The Australian Navy. Chapter 4 of The Story of the Anzacs

Snipers Ridge showing "The Mitre"

Yet Australia firmly refused to increase this contribution, despite numerous protests in her Parliament and elsewhere. Her attitude in this matter, as the sequel showed, was not due to any luke-warmness as to defence matters or her duty toward the Empire, but to her peculiar views regarding her naval situation in the Pacific and the part she felt called to play therein. Thinking Australians had always believed that the safety of their country depended in the main on the Imperial navy and its control of the ocean, and especially of the North Sea. 

It was believed that in that sea lay Australia's first line of defence, and that a total or even a partial defeat of the British Navy there might swiftly lead to the downfall of Australia as a free nation. Knowing as she does that she is at present holding a large area with a totally inadequate population, Australia has never been under any illusion as to her debt to Great Britain and the British Navy in this matter. On the other hand, she had for long felt herself confronted by certain problems in the Pacific which, in her opinion, were not at this time fully understood or appreciated by the Imperial authorities. 

On the one hand, Australia was assured by certain British statesmen, seamen and publicists, that she, like the rest of the Empire, could only-or could best be defended by a fleet under central control operating in the North Sea and other European waters. This policy, the "one ocean, one navy" policy, had always been resisted by Australian statesmen. Their difficulty was that while one set of men was speaking to them in this sense, another was telling them that in the event of a great war, not only would the crowning battle be fought in the North Sea, but that the Naval forces stationed during peace time in the Pacific would be withdrawn, and their strength concentrated in home waters. 

The matter was stated very frankly by Professor Spencer Wilkinson in a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute on January 23rd, 1912:

Now the question has been raised but hardly discussed as to possible conflicts for the command of the Pacific. What I want. to call attention to is that in the present state of the world it is not very likely that the British Navy in the near future could seriously enter into such a contest in the Pacific because there is a phenomenon hardly mentioned this afternoon, and that is - Europe. The present position is that this country at any time might have to defend herself in Europe; and in any naval war which it would be prudent for us to think about, we have to keep in mind the possibility of a European war. It has been found necessary in the present state of Europe, and is likely to remain necessary, that the principle force of our navy should be concentrated in European waters. It is not advisable while that state of things lasts that any large force should be detached into the Pacific. At least, such a detachment might render doubtful the issue of a European war.

This tended to show Australians that in case of war, no part of the British Navy could be spared to defend the coasts of the Dependencies. And the matter was complicated still further for Australia by the fact that her British advisers spoke with varying voices. Thus Mr. Winston Churchill declared that it would be the function of the outer Dominions to patrol the oceans surrounding their own coasts. Others, on the contrary, suggested that the warships which Australia and New Zealand had proposed to build should never proceed to those countries, but should be kept and used in home waters. 

Ready though she was in the cause of the Empire, Australia was perplexed by this situation, and eagerly desired some policy of naval defence which would cover the problems immediately con-
fronting her.

The Australian point of view was clearly stated by a writer in the "Round Table" of September, 1912, who in an article headed "A Plea for a National Policy," drew attention to Australia's Pacific problem. The main danger here was indicated as coming from the East and its rapidly expanding nations. Against these it was shown the position of Australia was strategically weak. She was "a lonely outpost of European civilisation in a region which is profoundly alien." 

Did a hostile power determine to invade her, she must speedily submit. And her safety was vital to
the Empire as a whole, for "India could hardly be held for the Empire with an aggressive power in Australia, and the British possessions in the Pacific would, of course, share the fate of Australia." The strategic position and the danger of invasion were only part of the matter: a further aspect
was embodied in the "White Australia" policy, which perhaps represented Australia's most cherished ideal. Great Britain found it difficult to understand the intensity with which Australia clung to this principle, and the sacrifices which she was prepared to make for its continued realisation. 

Weapons of defence are more powerful than weapons of offence, and a very strong naval armament will be required to establish a conquest of Australia. But in our present unprepared state we cannot take advantage of these weaknesses, and we offer a strong temptation to an aggressive power. Australia must realize that she has to shoulder the burden of nationhood. She has to undertake the responsibility for her own defence under circumstances that involve universal devotion to her national ideal. The future may demand great sacrifices. It will demand our best intelligence and the concentration of all our resources. There is no reason to fear that Australians will fail to respond to such a call, but, as they develop their defence policy, they are beginning to realize that it is not on armaments alone that defence depends. Defence depends chiefly upon policy.

These requirements are a very fair embodiment of the aspirations of Australian Nationalism. Their opponents tried to meet them by saying that even if Australia possessed a Fleet of her own, she would be still far weaker than the strongest naval power. To this she replied that this was perfectly true if the Australian Navy were to be regarded as an isolated unit: but that the case would be very different if Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa would combine to form a Pacific fleet operating in the interests of the whole Empire and for the defence of their respective coasts. A vitally important point in that scheme would be the full control of the main strategic points in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

These considerations were in great measure responsible for the adoption of Admiral Henderson's scheme for Australian Naval construction. But there was yet another feeling and desire in the minds of most Australians. This was the wish to participate more closely in naval work and to have a proprietary interest in at least a part of it. The money contribution had never kindled the imagination of Australians, and had always been regarded by them as a somewhat huckstering method of defence contribution. They had no affection for a hired fleet, even were the lessor England. They wanted their own ships, manned by their own men. 

They wanted to be "in" the Navy just as Wendy in "Peter Pan" wanted to be "in the story." It will be remembered that in ancient Greece, the Confederacy of Delos, originally formed to resist the Persian, decayed and eventually broke up when the naval contributions of the several States were commuted for money payments. In the instance of the Australian Navy, the case was reversed : for directly the money contribution ceased and the contribution in kind began, Australia showed that her former disinclination to make a money payment had not been due to apathy nor to any selfish readiness to accept the protection of Great Britain while making little or no return. 

Both the Liberal and Labour Parties vied with one another in forwarding the new scheme. The Liberal Party arranged for the visit of Admiral Henderson, and, as has been indicated, ordered the new ships in 1909. After the defeat of the Liberals in 1910, the Labour Party adopted the scheme suggested, with certain improvements, and immediately put it into action. The Australian Navy is consequently not the product of a party scheme, but of a supreme national ambition.

The difference in results has been striking and even startling. It has been pointed out that up till the adoption of Admiral Henderson's report, the annual contribution of Australia to the Imperial Navy had been only £200,000 per annum. In 1913-14, after the new ships had been completed, the Australian Defence 'estimates amounted to £4,752,735, and of this £2,000,000 was allotted to the Navy. It is therefore literally true that under the new regime Australia's naval contribution was increased more than tenfold. 

It is also worth noticing that the entire Defence estimates first quoted - £4,752,735 - represent a larger proportional expenditure than Germany's estimate of £70,785,000 in the same year. The result was that at the outbreak of the War, the Royal Australian Navy "possessed the most powerful war vessels of any belligerent in the Pacific, save Japan. They consisted of the battle cruiser 'Australia' (19,200 tons), the light cruisers 'Sydney,' 'Melbourne,' together with fifteen destroyers, gunboats and submarines ... . .. Round Table," March, 1915. There were also the light cruisers "Encounter" and "Pioneer," which were presented to the Commonwealth by the British Admiralty.

These results and the achievements of the Australian Navy after the War began supply a further illustration, were one still needed, of the flexibility of the British Empire, and of the fact that this flexibility is one of its main causes of strength. Had she not been allowed a certain say regarding her own naval defence during the years of peace, Australia would not have been in a position, when the War began, to play her part worthily in defence of the Empire. Her failure to do this could only have caused her the most profound chagrin. 

She was saved from any such feeling by the realisation that her policy in the past had been justified of its results, and had in return justified both Australia for practising it and Great Britain for giving her the liberty to do so. The success of the Australian Navy was a fresh proof that the strength of the British Empire lies in the liberty of development it offers to each of its component parts, and in its power of showing each one how to use this liberty for the common good. The event showed that in creating a Navy of her own, Australia had been inspired by a consideration far broader and higher than provision for her own coastal safety. 

It is quite true that such safety was assured to her by the presence of the Australian Navy, and that if it had not been for its existence, Sydney and other Australian ports would certainly have been shelled at the outbreak of the War by the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau." It is quite true, too, that the operations, elsewhere described, which resulted in the capture of German New Guinea and Samoa, were of practical and immediate value to Australia herself. But it is emphatically untrue that
in conducting these operations she placed her own interest first or thought of the gain immediately accruing to her as their result. 

Her fault, if there was a fault, lay rather in the opposite direction, and took shape in an amiable and human feeling of exultation that she had at last been able to play her part worthily on the element wherein lies the Empire's greatest strength. Her own development in the Pacific had for some time been helping her to a fuller sense of her extra-territorial powers and responsibilities and to the all-importance, in this regard, of control of the sea. And now that War had come, this sense of power was quickened rather than diminished by her first action-her placing of her Navy unreservedly at the disposal ~f the British Admiralty. The subsequent operations in the Pacific show that it has been a great thing for the Empire no less than for herself that Australia has had a Navy of her own.

Although New Zealand did not follow the lead of Australia in building a Navy of her own, her contribution to the Empire's sea power was still an extremely effective one. Not many years ago she presented to the Imperial Navy a great battleship bearing her own name, which is at present stationed in the North Sea, and has given a capital account of itself in the Jutland Battle.

Immediately after the War began the Australian warships were despatched in search of the German cruisers, which were known to he somewhere in the Pacific. These consisted of the two large cruisers, the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau," a smaller cruiser, the "Nürnberg," and two other ships. It was at first believed that this fleet was sheltering at Simpson's Hafen in German New Guinea, and the "Sydney" conducted the three Australian destroyers to this port while the "Australia" and the Melbourne" closely swept the more open waters in the vicinity.

The reconnaissance of the destroyers was a work of great daring and has not yet received adequate recognition. They were ordered to pass into the harbour by night, to torpedo any warships found there, and to destroy the wireless station. It seemed most probable that the powerful German warships were lying in the great bay, but the destroyers, nothing daunted, entered it and carried their reconnaissance right up to the harbour pier. They found no warships, and when they returned to the harbour next morning they found it impossible to locate the wireless station, but their daring raid deserves chronicling as the first combatant venture of the Australian Squadron. The destroyers then returned to their base at Port Moresby, New Guinea.

Meanwhile, the "Australia" and the "Melbourne" had been convoying the New Zealand Expedition to Samoa, as heretofore described. From here the "Australia" was recalled to take part in the Rabaul Expedition. After this had succeeded, the German warships were sighted off Samoa on September 14th, and the "Australia" was consequently detained in New Guinea waters till the end of the month, lest the enemy squadron should make for that locality.

The "Melbourne" destroyed the wireless station at Nauru and then returned to Australia. The "Sydney" accounted for the wireless at Angain, in the Pellew Group.

The German cruisers, on the authority of the German Naval Office, were at the outbreak of war in the Carolines. When they beard that hostilities had been declared they steamed north and obtained coal and provisions at one of the islands. By August 19th they were at the Marshalls with the "Emden" in their company; from thence the "Emden" went west, while the remaining ships made for Samoa, hoping to find the Australian Squadron. Subsequently, they abandoned the Western Pacific and made for Tahiti, where they bombarded Papeete and then steamed to Easter Island, where they were joined by the "Dresden" and the "Leipzig." They then made for the South American coast, where on November 1st was fought the battle of Coronel, resulting in the destruction of Admiral Cradock's Squadron.

Though the Australian warships missed the German Squadron, the work they did during these months was most useful and necessary. In default of information as to the whereabouts of the German fleet it was absolutely necessary that the strongest protection should be given to the New Zealand and Australian transports.

After the Coronel disaster the "Australia" ceased her patrol work, and steamed in haste across the Pacific, where she joined with several Japanese cruisers and conducted a systematic sweeping search of the Central and South American coasts. The Minister of Defence has officially stated that "she is now where she ought to be," from this not very mysterious locality she despatched a message: 30,000 miles since the 'War began, and all is well." It may be worth noting that the "'Melbourne" covered 11,000 miles in the first six weeks of the War.

Before the destruction of the "Emden" and certain other outstanding operations are described in proper detail, the Imperial value of the Australian Navy's work in the Pacific must be once more emphasised. It has kept open all the trade routes and means of communication for all British and Allied shipping between Colombo, Singapore, the Pacific Islands, and America. Had it not been stationed in Australian waters, the German warships in the Pacific must certainly have caused devastation among British shipping. As things are, not a single British merchant ship has been molested or captured by the enemy in Australasian waters. 

But the Australian Navy may be said to have had at least some part in a greater achievement still. It did not, it is true, actually take part in the Falkland Islands' battle; but it seems most probable that but for its presence and work in the Pacific the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" and their German consorts would have remained for long in the Pacific, and would have done great harm there instead of being driven to their destruction in the Atlantic.

It must be repeated that one of the most gratifying achievements of the Australian Navy was the part it played in covering the capture of Samoa by the New Zealand forces. This co-operation was handsomely recognised by the New Zealand Government. During October the Governor General of New Zealand, Lord Liverpool, wrote to the Governor-General of Australia, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, to the effect that his Government and the people of New Zealand appreciated the privilege of being associated with the officers and men of the Australian Navy in the aforesaid operation. A still more significant tribute was paid by Mr. Massey in the House of Representatives.

His words show how imminent was the danger at one time threatening the Southern Dominions from the German fleet, and they prove also that if Australia had not possessed a separate Navy of her own, the New Zealand ports would certainly have been shelled by the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau"

On this occasion he remarked that the New Zealanders were unable to appreciate the work of the Australian Navy at its full value, because they did not know the details of the happening s of the last few months. Had the people known these details they would have thanked God there was an Australian Navy in this crisis. While unable to state particulars, he knew that some New Zealand towns would recently have been in great danger but for the protection of the Australian Navy. 

He further stated that two powerful German warships had been, once at least, not more than three days' sailing from New Zealand. Next session of Parliament would see that the Australian people were adequately thanked for the protection furnished by their fleet.

A few days later in November, Mr. Massey again referred to the services rendered to New Zealand by the Australian Navy.

He said that what had taken place during the last few weeks had convinced the bulk of the population that New Zealand should do a great deal more in regard to defence than she was now doing. He referred to what had taken place at Papeete, and said this might have happened to any one of the towns on the seaboard of New Zealand during the first few weeks of the War. New Zealand had been greatly indebted to the Australian Navy , for valuable service to New Zealand in particular and the British Empire in general. He believed that we are now out of peril so far as danger of immediate attack by sea was concerned.

Toward the end of November, similar testimony was borne by Mr. Parr, a Parliamentary candidate, who confirmed the fact that the German warships came within three days' sail of New Zealand, and would certainly have bombarded the New Zealand ports had it not been for the Australian Fleet. The "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau," he showed, were bigger and stronger than any ship in the South Pacific, except the battle cruiser "Australia." Information reached the Naval Authorities that the German Fleet was approaching, and the Australian Navy immediately got under way. 

The Germans, hearing of this, thought better of their intention and turned back. These statements, it should be noticed, are official, and they overwhelmingly refute the arguments of those who a few years before had scoffed at the creation of an Australian Fleet, and had demanded that its existence should be sunk in that of the main Imperial Navy. Had this been done, it is quite certain that the Southern Dominions would have suffered heavily on their own coasts at the hands of the German Squadron.

The statement made by Messrs. Massey and Parr as to the operations at Papeete referred to one of the most picturesque minor incidents of the war. It has already been remarked that on September 14th, 1014, about a fortnight after the capture of Samoa, the German cruisers "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" appeared off Apia and trained their guns on the town. The wireless station here at once tried to call up Fiji, or any British warships cruising in the vicinity. These signals were picked up by the Germans, who spoiled the coherence of the message. 

The "Scharnhorst" ran right into the harbour's entrance, where she stayed in one position for a considerable time. Meanwhile the mission ship, "John Williams," had heard confused sounds, and concluded that German ships were trying to destroy the British signals. She therefore sent forth signals of her own in the hope that these might reach the British or Australian warships. The Germans appear to have picked up these, and to have believed that they were in the close neighbourhood of a British Fleet. They, therefore, took their departure without firing on the town ; but the experience had been interesting and exciting.

A week later the cruisers appeared before Papeete, the capital of the French island of Tahiti, the chief of the Society Island group. This charming town, with its gardens and beautiful aspect, is the chief emporium for the trade of South Eastern Polynesia and exports mother of pearl, cotton, cocoanuts and copra. It has a fine harbour, palace, cathedral, courthouse, and is the residence of the French Governor. The "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" signalled their requests to be supplied with coal, stores and water. This was promptly refused. 

The enemy, after firing blank shells to show they were in earnest, began to bombard the town with live shell. The Governor ordered all the inhabitants, except a small military force, 'to retire inland for safety. He then prepared to block the entrance of the harbour by sinking the little steamer "Zel6e" across the passage. She was useless from a fighting point of view, but pluckily steamed forth on her act of self sacrifice. As soon, however, as the German crews got the range they sank her. The French garrison, numbering 250 men, prepared to resist to the last if the Germans attempted a landing.

There were about 2,000 tons of coal in stock, and when the bombardment commenced the garrison poured kerosene over this and set it on fire so that it might not fall into the enemy's hands. Finally the Germans, seeing that they could not affect the determination of the Governor and his garrison, steamed away.