On the evening of the 23rd,
transports containing the 29th Division left the Harbour for Tenedos, where, on the 24th, they were re-embarked
on warships and fleet-sweepers. These were to take them close enough in-shore to enable them to be transferred to the small boats, in which they
be towed to the beaches.
The main landings at Cape Helles were to be effected at beaches "V," "W," and "X." Of these, "W" and "V," as the map shows, lie at the extreme tip of the Peninsula, "X"
being a little around the south-western corner, and somewhere about a mile and a half north of "W." A mile or so "X" lies "Y," one of the two beaches designated for the subsidiary
landings which were to protect the flanks of the main attacking forces and to divide the forces of the enemy. The other beach, "S," lies on the opposite
side of the Peninsula, nearly two miles along the coast, north-east of beach
"V." Both "V" and "S" are exposed to the fire of the Turkish forts on the Asiatic side of the Straits.
The Landing at Cape Helles was protected by a very strong naval
force under the command of Rear-Admiral R. E. Wemyss, C.M.G., M.V.O., whose squadron consisted of the following ships :
- Battleships-
- "Swiftsure,"
- "Implacable,"
- "Cornwallis,"
- "Albion,"
- "Vengeance,"
- "Lord Nelson,"
- "Prince George;"
- Cruisers-
- "Euryalus, "
- "Talbot,"
- "Minerva,"
- "Dublin;"
- six fleet-sweepers and fourteen trawlers.
We may deal with the separate landings in order, beginning with
Beach "Y." It will be noticed that in the passage quoted from Sir Ian Hamilton's first despatch, there are
two positions in this region, "Y" and "Y2". "Y," the former, being more remote from "X" than is the latter. "Y2" was easier of approach, but it had been very strongly fortified with machine and Hotchkiss guns, and was practically
impregnable. "Y," on the other hand, was backed by precipices, so steep that the Turks had not troubled to defend them. The landing force here consisted of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Marines. They embarked on the "Amethyst'; and "Sapphire," and, accompanied by the transports "Southland" and "Braemar Castle," steamed in-shore, being covered by a heavy fire from H.M.S. "Goliath."
With great gallantry and speed they scaled the beetling cliffs, and attempted their immediate objective, namely, to get into touch with the landing party at Beach "X."
Unfortunately, however, a very strong Turkish force had by this time
come up from "Y2;" the Borderers had to give up all thought of "X" and to fight desperately for their own existence. They were outflanked,
outnumbered fourfold, and subjected to heavy fire from the enemy's field
artillery; yet for twenty-four hours they held on to their position, delivering
repeated bayonet charges, and suffering tremendous losses.
Eventually the situation became intolerable, and they were withdrawn at
7.0 a.m. on the 26th in the "Goliath," "Talbot," "Dublin," "Amethyst," and "Sapphire." This operation was notable for the remarkably
gallant stand made during the re-embarkation at the cliff by a party of the Borderers,
who protected their retiring comrades from what would probably have been
an annihilating enemy fire.
The landing at "X" beach was the most successful of all. The troops
detached for it consisted of a battalion of Royal Fusiliers, which embarked
on the "Implacable" on the 24th, and disembarked on the following morning
between 4-3o and 5.15 a.m. After the "Implacable" had landed the troops, she stood close in-shore, and delivered a thundering fire upon the
enemy with all her available guns. Admiral de Robeck points out that the success of this particular operation was due to the nature of the beach,
which was very favourable for the covering fire from the ships.
The troops made their way inland, and attacked the Turkish trenches on Hill 114,
between "V" and "W" beaches. They were heavily counter-attacked, but held their ground nobly for a whole day. For the time being, they were
forced to give ground; but, being reinforced by two more battalions of the
87th Brigade, they made good their position, well in front of the landing
place, where they came in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers on "W" beach.
On this beach the fight was far more deadly. It extends between Cape
Tekke and Cape Helles, being some 350 yards long and 15 to 40 yards wide. It was by nature more exposed to attack than the beach at
"Y" and, as a consequence, it was far more strongly held by the enemy. In
officials reports, the place is described as a death-trap. It was protected
by land-mines and sea-mines, and exposed both in front and in flank to the fire of pom-poms, maxims, and snipers. The sand dunes, overlooking
the beach, bristled with trenches, and the holes in the cliff contained
cunningly concealed machine guns. There was barbed wire everywhere in the sea, across the beach, on the cliffs behind the sand dunes, and on the
flanks, where it prevented any intercommunication between "V" and "W" beaches.
A tremendous covering fire was opened by the warships upon this
position at 5 a.m., and continued up to the very moment of landing, but,
unfortunately, this had very little effect upon the defences. The troops
approached the beach in the charge of eight tows, three of which made for
the cliffs near Cape Helles, three for the beach itself, and two for the flank
near Cape Tekke. The Turks withheld their fire until the first boat had touched the ground, and then poured forth a deadly fusillade.
The Fusiliers found themselves confronted by a bristling hedge of barbed wire, but hacked through it with indomitable courage, although the whole first line was "at once mown as by a scythe." Indeed, almost all who landed first at the centre were shot down, but a certain number got through, being enabled to do so by the fire of the warships and the flanking fire of the landing party on the left. Three lines of trenches had been captured by io a.m., and reinforcements were sent up at this period, so that two hours later the whole force was able to come in touch with the troops who had landed at "X" beach, and to get a firm hold across the Peninsula. This part of the operations, despite the heavy losses incurred, had been brilliantly successful.
Less success, but not less gallantry, distinguished the operations on the
right of Beach "W." The attempt of the troops here was to get in touch
with the landing party at Beach "V." The Worcestershire Regiment advanced to the attack, and pushed along the cliff to the eastward. Here they were confronted by bristling and apparently impenetrable wire entanglements. The heroic wire-cutters could be seen through glasses "quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as though they were pruning a vineyard." Heavy counter attacks were delivered on the whole position throughout the night, but the men held their own, although contact was not immediately established with beach "V."
Sir Ian Hamilton holds that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British
soldier - or any other soldier than the storming of these trenches from the open boats on the morning
of 25th April.
The most terrible episode of all, however, was the landing at beach "V," which lies between Cape Helles and Sedd-el Bahr. The features of this landing place are not unlike those of beach "W." The beach itself is 3,50
yards long and 10 yards wide. It is commanded by terraced slopes which give every opportunity to the fire of a defending force. Southeast of the beach lies the fort of Sedd-el
Bahr, battered into ruins by the earlier bombardment of the British Fleet. The slopes bristled with trenches, and riflemen nestled
everywhere among the broken masonry. Almost every part of the beach was exposed to a murderous cross-fire.
There was, however, an escarpment a few feet high, where the sand hills descend to the beach, and this afforded the only semblance of shelter that could be found anywhere upon that bed of slaughter. Barbed wire ran everywhere along the foreshore, across the beach itself, and very thickly indeed up the hill cast of the position. The attacking force was subjected to the fire of pom-poms, maxims, and snipers on every hand.
As at beach "W," heavy bombardment from the warships preceded the landing. The first attempt was made by three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers, who were towed ashore after the fashion already described; but the distinguishing feature of this operation was the part played in it by the collier "River Clyde." This humble vessel was destined to play as splendid
and tragic a part as any engaged in the great War. She had been specially prepared for the Landing by her Commander, Commander Unwin, R.N., large holes having been cut in her sides, through which the troops could pass swiftly on to a gang-plank leading to lighters, which were to be anchored
between the bow of the ship and the beach.
These, so it was hoped, would form a gangway by which the men could pass directly to the shore. In her bows the "River Clyde" carried a battery of machine
guns with sand bags to cover them. Her freight, consisting of 2,000 men, was
the remaining company of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, and some other details. This landing differed from that of beach "W," inasmuch as no flanking attacks were possible.
The open boats and the "River Clyde" reached the shore simultaneously and, here as elsewhere, the Turks withheld
their fire till the boats grounded, when there broke out from all sides and from all arms a devastating fusillade. Even before
they had left the boats, the Fusiliers suffered terrible losses, and when
they landed, the only survivors were those who managed to rush across & beach
and shelter beneath the providential escarpment.
The fire was so terrific that none of the boats were able to return, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach. The "River Clyde" now opened her sides like a more tragic Horse of Troy, and began to pour forth her living freight. She was immediately subjected to a terrific fire. The lighters, moreover, which were to form a gangway to the shore, could not be kept in their proper positions, chiefly owing to the heavy current, and when they were secured, the pier connecting them was swept away by the tide.
Three companies of the Munster Fusiliers rushed in succession for the shore, but few of them ever reached it.
Probably less than half of these survivors managed to cross the beach and reach the crouching shelter beneath the escarpment. As many met their death by
drowning and when the connection with the shore was cut off, through the lighters breaking loose, many lay down in them, and were here killed by the rain of fire. Thus perished Brigadier-General Napier, Captain
Costeker, and many other brave officers.
This stage of the operations was distinguished by one of the most heroic episodes of the whole war. When the lighters broke loose, Commander
Unwin waded into the water waist deep, and got them once more into position, being assisted at this work by
Midshipman Drewry, R.N.R., Midshipman Sinclair Malleson, R.N., and Able-seamen
VV. C. Williams and George Mackenzie Samson. This most gallant deed was, of course, performed under a hail of fire.
Even when the bridge was prepared, it was impossible to use it for landing, for as soon as any troops appeared upon it, they were shot down. Consequently the disembarkation ,vas stopped, and, while daylight lasted, the remaining troops intended for beach "V" were diverted to beach "W."
It was at this juncture that the gallant attempt was made by the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers to pierce the barbed wire
hedge separating beach "W" from beach "V." Had this been successful, the Turks would have been taken in the flank and the landing completed without any considerable further loss; but the failure of this heroic attempt
has already been described. When night fell the wounded men struggled back, despite the bright moonlight, on to the collier;
and now, and not till now the thousand troops who still remained aboard her, safe behind the sand bag shelter, were able to make their way ashore and join their comrades crouching behind the merciful sandbank.
With dawn came a measure of relief. Admiral Wemyss ordered a heavy bombardment by H.M.S. "Albion" of the Turkish positions at the two forts and
Sadd-el-Bah- village, and, under cover of this, the men leapt up from their scanty
shelter and, despite the heaviest rifle and machine gun fire, fought their
way inch by inch up the incline, and then, after a magni6cent dash
across the open, stormed the Old Castle and Hill IV, and made good their position here. The beach was thus cleared for the disembarkation of the remaining troops.
Admiral de Robeck describes the success of the operation as "miraculous;" but unfortunately no miracle intervened to save the life of
Lieutenant Colonel C. H. H. Doughty-Wylie, the moving spirit of the whole attack. A member of Sir Ian Hamilton's staff, he had joined the landing party, and, in his commander's words, "had been striving with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep his comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril." He was shot down in the very moment of the victory that had been so largely of his own making.
Concurrently with the British landings, a French landing had taken place on the Asiatic side of the Straits at Kum Kale. The object of this operation was twofold. It was desired to prevent the enemy from occupying new positions in this locality, where they could bring gun fire to bear on the transports off Cape Helles; but the main objective consisted of the batteries already in position at Kum Kale, which could fire straight into "V" and "S" beaches. The French
landing was covered by the fire of the French Fleet, and was effected
very successfully by 10 a.m.
The troops pushed forward to Veni Shehr, where
they were held up by a heavy fire from trenches concealed south of Kum Kale village.
They had done most that was expected of them, however, and the diversion they effected greatly helped the landing at "S" beach. where the 2nd South Wales Borderers and a detachment of the 2nd London Field Company R.E. were put ashore under the fire of the "Cornwallis" and "Lord Nelson." On the 26th the French were re-embarked for positions allotted to them at "V" beach,
The worst of the carnage was now over. The beaches were becoming
congested with fresh reinforcements and supplies; so Sir Ian Hamilton ordered a general advance to a new line stretching from Eski Hissarlik Point
(N.E. of beach "W), to a point two miles north of Tekke Burnu, near the mouth of a great nullah, or valley, which a few days later was to be the scene of tremendous fighting. Even with the gain of this fresh
ground, the Allied position was felt to be congested, and on the next day (April 28th) the heroic 29th Division was hurled north on
Krithia, the Naval Division and the French forces co-operating actively on the right. A determined fight for the village ensued, the Allies being greatly helped by the fire of the Fleet. A single 15in. shell from H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth" wiped out a body
of 250 Turks.
It may be noted here that on the previous day the "Queen Elizabeth," under aeroplane direction, had fired over the hills of the Gallipoli Peninsula at a Turkish transport
which was approaching the Narrows, and had sunk her in three shots.
Despite the help of the Fleet, the Allies had to fall back from the village and consolidate their line after a day's strenuous fighting. A determined counter attack by the Turks
along our whole line was repelled, and at the end of the dav we held a position stretching from three miles north of Tekke Burnu to one mile north of Eski Hissarlik. We have Sir Ian Hamilton's assurance that if we had had reinforcements and munitions during this operation we should have won Krithia and gained a footing on Achi Baba.
Unfortunately, from beginning to end of the Gallipoli campaign, this same lack was felt, and resulted again and again in tragic failure. |