Gallipoli: Chapter 10 of The Story of The Anzacs

Gallipoli Peninsular	Gallipoli relief map

He, at any rate, was under no illusion as to the fate of the enterprise as it was originally planned and conducted. The wording of his first despatch and the probabilities of the situation suggest that it had been originally intended to send only a sufficiently large land force to help the fleet by shore operations, once this had succeeded in the main task. The event showed, however, that an entirely different plan of campaign was necessary, and that if a land force was to be used at all, it must be a large one, and must bear the brunt of the attack. 

Even so, success was anything but assured. But, in estimating Sir Ian Hamilton's responsibility for what followed, it becomes important to note that he recognised the great difficulty of the situation from the very outset, and in all his despatches warned the War Office that without large forces, there could be little hope of success. Before proceeding farther, it may be worth while to give some particulars as to the career of this distinguished commander.

Tents of the 4th Field Ambulance

Sir Ian Hamilton was born at Corfu in 1853. His war service includes the Afghan War of 1878-80, the Boer War of 1881, the Nile Expedition of I884-5, and the Burmese Campaign of 1886. In 1895 he became Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General of the Chitral Relief Force, and in 1897 he was appointed to the command of the 3rd Brigade of the Tirah Expeditionary Force. Throughout the last Boer War, he was Chief of Staff in Natal and Commander of the Mounted Infantry Division, and he was also one of the defenders of Ladysmith. 

Returning to England, he was appointed to the Southern Command, and came prominently before the public through his efforts to make the Territorial Army a success. He has been frequently wounded whilst on active service; early in his career his left arm was permanently injured by the bursting of a shell; on another occasion he was struck in the face by a flying splinter of shell, and in 1900 he was thrown from his horse and broke his collar-bone while on his way to take up the command against the Orange Free State Forces under De Wet.

He possesses a fine literary gift, as may be seen from his three despatches regarding the present War, and from the "Leaves from a Staff Officer's Note Book," which record his impressions of the Russo-Japanese War. A fine appreciation of his character and ability is embodied in Mr. John Masefield's book, "Gallipoli," which is dedicated to him.

It was well known from the outset that there had been marked opposition to the Dardanelles Expedition in certain military as well as in certain naval, circles, and that feeling ran strong against the weakening of the Western Front by the carrying out of "side-shows" in parts of the earth not immediately 'connected' with the central operations. This particular objection applied more strongly to a land attack than to a naval. The British Fleet in the North Sea had established so strong a superiority over the German, that it could easily afford to detach such a squadron as that which had vainly attempted to force the Narrows. 

This was not the case with the land forces of Britain and France. The situation on the Western Front was at this period precarious, and it seemed still possible that the Germans might force their way through to Calais, or even Paris. For this reason, General Joffre declined to weaken his line, or to despatch regular units of his army from France to the Dardanelles. The French contribution was limited to a force of Marines, a detachment from the Colonial Army, and a Foreign Legion. The nucleus of the whole force consisted of the British 29th Division, comprised mainly of regulars to be hereafter specified, and also of a Territorial Battalion, the 5th Royal Scots. 

In addition there was the famous Naval Division, now reinforced after its disaster at Antwerp; the East Lancashire Territorial Division; a strong force of Indian troops; and lastly, the troops which more immediately concern ourselves, the Australian and New Zealand Divisions. This force, as has been already shown, had completed its training in Egypt, and had, in fact, become, if anything, somewhat over-trained. The collapse of the Turkish attempt on the Canal made it possible to detach the greater part of it, leaving the defence of Egypt in the safe hands of the remaining Australasian troops, the Indian troops and the Territorials. The combined forces for the Dardanelles Expedition amounted to an army of about 120,000 men. Such was the material at Sir Ian Hamilton's disposal.

His objective and plan of campaign are most fitly described in the language of his first despatch:-

THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.

"By that time I had already carried out a preliminary reconnaissance of the north-western shore of the Gallipoli Peninsula, from its isthmus, where it is spanned by the Bulair fortified lines, to Cape Helles, at its extremest point. From Bulair this singular feature runs in a south-westerly direction for 52 miles, attaining near its centre a breadth of 12 miles. 

The northern coast of the northern half of the promontory slopes downwards steeply to the Gulf of Xeros, in a chain of hills, which extend as far as Cape Suvla. The precipitous fall of these hills precludes landing, except at a few narrow gullies, far too restricted for any serious military movements. The southern half of the peninsula is shaped like a badly-worn boot. The ankle lies between Gaba Tepe and Kalkmaz Dagh; beneath the heel lie the cluster of forts at Kilid Bahr; whilst the toe is that promontory five miles in width, stretching from Tekke Burnu to Sedd-el-Bahr.

• The three dominating features in this southern section seemed to me to be:
  • (1) Sari Bair Mountain, running up in a succession of almost perpendicular escarpments to 970 feet. The whole mountain seemed to be a network of ravines and covered with thick jungle.
  • (2) Kilid Bahr Plateau, which rises, a natural fortification artificially fortified, to a height of 700 feet to cover the forts of the Narrows from an attack from the Aegean.
  • (3) Achi Babi, a hill 6oo feet in height, dominating at long field gun range that I have described as being the toe of the peninsula.

A peculiarity to be noted as regards this last southern sector is that from Achi Babi to Cape Helles the ground is hollowed out like a spoon, presenting only its outer edges to direct fire from the sea. The inside of the spoon appears to be open and undulating, but actually it is full of spurs, nullahs, and confused under-features.

Generally speaking, the coast is precipitous, and good landing-places are few. Just south of Tekke Burnu is a small sandy bay (W.), and half a mile north of it is another small break in the cliffs (X). Two miles farther up the coast the mouth of a stream indents these same Cliffs (Y 2), and yet
another mile and a half up a scrub-covered gully looked as if active infantry might be able to scramble up it on to heights not altogether dissimilar to those of Abraham, by Quebec (Y). Inside Sedd-el-Bahr is a sandy beach (V), about 300 yards across, facing a semi-circle of steeply-rising ground, as the flat bottom of a half-saucer faces the rim, a rim flanked on one side by an old castle, on the other by a modern fort. 

By Eski Hissarlik, on the east of Morto Bay (S), was another small beach, which was, however, dominated by the big guns from Asia. Turning northwards again, there are two good landing-places on either side of Gaba Tepe. Farther to the north of that promontory the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult. In most of these landing-places the trenches and lines of wire entanglements
were plainly visible from on board ship. What seemed to be gun emplacements and infantry redoubts could also be made out through a telescope, but of the full extent of these defences and of the forces available to man them there was no possibility of judging except by practical test.

Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success, whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have described - a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout, and prepared for any such attempt - involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. 

The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable if awkward contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force.

The weather was also bound to play a vital part in my landing. Had it been British weather there would have been no alternative but instantly to give up the adventure. To land two or three thousand men, and then to have to break off and leave them exposed for a week to the attacks of 34,000 regular troops, with a hundred guns at their back, was not an eventuality to be lightly envisaged. Whatever happened the weather must always remain an incalculable factor, but at least by delay till the end of April we had a fair chance of several days of consecutive calm.

It will be noticed at once that the main obstacle to any effective occupation of the Peninsula, and the main objective of the Allies' attack, was the great rock fortress of Achi Baba. The aim of the whole expedition was the control of the Narrows; there was no possibility of approaching them as long as Achi Baba and its outpost, the village of Krithia, remained in the enemy's hands. During the first stage of the operations, therefore, the attack from Helles, as Sir Ian Hamilton has told us, was considered the principal operation. 

But even were Achi Baba taken, the main object would by no means have been achieved. The ridges behind would have to be successively stormed, and, above all things, the commanding plateau of Kilid Bahr would have to be permanently occupied by an invading force. Once this were done, we would dominate the Straits, and could submit the European and Asiatic forts at the entrance and at the Narrows to a devastating fire. It was in view of the Kilid Bahr objective that the attack on Gaba Tepe became vitally important. 

If it could once secure the pass leading to Maidos, the way was prepared for the attack upon the plateau, and this operation would have the best possible chance of success--always assuming that the Helles force had achieved its original objective. It is important to remember, however, that the Gaba Tepe venture was originally intended to be secondary to the other, and did not take first place until a fairly advanced stage of the operations.

By this time the transports containing the Australian and other troops had arrived at Mudros Harbour. Sir Ian Hamilton found that the forces had not been distributed in such a way as to suit the order of their disembarkation, and consequently sent them back to the Egyptian ports, with the exception of the Australian Infantry Brigade, and the details already encamped at Lemnos. He himself proceeded to Egypt on March 24th, and during the next fortnight he and General D'Amade personally superintended the redistribution of the troops. 

During this period, he was joined by the British forces from Great Britain, which arrived at Alexandria on the 1st of April. In April he returned with his General Staff to Lemnos. Final preparations were carried on henceforward till the 23rd of the month, the troops being exercised in landing manoeuvres while lying in Mudros harbour.