (less one section), 
  • the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles, 
  • the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and 
  • two Battalions of the 13th Division.

• No. 2 Column-Major-General H. V. Cox-
  • 21st Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), 
  • 4th Australian Brigade, 
  • 39th Brigade (less the 7th Gloucesters, relieved), with the 
  • 6th Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and 
  • the Indian Infantry Brigade.

• No. 3 Column-Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin-
  • two Battalions each from the 38th and 29th Brigades, and 
  • one from the 40th Brigade.

"No. 1 column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 column was also to move against Hill Q from Chailak Dere. This last column was to make the main attack and the others were to co-operate with it."

Shortly before dawn on the 9th a tremendous bombardment from the warships and Artillery was directed against Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. The whole ridge was covered in flame and smoke, and it seemed difficult to believe that life could exist in the Turkish positions. The three columns now advanced by their respective routes, which had been kept clear as far as possible; but the darkness and the intensely rough and rugged country prevented immediate success, and, for the time being, held up the troops all along the line. General Baldwin's column was confronted with a particularly precipitous and difficult lay of country, and, to add to the difficulty, he lost his way in the darkness and maze of ravines, and thus forfeited the precious hours that might have meant victory for the whole operation. 

While the main column was thus astray in the middle of Chailak, the Gurkhas of No. 2 column with part of the South Lancashire Regiment stormed the height of Hill Q. The promised land and the promised water were now fully in sight; below them like a map lay the long white road which forms the central artery of the Peninsula. Armies and supplies were coming and going, and beyond all lay the long blue ribbon of the Dardanelles, flecked with lighters and transports bearing troops and supplies.

The Gurkhas, with the men of the South Lancashire Regiment, did not stop to make good their positions, but, buoyed up with hope, charged right down the hillside with the enemy fleeing before them. It will now be seen that on the extreme right and the centre the heights were actually in our possession, but the forces which held these points of vantage were only subsidiary to the main attack under General Baldwin. This was far away, and while they were waiting for his help, there occurred one of the most terrible incidents in the whole campaign. 

Sir Ian Hamilton reports that a "salvo of heavy shells" burst among these stormers of the ridge, but Mr. John Masefield, in his book on "Gallipoli," gives a more explicit and harrowing account :-

"Whatever the cause," he says, "whether accident, fate or mistake, or the daily waste and confusion of battle, our own guns searched the hill-top for some minutes too long, and thinned out our brave handful with a terrible fire."

The havoc and consternation which this appalling accident caused in our ranks gave his opportunity to the Turkish Commander, who marshalled his forces, now heavily reinforced, and drove the hill-men and the Lancashires from their position by sheer weight of numbers. It seems almost certain that if the main column had arrived in time we should have held the whole of the heights, and it is absolutely certain that if this had happened, and the Suvla  Bay attack on the left had succeeded, we should not only have taken them, but should have held them permanently, and achieved a victory giving us everything that we were fighting for.

But the marks of tragedy were upon the whole operation. The men and their leaders were counting upon help from Suvla; during the last two days they had looked down upon the landing of a large army far away to their left, and were hourly expecting to reap the fruits of its endeavour; yet no help came, and it became increasingly evident that no help would or could come from that quarter in time to make victory certain. The Army of the main attack was now coming to realise that it must depend upon its own valor not only for victory, but for the bare conditions of safety.

General Baldwin, having failed of his immediate objective, now prepared to attack at the point where he found himself when morning broke, that is to say, at the famous Farm to the left of the New Zealanders on Rhododendron Spur. As the Turks swept our men back over the crest, the East Lancashires and Hampshires of General Baldwin's command charged them with the bayonet, and rolled them back again up the slope. They forced them back almost to the summit, and it is the sober conviction of Sir Ian Hamilton that a few minutes earlier "they would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and combined with them would have carried all before them."

But the loss of these few precious minutes meant the loss of all chance of victory. The Turks had now received heavy reinforcements from Battleship Hill, in spite of our watchful bombardment of that position and its approaches.

Baldwin's troops fought with unparalleled gallantry, but they were driven down from the commanding ground above to the Farm below, inflicting great slaughter upon the enemy as they retreated. The Turks now conceived victory to he in their grasp, and determined to make an end of the New Zealanders who had been holding so gallantly their all-too-shallow trenches on the south-eastern slopes of Chunuk. Here some 200 yards of trenches were held by about 8oo men, Sir William Birdwood subsequently giving it as his opinion that on this narrow crest there would in any case have been no room for a larger force. 

Sir Ian Hamilton considers it doubtful whether the trenches in this position were properly sited; according to the precedent set in the Boer War, they were withdrawn some 25 yards back upon the main ridge instead of being dug upon the skyline. Such an alignment would have been very effective against thin lines of skirmishers who would have had to show themselves against the skyline before they attacked, but it proved ineffective and dangerous against the huge Turkish masses fired with fanatic recklessness who were hurled down from the summit that day with the added momentum of the descent afforded by our choice of position.

On the evening of the 9th, the trenches ran down slantwise from the crest of Chunuk held by the New Zealanders, through the Farm, and thence ever descending, to the position below Abdul Rahman Bair where the 4th Australian Brigade was holding its own after its gallant assault on the ridge. Its numbers had now decreased from 2,900 to 1,000 the casualties of the whole expedition being officially stated as about 8,5oo up to 8 p.m. on the 9th.

During the night of the 9th and 10th, the New Zealanders and men of the New Army who were holding Chunuk, were relieved. For three days and nights they had fought incessantly in an area 900 feet above the sea, to which water, ammunition, and all other supplies had to be conveyed up precipitous slopes under heavy fire. For forty-eight hours they had held the actual summit, and during all this time had been heavily assaulted by the enemy and subjected to a withering fire. No men could have done more than they did, and no men could have held on longer in default of food, water and sleep.

Two Battalions of the New Army, the 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 5th Wiltshire Regiment, were now ordered to replace them, and hold the ground they had gained. The first of these arrived in good time, and for some hours they were able to hold the shallow and badly-sited trenches: but the second Battalion were held up by the darkness and the defiles, even as General Baldwin's column had been held up before them, and when they reached the position they were ordered to lie down near its edge "in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position."

Their arrival heralded the most desperate fighting which had occurred during the whole four days. An attack from Chunuk Bair Hill was delivered at dawn by the Turks, who hurled themselves, regardless of life, against the two regiments, in a huge column consisting of a full Division reinforced by a Regiment of three Battalions. It was utterly impossible for our thin khaki line to withstand this onslaught; no men alive could have done it. The Turks swept the Lancashires out of the trenches with terrible slaughter, while the Wiltshire Regiment was caught in the open by the enemy gun fire and "literally almost annihilated." 

The Turks now charged over the crest towards the gully that runs south of Rhododendron Ridge, their ambition being to penetrate between our lines and the Anzac position. They also swept round upon the right flank of our central column (under General Baldwin) which gave way, for the time being, beneath the terrible dead weight. The Turks were now pouring down the hill at full speed; but their progress was speedily checked in the most deadly fashion. The warships and land Batteries directed their fire against the four lines of Infantry advancing in massed formation, and mowed them down by hundreds. Never since the beginning of the Campaign had our gunners had such a chance. 

The Turkish Division was almost cut in pieces by the storm of high explosive shells and shrapnel. But even greater damage was wrought by the battery of 10 machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. In another chapter an account has already been given of this Battery and the splendid work done by Captain Wallingford in connection with its organisation. It had been of the greatest service at Anzac, and now in this moment of supreme peril it again saved the whole situation. 

The guns were played upon the Turkish ranks until their barrels became red hot, and the most appalling carnage ensued. The Turks, owing to the momentum of their rush down hill, could not possibly rally or reorganise. They were now in inextricable confusion; some still pressed forward, only to be met and annihilated by the shrapnel, others strove to retire but became mixed up with the advancing multitudes; very few got back over the hill top.

The Turks had taken the crest and the trenches, but only at a price that left them crippled for any further offensive. Still fiercer fighting was going on further along the line towards the Farm and the spurs adjoining it. Had our Army from Suvla been able to advance, it must have occupied a great part of the Turkish force which was now hurled down on this position. All along, our centre and our left had been counting on the support from the Suvla army, which would have enabled them to hold the upper slopes, and from them to take the Koja Chemen crest, and thus link up with the right wing and secure a position dominating for three miles the Narrows and the white road to Krithia. Yet no help came from Suvla, and the army there had not even succeeded in holding up the troops that were now swept forward for our annihilation.

The fight that now ensued was a fitting and terrible culmination to the great Battle of the Four Days, which has been described as the most ferocious and bloody soldiers' battle since Inkerman. Again the Turks, by sheer weight of numbers, drove our troops from their scanty trenches some way down the hill, and pierced our line in several places. Here our broken ranks were reformed and led upwards once more by the heroism of men like Staff-Captain Street, who left his transport work to rally the broken ranks of the fighters back to victory. Here was waged a battle "in which Generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. 

The Turks came on again and again fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood. Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brigadier-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith."

To support our line in this terribly critical position, the last two Battalions of the General Reserve were now hurried up, a further Battalion having been previously despatched to the assistance of the Australians at the Lone Pine. The Turks gave way before the charges and our unceasing Artillery fire. The Australians hurled back all attacks delivered on their line throughout this day with the heaviest losses, and did not give ground in any part of their line. 

Early in the day the Turkish attack had spent itself, and their soldiers were driven back over the top of the crest. The Turks found it impossible to dislodge us from the position we now held. On the right, where we had come nearest to complete victory, we still held the top of Rhododendron Spur just under the crest of Chunuk. On the centre and the left, our position was not so favorable, but we were still within call of victory. That victory would almost certainly have been ours, even apart from the Suvla failure, had it not been for the tragic accident which befell our main attacking column on the night of the 8th and 9th and prevented its joining up with the Gurkhas and New Zealanders. 

The casualties we sustained in these operations were very heavy, and in General Birdwood's force alone they reached a total of 12,000. The New Army (Imperial) lost 6,000 out of 10,500 men. Every officer with the Warwicks and Worcesters had been killed or wounded; 10 Generals out of 13 were
permanently incapacitated for further fighting. 

These losses, as the foregoing account will show, were justified by the greatness of the prize in view, and by the fact that once and again we were within an ace of gaining it. Over and above the fate which prevented them from doing so, must be reckoned the ghastly shortage of ammunition and water. The lack of high explosives was as marked at Gallipoli as it had been in Flanders, and was one of the most disastrous features of the whole Campaign. All accounts of the operations, both official and unofficial, draw attention to its deplorable results. The lack of water was perhaps even more distressing to the rank and file. 

Each man at Anzac was reduced to 1 pint a day, and this shortage made it impossible to hurry from there towards the summit reinforcements which might have turned the fortune of the Campaign. It is Mr. John Masefield's opinion that "even at the eleventh hour, two fresh battalions and a ton of water would have made Chunuk ours." As it was, during the whole of those terrible four days the men went short of water, and suffered agonies. Even at Anzac, where the troops were nearer their supplies, men would rush up to the mules as they arrived with the precious fluid and would lick the oozing canvas bags that contained it. Without fresh supplies of water it was inconceivable that a lar-er Army could have been despatched into the interior.

Three Commanclers in particular are singled out by General Hamilton for special praise-Lieutenant-General Birdwood, Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, and Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding the 13th Division. As for the troops themselves, it will be well to let their leaders speak. 

Sir Ian Hamilton writes thus in a special despatch immediately succeeding the operations :-

"I cannot tell you how magnificently the whole of the New Zealand troops have done their part in the recent severe fighting. They have successfully taken, with the greatest dash, trench after trench, and ridge after ridge, and have prevented the Turks from making any stand against them over country as precipitous and difficult as that which we took on landing." 

To this must be added the testimony of Major-General Godley :-

"I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian Units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Army had only just landed from a sea voyage and many of them had not been previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."