At Anzac; Chapter 13 of The Story of The Anzacs

I must begin by explaining that their role at this stage of the operations was first, to keep open a door leading to the vitals of the Turkish position; secondly, to hold up as large a body as possible of the enemy in front of them so as to lessen the strain at Cape Helles. Anzac, in fact, was cast to play second fiddle to Cape Helles - a part out of harmony with the dare-devil spirit animating those warriors from the south; and so it has come about that, as your Lordship will see, the defensive of the Australians and New Zealanders has always tended to take on the character of an attack.

We may note in passing that the only part of the foregoing extract to which the Australian soldier would demur would be the word "dare-devil." He appreciates the tribute which this epithet pays his courage and initiative, but resents the reflection which, in his belief, it casts upon his discretion. The average Anzac is as capable of cool judgment under shell fire as he is courageous and self-sacrificing. The Australasian position consisted at this time of a semi-circle running inland from the beach of Anzac Cove. It had a diameter of about 1,100 yards, and was in area somewhat about a square mile.  It consisted for the most part of a plateau protected by various ridges or other points of vantage which in many cases were only a few yards from the bristling Turkish trenches.

Map of the Anzac area

The main Australasian positions were as follows:-On the left, Walker's Ridge, running along the greater part of the left flank and leading to two lines of trenches which linked up with Pope's Hill. To the right of this was the terrible and famous position known as Quinn's Post; and still further to the right was another line of trenches terminating in Courtney's Post. The three positions just named were destined to bear the brunt of Turkish attack after attack throughout the succeeding months.

Quinn's Post for Some time had been a "No Man's Land," and had been coveted and disputed by ourselves and the Turks. After much hot fighting, we captured it and held it till the Evacuation. It would have been untenable if it had not been for the help of the New Zealand miners, who provided it with a network of trenches, bomb-proof shelters and tunnels covered by powerful beams.

The Turks repeatedly sapped towards it and strove to blow it up, but the New Zealanders countermined and blew up the Turks instead. Owing to their splendid work, the position became impregnable.

Further on still, trenches ran down to the sea from Courtney's Post, completing the semi-circle; the extreme position on our right was Chatham's Post. That redoubtable geographical feature, Shrapnel Gully, which runs through the centre of our position in a north-easterly direction, divided the outer from the inner ridge. Very shortly after our troops landed they found this position and made use of it for shelter, but the Turks soon dominated it with their fire, and swept it with a continuous hail of shrapnel, thus giving it its name. Running off Shrapnel Gully to the left is that well-known position, Monash Gully, named after the Commander of the 4th Brigade.

The distance of the Australian trenches from the Turkish varied from 20 yards to a quarter of a mile; the average distance is said to have been 100 yards. At Quinn's Post the trenches were only four yards apart.

The beach at this period had been converted into something combining the features of an arsenal, a mining camp, and a seaside resort - a resort whose daily music was the crackling of shrapnel and the thunder of high explosive shell.

The position at Anzac was speedily recognised by the Turkish commanders as being one of supreme danger to their main advance along the Peninsula and to the line of communications between Achi Baba and the hinterland. For this reason they strained every nerve at this stage of the operations to drive the Australians into the sea. On the other hand, the Australasian forces strove equally hard to increase the area of their occupation.

The first of their efforts was directed against the enemy's trenches in front of Quinn's Post. These were taken with a whirlwind rush and held with the aid of strong reinforcements. This brilliant operation was followed up by a series of counter attacks delivered by the Turks in the hopes of regaining them. The result of these may be best indicated by reference to a Turkish officer's diary, which shows that after the fierce assault of May 10th two Turkish regiments lost 600 killed and 2,000 wounded.

During the next week or two the Turkish attack surged and seethed round the apex and outpost of the Anzac position, Quinn's Post. Here the Turkish lines fronted ours so closely and menacingly that we were forced to deliver continuous attacks in sheer self-defence. Thus, on the night of May 14-15, a sortie was made from this position with the view of checking the bomb-throwing which was causing heavy mortality in our trenches. The attack was unsuccessful, and we sustained 70 casualties.

On the 14th of May the Commander-in-Chief of the whole Australasian Forces, General Birdwood, was slightly wounded, and on the succeeding day occurred the greatest tragedy which had so far befallen the Australian Army. This consisted in the wounding of General Bridges, who died a few days after this event. He was the greatest soldier whom Australia had so far produced, and his death cast a gloom over the whole operations. Details of his death and a full account of his character and achievements are given elsewhere in this volume.

While their gallant comrades were fighting like grim death on those crags and ridges in Gallipoli, the Light Horse were still in Egypt, and as one of their officers said, "The Light Horse men are like dogs in the leash straining to get at the quarry; but our time will come."

Colonel Chauvel, commanding the ist Australian Light Horse, was the first to volunteer with his Brigade to serve as infantry. His example was soon followed by Colonels Ryrie and Hughes, commanding respectively the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades. Every unit of the Australasian forces was eager to take part in the great adventure which had begun so heroically, and had been attended with such brilliant success. It means much for a mounted man to leave his horse behind him, but the men knew that their comrades needed help, and they wanted to be in the fight with them.

"My Brigade are mostly bushmen," said Colonel Ryrie, "and they never expected to go gravel-crushing, but, if necessary, the whole Brigade will start to-morrow on foot, even if we have to tramp the whole way from Constantinople to Berlin." This expressed the thoughts of the whole mounted force. It was in the early part of May that the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Australian Light Horse left for the fighting zone.

The first really heavy fighting after the landing, however, occurred on the 18th and 19th of May, this engagement being now known as The Second Battle of Anzac. Several days previous to this attack the Turks had been tunnelling against a portion of our line, where the trenches are within 10 yards of one another. Our engineers had counter-mined vigorously, but on the 18th the Turks blew up a mine beneath our trench and subjected our lines to a heavy bombardment from field guns, howitzers and 12-inch guns. 

Our General Staff was informed of the movements of the Turks by aeroplanes and by the warships, and warning was sent to the trenches on the evening of this day to prepare for a general attack. The fact was, that General Liman von Sanders had realised the extreme peril which threatened his line
of communications from the Anzac Cove, and had decided to make a crowning effort to take the whole position. He bought up five fresh regiments, and personally directed operations.

At midnight of the 18th and 19th a violent fire from rifles and machine guns broke out along the whole enemy front, the  firing being particularly heavy from the Turkish position at the head of Monash Gully. Quinn's Post, which may be called the vanguard of the Anzac offensive and defensive, bore, as commonly throughout this period, the brunt of the attack. From 3 a.m. till 4 a.m. the fire slackened, but after this hour broke out again more fiercely than ever. A strong Turkish column now assaulted the left of No. 2 section, but was beaten off with great loss, as were four other attacks delivered on the centre of the same section. A series of attacks were also delivered against Quinn's Post and Courtney's Post, but these were subjected to a withering fire, withheld until the Turks were at close range. Piles of Turkish dead now lay in front of our trenches along the whole line, and it was evident that their first effort had failed.

An hour after dawn, however, a fresh and still more furious bombardment was opened by the 12-inch and 9.2-inch guns of the enemy, and heavier artillery was now brought into action than any which had been previously used. This was the prelude to a fresh assault, directed mainly to the position between Quinn's Post and Courtney's Post. A few Turks actually reached our trenches, but were at once disposed of. A series of desperate Turkish attacks followed, and after 10 a.m. the attack swung across from the right section to the left, where our machine guns did particularly heavy damage. 

A fresh Turkish Division was brought up for the last attack : it probably lost half its numbers. By midnight the Turks had had enough of the offensive, and gradually gave ground. It is estimated that at least 30,000 Turkish troops, were brought against us in this battle, and it seems probable that there were about 7,000 Turkish casualties. Sir Ian Hamilton reports that "over 3,000 dead were lying in the open in view of our trenches. Our casualties amounted to about 100 killed and 500 wounded."

It should be noticed that the 2nd Australian Brigade which did such splendid work at Cape Helles was transported from there to Anzac on the morning of the 17th May, and thus arrived in time for this battle.

General Birdwood, writing to the Hon. T. McKenzie, High Commissioner of New Zealand, states that before the battle his forces were temporarily reduced to 15,000 rifles and about 30 guns, and estimates General Von Sanders' forces as amounting to 30,000 men and 90 guns. He adds :--"had he come on in any great strength on one of the weakest points of my line he must almost of a certainty have got through; as it was, he went in for disjointed attacks of a more or less general nature, each of which we were able to beat off comfortably with heavy loss to him."

The next four days were given up to negotiations for an armistice. This had been proposed on the evening of the 20th of May by the Turks, who were desirous of burying their dead. Some Turkish officers were sent forth to treat for a truce, and were met by Major-General Walker. It was discovered, however, that these bore no written credentials, and that the Turkish trenches were being manned in a very suspicious manner, and reinforced by columns moving up from the valley behind. Consequently the envoys were informed that no decision on the matter could be arrived at, and General Birdwood took every precaution against a possible Turkish attack. The negotiating parties on each side retired to their trenches, and firing broke out afresh.

During the 21st and 22nd, the Turks made fresh requests for an armistice, and, in order to arrange this, a Turkish officer was brought blindfolded from the vicinity of Gaba Tepe to Anzac Cove. This time he bore papers signed by General von Sanders, and it was agreed that there should be a suspension of arms from 7.0 a.m. to 4-30 p.m. on the 24th May. The truce was honourably carried out on both sides, and it should be mentioned that when the Turks were removing their wounded to Gaba Tepe they gave water and medical treatment to our wounded as well. The Turkish officers behaved like gentlemen, but it was noticed that the German officers present were "Suspicious and arrogant." Three thousand Turks were buried, the whole of whom had been killed during the operations since the 18th May.

For the next few days there was a lull in the operations. Both sides, however, were busily sapping towards one another's lines, the New Zealand miners doing specially valuable work and constructing trenches, tunnels, and bomb-proof shelters in the most vulnerable parts. On the 28th May, at 9 p.m., we made a brisk attack on the Turkish post overlooking the beach north of Gaba Tepe. The position was captured by a party of 50 rifles, and a similar attack was also successfully delivered against an enemy trench in the northern part of our line.

On the 29th a fresh Turkish attack was delivered against Quinn's Post. This was one of the most serious engagements in the whole course of the operations. Quinn's Post had, up till now, borne constantly the brunt of the Turkish attack, acting like the peak of a promontory battered by the inrushing sea. The enemy had been busily mining against this position, and trying to check the counter-mining of our engineers. At dawn, on the morning of the 29th, a Turkish mine was sprung near the centre of Quinn's Post. 

A terrific uproar occurred, and the enemy immediately charged our trenches, swarming over the parapets and embankments, and showering bombs at us. Shrapnel and rifle fire followed, and one who was present at this battle describes it as the "worst of all the infernos I had ever dreamed or read of." Fifteen yards of our trenches had been blown up, and it was through this gap that the Turks were pouring; but they were immediately subjected to a heavy enfilading fire, and at 5.30 a.m. a counter attack was launched. and the Turks were driven back from their position, with the most heavy casualties, by the 15th Australian Infantry Battalion. 

Most unfortunately, this operation resulted in the death of that most gallant officer, Major Quinn, who was shot while leading his men in the attack. Almost immediately, after the retaking of the trench, the Turks began a fresh bombardment with heavy guns. machine-guns, rifles, and bombs,
and under this cover delivered another attack. This, however, was again repulsed by our troops with the heaviest and the same fate befell a further Turkish attack delivered an hour or so later. 

Sir Ian Hamilton estimates that the Turkish losses in this engagement were probably equal to those sustained on. the 9th and 10th May. During this engagement the Turks fought with great courage, and even after the main attack was repelled, threatened our positions by sapping, and made it necessary for us to deliver counter attacks in order to avoid disaster similar to that threatened
on the 29th.

The next important operation at Anzac occurred on the 4th and 5th June. The Turks, it should be noted, possessed large reserves lying between Anzac and Krithia, which they were able to move up to either position at a few hours' notice. Sir Ian Hamilton was meditating an attack in the southern zone, which will be described elsewhere, and it was discovered that enemy reinforcements were being sent up from the direction of Maidos towards Krithia. The Anzac forces, in order to divert these troops from the southern zone, were ordered to carry out three separate enterprises. 

The first consisted of a demonstration against Gaba Tepe, in which the Navy co-operated by bombarding the Turkish trenches. The two remaining operations took place at, or near, Quinn's Post.
The first consisted of a sortie made by two small parties of New Zealand troops against a Turkish trench about 200 yards distant from the position. One of these parties suffered considerably, and they were at first driven back, but on the next day they made a second attempt, which was more successful, demolishing a machine-gun emplacement which had enfiladed our position.

The last operation, however, was the most important of all. This consisted of an attack directed against the trenches immediately in front of Quinn's Post, and only 10 yards distant from our own trenches. This was delivered at 11 p.m. by a party of 60 men, accompanied by bomb-throwers.
The position was taken most brilliantly and gallantly, but was subjected V throughout the night to a heavy fire and to a strong Turkish counter-attack, accompanied with bombs of heavier type than had hitherto been used. Two hours after dawn the trench was evacuated, but the Turks had suffered heavy casualties.

There were no further operations of any magnitude until the spirited operation of the 5th June, which may be related in Sir Ian Hamilton's own words:-

A sortie was made from Quinn's Post by two officers and 100 men of the 1st Australian Infantry, the objective being the destruction of a machine-gun in a trench known as German Officers' Trench. A special party of 10 men with the officer commanding the party (Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion, New South Wales, Australian Imperial Force) made a dash for the machine-gun; one of the ten men managed to fire three rounds into the gun at a range of five feet, and another three at the same range through a loop hole. The darkness of the trench and its overhead cover prevented the use of the bayonet, but some damage was done by shooting down over the parapet. As much of the trench as possible was dismantled. The party suffered some casualties from bombs, and was enfiladed all the time by machine-guns from either flank. The aim of this gallant assault being attained, the party withdrew in good order with their wounded. Casualties in all were 36.

Throughout the months of June and July both armies were for the most part marking time. The Turks had discovered that our men had come to stay. On the other hand, we found it impossible to make further headway against positions fortified by the skill of German engineers, and occupied in ever-increasing force by fresh troops brought up from Constantinople. Furthermore, Sir Ian Hamilton was awaiting the reinforcements which he had so urgently demanded at the time of the Landing.

These, if they had arrived in time, would almost certainly have turned the whole course of events. As has been pointed out, the Australians did not at first take kindly to trench warfare, and it had always been their ambition and desire to meet the Turk in the open; but they had by now evolved a new kind of pride in the warfare they were conducting, a pride based largely on their knowledge that they had never yet been permanently driven from any position which they had taken, in spite of continuous enemy efforts of the fiercest kind. 

They had now made their fire-trenches impregnable, and at Quinn's Post had converted what had previously been No Man's Land into a strong position of vantage. The operations now took on all the monotonous yet dangerous features of trench warfare, our troops giving themselves up to bombing, sapping, and sniping.

Towards the end of this period, however. the monotony was broken sensationally, and by a greater and fiercer attack than had hitherto been launched against our positions. On the 28th June Sir Ian Hamilton had ordered a fresh attack from Anzac for the purpose of distracting the enemy's attention from certain operations, which were taking place at Helles. The engagement opened with the shelling of the enemy's heavy guns by the monitor "Humber" and the destroyers. We also shelled the enemy's reserves with guns and howitzers, doing terrible damage and repelling counter-attacks directed against the left of our advanced troops. The 2nd Light Horse and the 3rd Infantry Brigade moved out on the right and covered 700 yards, after which they encountered the enemy in strength.

Having inflicted great loss, and held up a large Turkish force, they retired in good order under heavy rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire.

This attack was the prelude to the great assault made on the night of the 29th and 30th June by the Turks, acting under the direct personal order of Enver Pasha. This brilliant but erratic adventurer had conceived the idea of imitating the great drives which Mackensen had used with such effect against the Russians, but, unfortunately, he had none of Mackensen's experience, and but little of the genius shown by the German general in the hurling of huge masses of troops at their objective.

His artillery tactics, however, were correct, and were delivered with the advantage of large supplies
of shells which he had brought from Constantinople, and of considerable rein of troops. His gunners had studied our positions carefully throughout the day, and the bombardment was as accurate as it was unexpected.

About midnight, the Turkish fire broke out in an overwhelming roar and flame; the whole mountain-side, as well as the Anzac trenches, were illuminated, and the Turkish trenches rattled and blazed with rifle fire. This bombardment lasted for 90 minutes, and then Enver launched his troops in dense massed columns against the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps under the command of Major-General Godley. The snipers to our north heard shouts of "Allah, Allah," and the Turks poured across the parapets into our nearest saps. A few got over, and none returned. 

The majority made for the main firing trenches, where they were opposed by the maxims and machine-guns of the 7th and 8th Light Horse. General Birdwood was quite ready for them, but withheld both gun and rifle fire until they were at close quarters, when a murderous fire was poured into their ranks. By 2 a.m. the attack was broken, and an hour later a fresh attack on Quinn's Post was delivered, but was crumpled up by a withering fire. The enemy's casualties in this operation were very large : "in areas directly exposed to view between 400 and 500 were actually seen to fall.

One more operation, and a very brilliant one, took place toward the end of those weeks of comparative quiet which preceded our great final attack. On the south of our line a position known as Tasmania Post was threatened by the enemy, and it became imperative that an extended Turkish trench should be taken. An assaulting party from the 11th Battalion of the 3rd Australian Brigade dashed forward after a series of mines had been fired, and rushed the trenches. The Australians, as usual, were delighted at the opportunity of using the bayonet, and did this with such effect that they killed 100 Turks, with casualties to themselves amounting to 11 killed and 74 wounded. The crest of the ridge was seized, and our whole position at this point rendered once more secure.