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Cape Helles

From the Outbreak of War in August 1914 until the Evacuation of Gallipoli December 1915

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Cape Helles, The battle of Achi Baba: Chapter 14 The Story of The Anzacs

The Man With The Donkey

We may now return to the southern theatre of war at Helles, where we left the British, French, and Indian forces entrenched after the fighting immediately following the landing. By the morning of the 5th May they were drawn up in the following order :-
  • On the left was the 29th Division, consisting of four Brigades, the 87th, the 88th, the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade; 
  • on the right were the French Corps Expeditionnaire, and 
  • to their left, between them and the 29th Division, came the 2nd Naval Brigade. 

Sir Ian Hamilton withdrew from the northern zone of Anzac, for the purpose of the ensuing battle the 2nd Australian and New Zealand Infantry Brigades, and formed from this and the Plymouth
and Drake Battalion of the Naval Brigade the Composite Division, which he used as his general reserve. The whole line stretched at this period across the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from a point about three miles north-east of Cape Tekke to a point immediately south-west of the Eski Hissarlik Point. 

The objective of the whole attack consisted of the two great arms of the Achi Baba Peak, which run, on the one side, down to the Gulf of Saros, and on the other, to the mouth of the Dardanelles. The left arm of Achi Baba is easier of access and less covered with scrub than the right. Possession of it was absolutely necessary if the attack- on the north-western side was to succeed. It abuts on the ridge and defile of Kereves Dere, and thus dominates the road from the tip of the Peninsula to Krithia, which formed the immediate objective of our left attack. In order that that attack should succeed, and avoid being enfiladed, it was of supreme importance that the eastern attacking force should seize the ridge which dominates the Kereves Dere. 

Could this once be done, the 29th Division would find Krithia open to it, and would be able to push forward toward this objective whilst the French were advancing through the Kereves Dere ravine
on the right. The battle began at i i a.m. on the morning of the 6th with a violent bombardment of Achi Baba by the battleships and the French 75's. Immediately after this, the 29th Division advanced under a heavy fire against the Turks, whom they found strongly entrenched along the whole line. 

On the right, the Senegalese advanced with considerable gallantry, but found the Turkish fire too heavy for them, and were replaced by the French Infantry. By 1.30 the whole line had been pushed forward from two to three hundred yards; but the Turkish guns wrought terrible havoc upon our
lines, and could not be located or silenced by the warships or the French batteries. The Turkish trenches, too, were remarkably strong and well built, many of them being eight feet deep. To make the situation more difficult and deadly still, from front and flank a murderous fire was poured forth
from cleverly concealed machine guns. 

Here and there along the line positions were carried in advance of those indicated, but at 4.30 the attack was held up, and it was seen that no more progress could be made that day, the French in particular being subjected to so withering a fire that they were unable to entrench until nightfall. They bore the brunt of this day's work, but it is incorrect to say, with one correspondent, that the first day's fighting was almost entirely confined to the right wing. On the left, the 88th Brigade made a most determined attempt to carry a clump of fir trees, but here again machine guns proved too much for them, and mowed down company after company. 

During the night there was continuous rifle fire along the whole line, and in the early morning the Turks attacked the French with the bayonet, but were completely repelled after our Allies had momentarily given ground.

The 7th of May began with the usual bombardment from the warships, delivered from the western coast of the Peninsula, and this was followed by heavy shrapnel fire from our left flank. The indomitable 29th Division bore the brunt of the opening attack, but suffered terrible carnage from the machine uns which the warships and the artillery had not been able to locate. The Lancashire Fusiliers, on the extreme left, had especially heavy losses. On their right, the 88th Brigade swept forward, and, backed by fierce artillery fire, carried the clump of fir trees, which had given so much trouble on the preceding day. They were supported on their left by the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers of the 87th Brigade, and had just wrested the clump from the enemy, when a furious attack, accompanied by a hail of bullets from machine-guns, drove them temporarily back. The danger was increased by the Turkish snipers who were perched in the trees, often upon small wooden platforms.

 "When these were brought down," remarks Sir Ian Hamilton tersely, "the surroundings became much healthier." The Fusiliers captured three Turkish trenches, but, on the extreme left, the Lancashire Brigade found that by 3 p.m. further advance was absolutely impossible owing to the cross-fire of machine-guns. During this part of the operation our left wing, including reserves and supports, suffered heavily from the accurate fire of the Turkish field guns. For the time being our right wing remained quiet, but Sir Ian Hamilton ordered a general attack for 4-45 p.m., the New Zealand Brigade being ordered to support the 87th and the 88th. When the order to advance was given, the whole line moved forward with the greatest gallantry, and in perfect order.

The Turks were now heavily reinforced, and brought new guns into action against the French advance. The position became almost intolerable, but General D'Amade sent forward fresh reserves, and delivered a counter attack. On the left, the gallant 29th once more carried the fir clump. At sundown, orders were issued to dig in and secure the ground gained, which amounted to from two hundred to three hundred yards. On the next morning, after bombardment, the New Zealand Brigade, which had been moved to the front over night, advanced some two hundred yards beyond the fir trees, and beyond the previously most advanced position of the 88th Brigade. The whole army had its heart set on a decisive success. 

News, came, however, at 1.30 that the French could not advance unless our left flank made further progress. A combined movement was therefore determined on by Sir Ian Hamilton. Three hours were spent in straightening up the line, redistributing units and giving fresh directions to the batteries and the warships. A general attack was ordered for 5.30 p.m., and was preceded by a bombardment from the ships' guns and heavy artillery. Then came the attack.

The sequel is vividly narrated by Sir Ian Hamilton:-

The steady advance of the British could be followed by the sparkle of their bayonets until the long lines entered the smoke clouds. The French, at first, made no movement, then, their drums beating and bugles sounding a charge, they suddenly darted forward in a swarm of skirmishers, which seemed in one moment to cover the whole southern face of the ridge of the Kereves Dere. Against these the Turkish gunners now turned their heaviest pieces, and as the leading groups stormed the first Turkish redoubt, the of high explosive shells blotted out both assailants and assailed. The trial was too severe for the Senegalese tirailleurs. They recoiled. They were  rallied. Another rush forward, another repulse, and then a small supporting column of French soldiers
was seen silhouetted against the sky as they charged the crest of the ridge of Kereves Dere, whilst elsewhere it grew so dark that the whole of the battlefield became a blank.

The British bombardment at this part of the proceeding is described as the most tremendous which had yet taken place upon the Peninsula. It was specially fierce beyond our right, where great volcanoes of earth were thrown up by the bursting shells. During this operation, on the extreme left, the 87th Brigade once more attempted to seize the strong and deadly positions between the ravine or nullah and the sea, but here again the machine guns proved too much for them, and at first they fell back. Subsequently, however, they asked of their own accord to be led forward, and dug themselves in two hundred yards ahead of their previous position.

It was in this operation that the New Zealanders and Australians of the 2nd Brigade added yet another laurel to their wreath. The New Zealanders advanced through the ranks of the 88th Brigade, and charged forward most gallantly under heavy shrapnel fire. Many of the 88th flung themselves into the advance by their side, and the whole body went forward right over the enemy's concealed machine guns, which opened up and wrought frightful havoc in their ranks; yet, in spite of this, they held their position, and dug themselves well in within a few yards of the Turkish trenches.

Equally heroic was the charge of the Australian Brigade. These had been held in reserve, but before the general advance they received orders to fall into the firing line and support the New Zealand Brigade on their right. They were 1,200 yards distant from the Turkish trenches, and were 400 yards behind the British firing line, through which they had been ordered to advance. There was no scrap of cover, and the whole area was exposed to a withering fire, yet they advanced in steady order at wide intervals and never hesitated or checked for a single moment. Within two or three minutes they were in the British trenches, where they halted for a brief breathing space. 

Then Brigadier General McCay leapt forth from the trenches at their head, shouting "Come on, Australians." They followed him, and "swept like a whirlwind over the deadly plateau." Beneath the hail of bullets they advanced 500 yards beyond the British firing line, and here dug themselves in. There were no more dashing charges in the whole of the Gallipoli operations than those of the Australians and New Zealanders in this great fight, and both Brigadier-General McCay and Brigadier-General Johnston richly deserve the praise bestowed upon them in Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch.

The French on the right had by this time made considerable gains, the Senegalese proving especially deadly in bayonet charges. The French attack consisted of a succession of desperate bayonet charges, covering the slopes of Achi Baba's left arm. Both General D'Armade and General Simonin were present at this attack. The 2nd Division on the left of Kereves Dere, stormed the redoubt, which had hitherto been its objective, and the 1st Division, on the right of the ravine, took two complete lines of Turkish redoubts and trenches and declined to be displaced from them.

The result of the three days' fighting, in the words of the official despatch, was that we gained "600 yards on the right of the British line, and 400 yards on the left and centre. The French captured all the ground in front of the farm Zjimmerman, as well as a redoubt for the possession of which there had been obstinate fighting during the whole of the past three days."

This engagement marks the turning point in the nature of the Allied operations throughout the Peninsula. It had shown that there was for the present no possibility of taking Krithia or Achi Baba by a direct attack. The element of surprise was no longer possible, the enemy being heavily reinforced and acquainted with our numbers and dispositions. There was little scope left now, writes Sir Ian Hamilton, either at Achi Baba or at Gaba Tepe, for tactics which would fling flesh and blood battalions against lines of unbroken barbed wire. 

The unique strength of the Turkish position had been realised, and it was realised, too, that there could be no attempt to rush it. Henceforth for a considerable period the Allied operations took the form of siege warfare. But before this new phase is described, one brilliant exploit must be mentioned.

It should be realised that one of the most murderous portions of the Turkish lines was that immediately abutting on the sea: here there was a bluff which had been strongly fortified by the enemy, and bristled with machine guns. After the three days' battle, a succession of attempts had been made by the Munster Fusiliers and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers to seize this position. All of these, however, had failed, and there seemed little likelihood that the bluff would be taken until the Gurkhas, commanded by Major General Cox, made their attempt upon it a few days later. On the night of the 10th and 11th of May, their scouts made a surprise attack upon it which failed, but prepared the way for the main attack delivered on the 12th.

In this operation, a diversion from the south-east was made by the Manchester Brigade, covered by a heavy fire from the warships and artillery. Under cover of this, the Gurkhas crept along the shore, assembled in strength below the bluff, scaled the cliffs and took the works by storm. This dashing operation removed a thorn from our left side and advanced the British flank considerably. The advantages gained by all these operations consisted in an advance along the whole front from 400 to 1,000 yards. This gain will not appear inconsiderable when it is remembered that the Allied forces had hitherto been penned up in an area which hardly allowed them free movement, and that with every yard gained, the conditions of living became more tolerable.

We may continue to trace the operations at Helles from the great battle of the early days of May up till the beginning of the crowning triple attack of the beginning of August. Both at Anzac and Helles this interval represents an intermediate chapter between the landing and the final operations. After the gains effected during the first fortnight of May, the forces on both sides marked time for some 10 clays. The Turks, as we have reason to know, were reconsidering the question whether it was really wise to attack in heavy massed formation after the fashion dear to the heart of Enver. 

The first and second battle of Krithia had taught them a lesson in this respect, and after the 25th May they pursued slightly different tactics, trying to hold their own line and to wear our men out with swift and sudden charges. Our troops, however, retained all the ground they had hitherto held, and the Royal Naval and 42nd Divisions in the centre, and the French Corps Expeditionnaire on the right, made gains which they retained permanently in the teeth of heavy Turkish counter attacks.

BATTLE OF THE 4th OF JUNE

In the early days of June it became clear that the Turks had weighty matter in hand. They began by bombarding heavily the small post in front of the French on the right, and followed this up with an infantry attack, which was repulsed with considerable loss. Sir Tan Hamilton had by this time realised that extended manoeuvring was hampered by the narrow limits of the position, and that progress could only be made by a steady advance pushing on gradually from one point d'appui to another. His attack was therefore directed to immobilising the enemy over the greater part of their line, while a strong attacking force attempted to capture the most important part of the terrain.

As usual, the attack was preceded by heavy bombardment from all the land guns, assisted by the battle ships, cruisers and destroyers. This was continued during the morning of the 4th June, from 8 to 10-30, and after a short lull and a feint attack, which drew the enemy's fire and disclosed his batteries, our bombardment broke out with increased violence and continued till noon. Our line now ran in the following order, from right to left:-The Corps Expeditionnaire, the Royal Naval Divisions, the 42nd (East Lancs.) Division and the 29th Division. It occupied a front of 4,000 yards, and numbered an infantry force of 24,000 men.

The French 1st Division on the right carried the trenches in front of them - and their centre attacked the deadly redoubt called Le Haricot, which they had already assaulted three times. With the greatest gallantry and desperation they captured the position, but later in the day the Turks
counter-attacked in such huge masses that the French had to fall back, their extreme left also being unable to make headway.

The 14th Sikhs on the right flank of our left wing fought with the greatest heroism, and in their attempt to push on, lost three-fourths of their force. The 6th Gurkhas on the left flank were skilfully led by their commander, and with their well-known bravery they actually forced their way into the Turkish works; but unfortunately our left centre was held up by heavy barbed wire entanglements, which had remained undestroyed by our artillery. It thus exposed the Gurkhas' flank, and the latter were forced to retire to avoid being isolated and cut off. This unavoidable check balked our centre of a great victory.

The honors of the dav fell to the 2nd Naval Brigade and the Manchester Brigade of the 42nd Division. Both of these stormed the trenches in front of them, the Manchesters taking their objective within five minutes after the engagement had begun.

On the left the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division also advanced most gallantly, and under very heavy fire, till they had taken the whole of the Turkish first line. A notable feature of this attack was the use of armoured motorcars belonging to the Royal Naval Air Service, which crossed the trenches on specially laid bridges and advanced to the enemy lines, where they grappled the barbed wire entanglements, and then pulled them down by reversing engines, and going full speed astern. There were eight of these cars, and all of them returned to the camp, two of them sustaining damage.

The Turks in this part of the field were now on the run, and our men advanced, taking trench after trench. It appeared as if Krithia was likely to fall to us, and, had that been so, Achi Baba might have followed shortly, as at this time there was no entrenched position between the village and the Citadel. But the cup of victory was dashed rudely from our lips.

The greatest strength of a chain is its weakest link, and despite their extreme gallantry, the French, as has been shown, had to fall back from the Haricot. In doing this they uncovered the flank of the Royal Naval Division, with the tragic result thus narrated by Sir Ian Hamilton :

Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the 2nd Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the Howe and Hood Battalions to enfilade fire, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire. By 1-30 p.m., the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the Brigade was back in its original position-the Collingwood Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

This collapse threatened to drive the gallant Manchester Brigade from the position which it had so brilliantly won. It was now holding a perilous salient, and became in its turn enfiladed through the falling away of the force on its right flank. Repeated attempts were made to sustain it in position, and it seems likely that if we had had the necessary reserves this would have been effected; but there was now a gaping hole between it and the Royal Naval Division, and it had to fall back, after the heaviest losses, on the first Turkish line which it had captured, relinquishing its other gains to the enemy.

it had been hoped that the French might be able to advance, and thus enable the Manchesters to secure their gains; but they were so hard pressed that this was impossible, and as the 88th Brigade and the Indian Brigade on the left were also hard beset, no further advance was possible, and we had to be content with an advance of from 200 to 400 yards along the centre; no mean gain, but still one inconsiderable if compared with what might have been secured if the French and the Indians had not been held up so disastrously on the right and left. 

It must be remembered that their difficulties were greatly increased by the natural configuration of the country held by the troops opposing them. The chief obstacle in their way consisted of the two spurs running down Achi Baba and forming a strong natural fortress, covered with gullies and rugged hills. In the circumstances, the French behaved with the conspicuous gallantry which they showed throughout the whole of these operations.

It must not be thought that because no minute chronicle is given of the operations at Anzac and Helles intervening between the great battles, that these intervals were periods of calm or truce. As a matter of fact there was fierce and incessant fighting at Helles from the end of April till the beginning of December. The Turks had now received very strong reinforcements, and positions which by the 4th June had promised to succumb were a fortnight later so strongly manned and entrenched as to be almost impregnable. One of the most tragic things about the whole expedition was the fact that there were few or no reinforcements on our side till it was too late to use them, and constantly increasing reinforcements on the side of the Turks. It is only possible to notice here the main engagements which occurred in this zone.

On June 19th the Turks penetrated a salient in our line, which had remained after the Battle of the 4th June. They were gallantly driven out by the 5th Royal Scots and a company of the Worcesters.

THE BATTLE OF THE LONGEST DAY.

A more important engagement still was the battle of the 21st June, or the Battle of the Longest Day, in which the French bore the brunt and burden of the fray.

The preliminary bombardment from the warships began three hours before dawn, and continued throughout the day. The 2nd French Division on the left stormed two lines of Turkish trenches and captured once more the Haricot Redoubt with all its entanglements and communications: but the 1st Division, after taking the first line of trenches, were counter-attacked and driven back: again they took the trenches, but again the overwhelming numbers of the Turks were too much for them, and they were driven forth. 

At 2-45 p.m. General Gourand told his command that the Turkish trenches must positively be taken and held during the five remaining hours of daylight. The General also requested the help of British guns and howitzers, which were quickly supplied; and at 6 o'clock the third assault was delivered. This resulted in some of the fiercest fighting experienced in the southern zone. The enemy even fought in one trench with stones, sticks, and fists, while in another part of the field a whole battalion of Turks was caught in the open ground by the seventy-fives and literally melted away. The French attack was successful, and resulted in a gain of 6oo yards of trenches with 7,000 casualties to the enemy.

On this occasion our right wing had had the burden and honor of the day. In the next great fight at Helles, occurring a week later, the left wing was called upon for a supreme effort.

THE BATTLE OF THE 28th OF JUNE, OR BATTLE OF GULLY RAVINE.

The nature of this operation was to a large extent conditioned by the operations of the 4th June, and resulted from the need of straightening out the salient which had then been formed in the centre of our line. It will be noted from the foregoing narrative that the position of the Turkish right had always been a great menace to our general advance. Any gain which we might make in the centre could be enfiladed from this strongly held position, and, until it should be taken, progress became practically impossible. Sir Ian Hamilton, therefore, determined to throw an attack upon the Turkish right wing with a force "pivoting from a point on our line about one mile from the sea." It was hoped that near the coast, at the end of the moving radius, an advance would be made of over 1,000 yards, the gain gradually becoming lesser as the line approached the stationary centre. 

If the operation were successful, our trenches would face due east instead of north-east, and we would be in a position to enfilade the Turks instead of suffering their enfiladement. The struggle centred round a plateau bounded on one side by cliffs sloping to the sea, and on the other by the steep ravine called by our men indifferently the Nullah, or Ravine Gully. From this plateau the Turkish trenches started and ran right across the Peninsula.

Our bombardment began at 10.2o a.m. on the 28th June, its chief target being the barbed wire in front of the enemy's trenches. This was quickly pounded to pieces. The men had been waiting meanwhile on raised platforms, so as to be able to clear the trench-top quickly ,when the order came. When this was signalled, they leapt over the parapet, and rushed across the intervening space, taking the Boomerang Redoubt by storm with little loss to themselves but great loss to the enemy. This position was captured by the Border Regiment, which had done splendid service ever since the day it landed at Beach "Y." The formidable trenches which the Borderers stormed so gallantly were situated in the Nullah, otherwise known as the Gully Ravine or Valley of Death.

This achievement opened the way for our main attack, which began at 11a.m., when the 87th Brigade, under Major-General W. R. Marshall, captured three lines of Turkish trenches. On the plateau between the cliff and the sea on the right of the Nullah the 4th and 7th Royal Scots captured the two Turkish trenches before them, but further to the right still, at the pivotal point near Krithia, the remainder of the 156th Brigade was held up and no further progress could be made. 

This failure, however, was not serious, as the position where it was really important to gain ground was at the other end of the swinging radius, and here the result throughout the day, was everything that could have been contemplated, or desired : for during the second attack, which began at 11.30, the 86th Brigade, with the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, dashed across the trenches already captured and then across several hundred yards of open ground, after which they took two more lines of trenches and succeeded in getting the enemy fairly on the run. They had achieved in all five successive lines of trenches, and no troops in the circumstances could have done more.

Later in the day, the Indian Brigade managed to capture a small ravine connecting the captured trenches with the sea.

The results of this battle were exceedingly important. The danger which had been threatening our salient from the left was removed, and our left wing, instead of being behind our centre was pushed well beyond it in such a way that it now faced due east instead of north-east. Very heavy losses were also inflicted upon the Turks in this battle.

Vigorous counter-attacks had been made by the Turks on the day of the battle, but it was on June 30th that they made their crowning effort to regain what had been lost. It will be noticed that their assault synchronises with the great attack - made by them at Anzac under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha. His arrival at Achi Baba had been signalised by the hoisting of a great banner. He overruled the wishes of the Generals on the spot, who were against hurling heavily massed counter-attacks against troops and trenches which had hitherto defied all their efforts. 

Enver, in overruling their decision, occasioned the terrible carnage which befell the Turkish Army at Anzac, and insisted also that the Turks should attack with bombs and in great force the northern part of the trenches we had captured at Helles on the 28th. This, as we have noticed, had fallen to the Gurkhas, who now faced the Turk in magnificent style, first hurling all their bombs at his on-rushing masses, and then leaping over the trenches and tackling him in the open with the kukri. Meanwhile, as has been noticed, the Turks at Anzac had been "completely crumpled up by the musketry and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse."

THE BATTLE OF THE 12th AND 13th OF JULY.

One more battle, and that a very fierce one, belongs to this intermediate chapter of the great adventure at Helles. We have seen that the battle of the 28th June had advanced the Allied left, and had left it almost at right angles to the centre and right. Sir Ian Hamilton describes the action of the 12th and 13th July as a sequel of that battle, and shows that its object was to capture the Turkish trenches east of the Achi Baba Nullah and facing the French on the right and the 52nd (Lowland) Division on the right centre. If this operation succeeded, the whole of the Allied line would be flung forward several hundred yards on a line level with the position on the extreme left so heroically stormed and held by the Gurkhas.

It cannot be too often repeated that every successful engagement at Helles was followed by a strengthening of the Turkish lines. The whole of the position now forming our objective was furrowed with fresh trenches and redoubts protected by barbed wire and connected by saps and communicating trenches. "In front of Achi Baba," writes Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, "at the present time, the situation is exactly the same as it is before Ypres, and other parts on the eastern Front, and victories cannot be won in a day here any more than they can in France. The enemy's line must first be pounded to pulp, then stormed, and finally held against their counterattacks."

The trenches to be seized ran from the mouth of the Kereves Dere to the Sedd-el-Bahr-Krithia Road, along a front 0f 2,000 yards. The attack began with a heavy bombardment, and then on the right the French and Lowland Scottish leapt over their trenches and stormed two lines of the enemy's position. The 1st Division of the French Corps carried a still further position, while the 2nd French Division held all that they had already gained.

The tragedy of the day was the fate which befell the 4th Battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. In the words of the official despatch "they pressed on too eagerly," and "not only carried the third line of trenches, but charged on up the hill and beyond' the third line, then advanced until
they came under the feu de barrage of the French artillery. Nothing could live under so cruel a cross-fire from friend and foe, so the Scottish Borderers were forced to fall back with heavy losses, to the second line of enemy trenches which they had captured in their first rush." 

There was much confusion throughout this phase of the attack, the battle being swallowed up in a mist of gun fire and dust and the whole terrain being pitted with the craters made by high explosive shells. When the smoke lifted, it was found that our men held the greater part of the Turkish trenches. The 157th Brigade was now hurled against the position under the heaviest machine-gun and rifle fire, and most gallantly stormed the whole line of trenches allotted to their attack.

When night came, the Turks still kept up a succession of counterattacks, which our wearied men repulsed with the greatest heroism till the dawn, when the Territorials on the right of the 157th Brigade were forced to give way before a party of bombers. The Army and its General, however, had determined that the day should be theirs, and that they would retake the position thus forced from their hands. Three Battalions of the Royal Naval Division were, therefore, brought up on the left, and a second attack was delivered, in which the 1st and 2nd French Divisions, in the teeth of the heaviest fire, pushed their positions well beyond the line won on the previous day. Two of the Naval Battalions were completely successful.

The Portsmouth Battalion was too successful, for "pressing on too far, it fell into precisely the same error at precisely the same spot as did the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers on the 12th, an over-impetuosity which cost them heavy losses."

This battle was successful in so far as it left the two Turkish front lines in our hands along the whole of the position, and gave us in some parts the third line as well. The new position was a great improvement on the old, owing to the vantage which it provided for our machine-gun and rifle fire.
The whole operation, though not without its incidental mistakes and failures, had on the whole been brilliantly justified by its results.

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