The Problem of the Dardanelles: Chapter 9 of The Story of The Anzacs

Signallers of 3rd Light Horse Brigade watching the warships in the Aegean Sea

Occupation of the Narrows, and a free passage through them, would have been a possession of priceless importance. Constantinople must necessarily fallen to their possessors, even as it had fallen to those Ottoman Turks who in 1358 seized the Peninsula as a preliminary to their conquest of South Eastern Europe.

If an Allied Fleet could once make its way into the Sea of Marmora, it was probable that the Turks would be detached from an alliance in which the greater number of them had been unwilling participants in any case, the power and prestige of the war party and of Enver Pasha would be
injured beyond all possibility of recovery. 

If transports could once pass freely through the Narrows, Constantinople must fall, and with it, the Turkish Empire; and, given that catastrophe, Allied ascendancy was permanently secured in the Balkans. and Germany's ambition of Eastern domination and expansion was foiled for ever. Certain neutral nations, who were anxiously awaiting the final issue, would have been left in little doubt as to what this would be, and it is certain that some of them would have entered the War on the Allies' side. 

Before the Dardanelles Expedition British diplomacy in the Balkans had come in for hostile criticism, and it was believed, rightly or wrongly, that had our action here been firmer and swifter, Greece might have been secured as our Ally, and Bulgaria might still be prevented from coming in as an enemy. There was now an opportunity of redressing the balance and securing both these advantages.

But the most pressing consideration of all lay in the just claims of Russia. After having fought with splendid determination and success during the early months of the War, she had at last given ground before the pressure of the German war machine, and her statesmen were eager for any diversion which might bring  her relief. Forced into war with both Turkey and Germany against her wish, she was determined that she would not emerge from the struggle defeated or a loser, and she had marked down Constantinople as her most desirable prize of victory-a prize coveted for centuries, which would provide her at last with a great warm water harbour and emporium. 

But Russia's desire that the Allies should open the Dardanelles was due in the first instance not to ambition, but to imperious necessity. She needed a free passage from Odessa to the Mediterranean
for two main reasons. Since the beginning of the war she had accumulated great stores of wheat; owing to the German blockade, these could not be despatched through the Baltic, while during the winter months it was impossible to clear them from the ice-bound pert of Archangel. 

Given the Dardanelles, she would have easy access to foreign markets. An even more important advantage would be the free ingress of munitions, lack of which had been the main cause of her early reverses. For all these reasons, possession of the Dardanelles was vitally important to Russia, and we now know that she exerted pressure upon the Allies in order to secure it. This fact must be of great weight in any discussion of the responsibility for the expedition. But if the end was one apparently warranting a mighty effort, were the means equally beyond criticism? 

Had the Dardanelles expedition ever any real chance of success, or was it justifiable solely as being necessary to the satisfaction of Russia? This question is still under dispute and will i quite possibly always remain so. There are vastly important points at issue. Firstly, had any attack on the Dardanelles, even if delivered in full military and naval force, and at the most favourable moment, a chance of succeeding? Secondly, such a chance within the power of a force operating by sea alone? Thirdly, -was it within the power of an expedition operating both by sea and land at the date of the actual invasion of Gallipoli Peninsula?

These questions can only be answered tentatively; but there seems little doubt that if a combined attack by land and sea had been launched the weeks immediately succeeding the outbreak of war with Turkey, success would have been not only possible but assured. As things are, such a combination of forces was not even contemplated until after the failure of two attacks by sea, each of which put the Turks upon their guard and rendered the all important element of surprise henceforth impossible. 

The first attack, that of November 3rd, 1914, was hardly of a serious nature, and consisted in a reconnaissance by the French and British Squadrons, combined with the bombardment of the entrance forts at long range. From that date onwards there had been desultory warfare, accompanied by such outstanding exploits as the torpedoing of the "'Messahdieh" by Lieutenant Holbrook after he had taken his submarine up the Straits through five lines of mines. It was not, however, until February 19th, 1915, that the main naval attack was made upon the Dardanelles.

The historical precedents for this attack consisted in the fact that during the last hundred years the Dardanelles had been twice passed by a British fleet. In 1807 a squadron, under Sir J. T. Duckworth, had passed through the Narrows in the teeth of gun-fire from the forts, had anchored opposite Constantinople and had threatened to bombard that city. Again, in 1877-8, during the Russo-Turkish war, a British squadron under Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby passed the Straits and anchored in the Sea of Marmora with the view of preventing the Russian seizure of Constantinople. 

Here, apparently, were encouraging precedents. But the circumstances attendant on each of these Expeditions might in themselves have warned the British Government of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of the task. Sir J. T. Duckworth, after accomplishing his task, had had to retreat somewhat hastily owing to the impossibility of transporting munitions and supply via the Straits. Had he not withdrawn, his fleet might have been caught like a rat in a trap, as prior to his retreat the Turkish engineers, working under the direction of the French, were strengthening the forts at the Narrows for his interception. As things were, he received a fairly severe punishment from the Turkish artillery (on his way out. 

Neither could Hornby's expedition be fairly quoted as a precedent, for his squadron, though menaced by the Turks, was never actually attacked by them either going or coming; and it is significant that he himself had warned the Home Authorities of the great difficulties and dangers attendant on a sea attack unsecured by the possession of Gallipoli Peninsula. But the chief drawback to the expedition lay in the fact that since the days of Duckworth and Hornby several entirely new developments had occurred in the development of warfare by land and sea. At sea, the use of mines, both drifting and stationary, made it impossible for a fleet to advance in a restricted area with the freedom and confidence of old, while the presence of submarines was also a new and vitally important factor. On land, garrison artillery had developed vastly in size, mobility and precision. 

For the old stationary cannon, had been substituted guns which could be easily trained, and kept trained, on a moving mark, while the mobility of modern batteries made it easy to remove them from the fire of naval guns which had found their range. Also, the possibilities of defence were enormously in favour of the forts as against the fleets. The ships presented isolated targets, vulnerable over all their surface to any hit; the forts could be strengthened to almost any extent with earth and concrete, so as to suffer but little from the effects of shellfire. In the present instance, as the event showed, the forts had been walled with riveted earth, and scientifically faced. 

The only chance for the attacking party lay in getting their shots absolutely home on the guns or parapets or embrasures. This was exceedingly difficult with guns designed for naval warfare and aiming at effecting direct hits at long range. Of course the British naval guns far outranged the Turkish land guns; but the advantage would at once be neutralised when the ships came within the channel of the Straits and had to operate at one mile instead of ten. Here, too, they would be exposed to the fire of the numerous concealed batteries, along both the European and the Asiatic coasts, whose small artillery, ineffective at long range, would prove deadly at short range, and might easily destroy the fire control of ship after ship. 

The peril would become acute at the narrowest point of the Straits, where only three-quarters of a mile separates Chanak from Kilid Bahr. In addition there were the mines, which might be either drifted down on the four knot current or anchored - as the event proved, they were anchored in the water off the Baikrah battery. And to crown all, there was the certainty that even if the warships could force the Narrows, there would still remain the question of supply, and the supreme difficulty of dispatching food and munitions through the narrow Straits dominated by enemy forces and fortresses.

If, on the other hand, a sufficient land force had been despatched to Gallipoli at this period, it seems likely that there would have been a reasonable chance of success. According  to eye witnesses, it was only after the naval attacks of February, 1915, that the land defences were increased to their subsequent great strength. One observer considers that "the few Turkish troops in the vicinity of Seddul Bahr and Kum Kale in mid-March would have been a mouthful for two resolute divisions" (

It was certain that possession of the Gallipoli Peninsula up to the lines of Bulair would give the fleet command of the passage, and would-result in the silencing of the forts along the Asiatic shore. Yet in spite of serious opposition in certain high naval quarters, it was decided to make the attempt with warships alone.

The first objects of attack were naturally the forts at Cape Helles on 6 the European, and Kum Kale, on the Asiatic, side, of the opening to the Straits. The warships engaged in the opening attack were the British ships "Inflexible," "Agamemnon," "Cornwallis," "Vengeance" and "Triumph," and the French ships "Bouvet," "Suffren" and "Gaulois." The combined fleet shelled the four extreme Turkish forts heavily at long range. There was at first no reply, but eventually the warships, steaming nearer in shore in the belief that the forts had been seriously injured, drew a vigorous fire, which showed that they had been mistaken in this supposition. 

The fleet withdrew, and owing to foul weather did not reopen operations till the 25th of February. It was on this occasion that the eight 15-inch guns of the "Queen Elizabeth" first came into play, representing the most powerful weapon used in naval warfare. The object, as in the former attack, was to silence the outer forts and then open the lower part of the channel to the whole fleet.

This part of the objective proved quite successful, as the "Queen Elizabeth" could pour shell after shell into the forts, while none of their shells could come anywhere near her. Her efforts were seconded, also at long range, by the "Agamemnon," the "Irresistible," and the "Gaulois." Early in the day, the Cape Helles guns were silenced, and by nightfall the main Asiatic and European forts had all ceased to fire. Now, and now only, was it possible for the Allied mine-sweepers to get to work, and they made good use of their opportunity, clearing the great mine field for four miles up the Straits.

This at first seemed a commanding advantage, as the minefield had previously made the passage impregnable, and as long as the shore batteries were active it was impossible for the mine-sweepers, with their powerful cranes and grappling-irons, to get to work. At one point 26 mines had been laid across the channel, completely closing it.

The clearing operation made it possible for some of the warships to enter the Straits and open fire on the forts within the heads, which had not previously been bombarded. It was here that the real difficulty and danger for the fleet began. Out at sea, they had had the forts at their mercy, being able to shell them with little danger of being hit in return. But now, in the close passage, the "Albion," "Vengeance" and "Majestic" were attempting a far more perilous adventure. At first they bombarded Fort Dardanos, and during the next few days landing parties were sent ashore on the Asiatic side.

These had several brushes with the Turkish troops, but were enabled to reach the silenced forts. Greatly to their surprise they found that these had by no means been completely destroyed. The great shells had broken up the concrete defences, but the earthworks had suffered little damage.
The main objectives of the squadron were now the two forts commanding the Narrows, at Chanak on the Asiatic side, and Kilid Bahr on the European. 

As a preliminary, the intermediate forts at Sogandere and Kephez had to be silenced. For four days there ensued a fierce bombardment, the greater part of the British squadron steaming into the Straits and shelling all the forts under a heavy fire. Their immediate objective was Fort Chanak, which carried the heaviest armament of al! the Dardanelles forts, and had now brought its big guns to bear upon the warships. While the "Vengeance," "Albion," "Majestic," "Prince George," together with the French squadron, made their attack from this quarter, a terrific bombardment was kept up by the "Queen Elizabeth," "Agamemnon," and "Ocean" from the outer side of Gallipoli Peninsula. 

The great guns were fired from a point off Gaba Tepe over the intervening range of hills and
over the Strait itself, and under the direction of planes they made fine shooting at a distance of twelve miles. On the 7th March, the last day of this operation, the French squadron made some good shooting, and eventually silenced Dardanos.

But the lesson indicated by the comparatively undamaged condition of the forts at Kum Kale had apparently not been learnt by those responsible for the expedition, who cherished the belief that because Chanak ceased replying to the naval guns, she had been permanently silenced. The same conditions which had operated at the outer forts probably prevailed here, and although the masonry was smashed, the great earthworks apparently remained intact. 

After the shelling of Bulair on -March 10th, a plucky dash into the Narrows was made by the light cruiser "Amethyst." This exploit was attended with considerable loss and danger, but it drew the enemy's fire, and enabled us to see that the passage would not yet be possible for the main squadron.

On March i8th, the final attempt was made to force the Narrows. The Allied Fleet had now grown to formidable proportions, numbering twelve British capital ships besides the French "Bouvet," "Charlemagne," "Gaulois," and "Suffren," and the Russian "Askold." Six British battleships, including the "Queen Elizabeth," led the way, their main objects of attack being once more Chanak and Kilid Bahr. The French squadron followed, and after temporarily silencing the lower forts, made wav for a further squadron of British battleships, which moved into the van of the attack, and made straight for Chanak. 

This consisted of the "Albion," "Irresistible," "Majestic" "Ocean," "Swiftsure" and "Vengeance." Under the withering bombardment of the whole fleet, the forts ceased firing, but the sequel showed that they had not been permanently silenced : for as the naval fire slackened during the transference of positions, their own fire broke out again with considerable violence, showing once more how difficult it is for a naval force to put land fortresses permanently out of action.

Several ships, notably the "Gaulois" and the "Inflexible" were badly injured by the Turkish guns, the French battleship being in a really serious plight. But it was not the Turkish gun fire which proved most deadly to the warships : it was the Turkish mines. Attention has already been drawn to the existence of permanent minefields in the Straits : but these, although a formidable obstacle, could at least be located and avoided, and as experience had shown, once the forts and batteries had been silenced, they could be removed by sweepers. 

But the Turks had now taken to sending down drift mines upon the four-knot current. These were all the more deadly because unexpected: the Turks had withheld them while the ships were separated and in the open sea, but now that they were together in the narrow channel, mines were liberated in such quantities as to baffle completely the sweepers which had been sent up to cope with this danger. The first victim was the "Bouvet," which had already suffered severely from shellfire. While moving down to her new position she blew up with a tremendous explosion, sinking within three minutes, and carrying with her most of her crew. 

Shortly afterwards, the "Irresistible" was also struck, and sank an hour after the explosion, most of the crew being saved under heavy fire by the gallant destroyers. The last victim was the "Ocean," which was struck shortly after sundown, and sank almost immediately, though two destroyers saved most of the crew. To remain longer in the Straits could only mean destruction for the rest of the fleet, and with the forts still firing, they withdrew from the channel at dusk. No men or ships could have done more : but they had been set a task that neither ships nor men could compass, and it was not their fault that they failed with terrible loss. 

If the Dardanelles were to be forced at all, a new way must be tried. . The acceptance of this conclusion led to a fresh act in the tragic drama. Though the naval operations dragged on for another month, little of importance was effected. The British submarine E15 was destroyed by two picket boats from the "Triumph" and "Majestic," under Lieutenant Commander Eric Robinson. The submarine had grounded on the Asiatic side of the Strait, midway between Kum Kale and Chanak, and there was some fear that the enemy would be able to capture and use her. Hence she was
torpedoed and destroyed by the picket boats under heavy and point-blank fire from the forts and batteries. 

This was not the least brilliant and gallant episode of the great naval venture. A more regrettable incident, and one of much greater moment to Australia, was the sinking of the Australian submarine AE2 by the enemy in the Sea of Marmora. She had the distinction of being the first British vessel
to pass through the Dardanelles since the beginning of the War. Her Commander, Lieut.-Commander Stoker, and the crew were saved, but are now prisoners in the interior of Asia Minor.